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Evolving Joint Ventures: A Study of Dalian-Based Joint Ventures 
in the Transitional Chinese Economy 
Abstract 
This thesis attempts to explain the evolution and survival of joint ventures in the 
transitional Chinese economy. Since China 'opened its doors' to foreign direct 
investment in 1979, the inflows of capital, technology, and management skills via joint 
ventures have contributed significantly to its economic development. Joint ventures were 
unquestionably regarded as the most feasible and also the only possible strategy for 
legitimate foreign direct investment. However, evidence is presented showing that in the 
1990s, in line with China's ongoing economic reform, significant changes took place in 
the country's institutional and economic environment. Hence, the changes in its business 
environment had a strong impact on China's foreign direct investment. 
The findings of this study show that China's transitional economy has had a significant 
impact on the relaxation of state control over foreign direct investment and has seriously 
affected joint venture partners' initial power relationships and interdependency. The new 
power relationships between venture partners have driven dramatic changes in joint 
venture partners' strategies, ownership structure, and operational management. As a 
result, this study further indicate that the changes in China's business environment, 
although not the only dominant factor, have exacerbated joint ventures' internal 
difficulties and further affected joint venture partners' strategic choices, which in tum has 
led to a rapid evolution of China-based joint ventures. 
This study contributes to both the theoretical and practical understanding of the evolution 
of China-based joint ventures as they have adapted under China's economic transition 
and indicates an additional exit way out to a joint venture's eventual destination, rather 
than termination or dissolution. This study also offers areas for future research. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment is considered vital to China's transitional economy. 
Nevertheless, the research on the recent development and continuing evolvement of 
China-based joint venture has yet to emerge. In this light, this thesis studies Dalian-based 
joint ventures in China's transitional economy, with a view to enriching the existing 
literature of joint venture evolution by identifying the evolving pattems and processes of 
these joint ventures. 
1.1 Motivations of the Study 
Arguably, China is the most unusual of the transitional economies. It is the largest, the 
fastest growing, and the most heavily engaged in intemational business and investment. 
On the other hand, China is also unusual because its transition continues to be planned by 
the state and is subject to the active involvement of govemmental institutions in business 
activities (Child and Tse 2001). China's distinctiveness and its relevance to the study of 
intemational joint ventures are fundamental for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
characteristics of China's business system generate uncertainties for the intemational 
joint ventures and these aspects are significant because of its size and its growing 
engagement with the intemational economy (Luo 2000). Secondly, the nature of China's 
economic transition arguably challenges the principle of present intemational joint 
venture theory (Peng 2000). 
According to the official statistics from China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation, 1 between 1979 and 2002, all levels of Chinese govemment approved a total 
of 424,196 projects of foreign direct investment, with the creation of about 25 million 
jobs. The growth of foreign direct investment becomes increasingly crucial for China's 
transitional economy. As refonns continue, state priorities and policies towards foreign 
direct investment have been changing over time. 
1 Website of Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China- www.mofcom.gov.cn (2002) 
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Many researchers (Daniels 1985; Campbell 1986; Kogut 1988; Campbell 1988; Kogut 
1989; Parke 1993; Ring and Van de Yen 1994; Gulati 1995; Gray and Yan 1997; Yan 
and Luo 2001) have examined the political, economic, social, cultural, and legal aspects 
of doing business in China. Others (Boisot 1990; Aiello 1991; Beamish 1993; Ding 1993; 
Bjorkman 1994; Child 1994; Hamilton 1997; Chen 1998; Walsh 1999; Luo 2000) have 
identified firm-level factors of success, such as the venture's size, equity shares, prior 
international business experience, operation and management. Nevertheless, to some 
extent, previous studies of China-based joint ventures are locked into looking at the 
theories and strategies for market entry and operational management, including 
negotiation and formation of joint ventures, joint operations and mutual adaptation 
between partners/government/local authorities, methods of coping with cross-cultural 
difficulties and, finally, the instability and termination of joint ventures, which focuses on 
changes in ownership structure, and reorganisation or contractual renegotiation. In short, 
previous studies went into great depth in identifying factors contributing to joint venture 
success or instability. 
China's economic transition is different in many aspects from that of other developing 
countries. The characteristic of the transitional Chinese economy is felt to have had some 
impact on the evolution of China-based joint ventures. However, it is not yet clear how 
China-based joint ventures have evolved over time, and whether some evolutionary 
patterns can be established. So far no one has attempted to identify a pattern in this 
regard. 
For more than two decades, China-based joint ventures have evolved along with their 
dramatic changes in China's business environment. The development of international 
joint ventures is a multi-faceted process and one in which joint ventures have to respond 
to environmental changes (Craig and Douglas 1996). This thesis therefore attempts to 
investigate the changes in China's business environment and their impacts on 
international joint ventures. It then will identify major changes in joint ventures and the 
process of their evolution in the transitional Chinese economy. 
2 
Introduction Chapter I 
1.2 Aims of the Thesis 
Given the above considerations, this thesis aims to investigate the impact of China's 
economic transition on state policy towards foreign direct investment in terms of whether 
and to what extent joint ventures are affected by the changes in China's business 
environment and are evolving as a result. It also aims to make a theoretical contribution 
to the literature in this field by presenting a systematic account of the evolutionary pattern 
of China-based joint ventures with a justifiable interpretation. In particular, the questions 
to be addressed include: 
1. To what extent has China changed state controls over foreign direct investment, 
especially for joint ventures? 
2. Are there now significant changes in partners' strategies, ownership structure, and 
operational management in China-based joint ventures? 
3. To what extent are these ventures evolving as a result? 
4. What best characterises the resulting patterns of evolution of these joint ventures? 
This thesis will not focus on whether or to what extent, China has benefited economically 
from China-based joint ventures. Rather, it seeks to examine why and how China-based 
joint ventures have evolved over time and the implications of this evolution for the future 
development of international businesses in China. 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. After this introduction, Chapter Two reviews the 
literature on international joint ventures and establishes a theoretical platform for 
understanding the evolution of international joint ventures. Chapter Three presents an 
overview of the development of China-based joint ventures in the 1980s and the 1990s, 
and reflects both the official Chinese and the Western perspectives. It also reviews the 
literature on recent changes in China's business environment and their impact on 
international joint ventures. It then develops a framework for analysing the findings of 
3 
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this research. Chapter Four introduces the main research theme and the methodology 
employed for gathering essential data and discusses the problems encountered in the 
course of this study. Chapter Five and Chapter Six present the research findings from the 
questionnaire survey and in-depth personal interviews that were carried out in China. In 
Chapter Seven, the quantitative and qualitative findings are discussed using the research 
framework established in Chapter Four. Chapter Eight concludes the thesis and suggests 
areas for future research. 
4 
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Chapter 2 International Joint Ventures 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter defines international joint ventures and explains why managmg such 
ventures can be particularly challenging compared with managing domestic enterprises. 
Secondly, it attempts to develop a framework that allows the investigation into the 
development process of international joint ventures - motives for joint venture formation, 
joint venture ownerships, joint venture partners, joint venture operation, and finally, the 
evolution of international joint ventures. 
2.1 International Joint Ventures- The Model Framework 
2.1.1 International Joint Ventures Defined 
International joint ventures are broadly defined as companies that involve firms from 
different countries cooperating across national and cultural boundaries (Killing 1982; 
Cundiff 1984; Beamish 1985; Campbell 1988; Harrigan 1988; Kotler 1991; Yan and Luo 
2001). Pfeffer and Nowak (1976) and Anderson (1990) note that equity joint ventures are 
legally and economically separate organisational entities created by two or more parent 
organisations that collectively invest financial as well as other resources in order to 
pursue certain objectives. Beamish (1988) defines international joint ventures as shared-
equity undertakings between two or more parties, each of which holds at least five per 
cent ofthe equity. 
In their pioneering study on joint ventures, Friedman and Kalmanoff (1961) adopted a 
very broad definition of a joint venture as "any type of association which implies 
collaboration for more than a transitory period". Tomlinson (1970) added that the 
partners collaborating in that association are legally separate and collaborate for their 
mutual benefit. He also stressed that the establishment of a new entity was involved, as 
distinct from Friedman and Kalmanoff s (1961) earlier definition. Harrigan (1984, 1985) 
considered that a joint venture is a 'partnership in which two or more firms create an 
5 
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entity to carry out a productive economic activity and take an active role in decision-
making, if not also in operations.' Harrigan (1984, 1985), Kogut (1988) and Hennart 
( 1988) highlighted the importance of management participation. Various authors (Killing 
1983; Harrigan 1984; Oman 1984; Beamish and Banks 1987; Contractor and Lorange 
1988; Kogut 1988; Hennart 1988; Gomes-Casseres 1989; Young et al. 1989; 
Lichtenberger and Naulleau 1993; and Laughton 1995) considered the creation of a 
separate legal entity as essential for the definitional existence of a joint venture, though 
this is not essential for the existence of a joint venture. 
Kogut (1988) stated that international joint venture is a means to resolve competitive 
conflicts inherent in economic relations or to achieve the competitive positioning of firms 
relative to rivals, including buyers and suppliers. However, joint ventures perform 
another role in addition to resolving or affecting competitive factors, namely, as vehicles 
by which knowledge is transferred and by which firms learn from each other (Kogut 
1988). 
Yan and Luo (200 1) further emphasised that although an overwhelming majority of 
international joint ventures involved only two parent firms, one from a foreign country 
and the other from the local country, some ventures may consist of multiple participants, 
with more complex national or cultural backgrounds. For example, Thermo King Dalian 
Transport Refrigeration Ltd. is a joint venture formed between Thermo King Transport 
Refrigeration Ltd. (USA), Dalian Refrigeration Works, Shenzhen Telex Group Co. Ltd. 
and Santoso Holdings (Hong Kong) Company. 
Previous studies (Harrigan 1984; 1985; Kogut 1988; Hem1art 1988) indicated that joint 
ventures are the most active and popular form of international economic co-operation in 
the modem world. In the international business field it is clear that joint venture is a most 
flexible tool, which can tum an impossible project into a possible one. But others 
(Davidson 1987; Beamish 1989; Boisot and Child 1990; Aiello 1991; Bjorhman and 
Schaap 1994; Child 1994; Hamill and Pambos 1997; Cui 1998; Selmer 1999; Wong 
1999; Yan and Luo 2001) claimed that joint ventures involve the most complicated 
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management requirements, hence operations are also difficult, especially in the Chinese 
context. 
• Complexities in International Joint Ventures 
Among the different fom1s of inter-organisational relations, joint ventures are unique and 
arguably the most complex type of arrangement, because they deal not only with multiple 
goals and objectives, but also mutually non-congruent or even conflicting expectations of 
the partners. Anderson (1990), Yan and Gray (1994) suggested that international joint 
ventures involve a far more complex set of organisational entities as stakeholders than 
independent firms do. In addition to the 'regular' constituency group such as suppliers, 
customers, creditors, government agencies, and employees, an international joint venture 
involves at least two different partners, the venture's own management and the national 
and local government agencies in different countries, each holding distinct stakes in and 
placing different demands on the partnership. 
The argument is that as legally and economically independent organisations, joint 
ventures operate like stand-alone firms and have to engage in all the different types of 
'regular' business activity and external relationships that any independent firm has to 
undertake. However, more complex than those independent firms, joint ventures 
inevitably involve multiple 'internal' inter-organisational relationships: the relationship 
between the partner firms, the venture management's relationship with the foreign parent 
and with the local parent, and the relationship between the venture's managers nominated 
by different partners. Each of these relationships can be difficult to manage. 
Above all, international joint ventures represent inter-cultural and inter-organisational 
linkage between two separate parent companies that join forces with different strategic 
interests and objectives (Yan and Luo 2001). Joint venture parents, unlike the multiple 
shareholders of a public corporation, are visible and powerful, and can and will disagree 
on just about anything (Killing 1983). 
7 
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o Previous Research Models on International Joint Ventures 
Killing (1983) addressed the different issues that make a joint venture succeed or fail 
with a model that revolves around issues of control and incorporates elements such as 
performance, techniques of joint venture control, partner selection, staffing, reward 
systems, production flows and management. The limitations of his model are that it does 
not address the issue of diverging strategic expectations of joint venture partners, which 
could have a strong impact on joint operation. 
Harrigan (1985) presented an early framework for joint venture research, in terms of the 
relationship between the partners in a joint venture, between the parents and the joint 
venture, and between the joint venture and its competitive environment. She allocated a 
variety of factors to the individual elements of her model, which determine the bargaining 
power of the parent firms on issues including benefits, costs, resources, alternatives, 
needs and barriers. Harrigan's ( 1985) model further suggested that a joint venture, as the 
bargaining agreement, covers outputs, inputs, control mechanisms and the duration or 
stability of the agreement. It incorporates a dynamic element, so-called change stimuli 
that influence the stability of the joint venture and the timing of changes. These stimuli 
include changes in the parents' strategic mission, in the importance of the joint venture to 
the parent, in parent firm bargaining power, in the sector of the industry, in the 
effectiveness of joint ventures as a competitive strategy, and in the joint venture's need 
for autonomous activities. 
For application in this thesis, Harrigan's model is appropriate for several reasons. First, 
this model emphasises the relevance of success with regard to the joint venture and its 
competitive environment. Secondly, although the model does not emphasise differences 
of strategic expectations between joint venture partners, it does define the joint venture as 
crucial for the bargaining agreement or the compromise agreement, which implicates 
different strategies between joint venture partners. Nevertheless, the main limitation of 
the model is that it confines itself to competing in mature markets - the US market in her 
case. Its application to situations where emerging markets are being serviced has not yet 
been tested. 
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In an effort to draw together the main findings within the vast and growing literature, 
Parkhe (1993) identified four major areas of research on international joint ventures: the 
motives for joint venture formation, partner selection, governance and control, and joint 
venture performance and stability. He further argued that although some of these areas 
have received enormous research attention, others continue to be under-studied or 
virtually ignored. In particular, the choice of organisational structure, alliance structure 
design, and dynamic evolution of the cooperative relationship represent the three major 
areas awaiting deeper theoretical insights. Yan and Luo (2001) recently emphasised 
diverging strategic expectations together with cross-cultural differences, incongruent 
organisational strategies, structures, and operational processes between partner firms as 
sources of inter-partner conflict, which in tum lead to the venture's instability and affect 
its performance. They also argue that the dynamic evolution of international joint 
ventures needs in-depth study. 
In this study, Killing (1083), Harrigan (1985) and Parkhe's (1993) research models are 
adopted and modified as a framework to guide the fieldwork for data collection: joint 
venture formation motives, joint venture ownership, joint venture partners, joint venture 
operation, and joint venture instability. Yan and Luo's (2001) model of joint venture 
reconfiguration is also adopted for the analysis of data collected from the marketplace in 
China. 
2.1.2 Joint Venture Formation Motives 
Why do firms choose joint ventures to conduct international business? Previous studies 
have offered a variety of theoretical perspectives on the formation incentives of 
international joint ventures, ranging from economic theories to organisation theories and 
game theory (Harrigan 1985; Beamish 1988; Datta 1988; Kogut 1988; Shenkar 1990; 
Hamel1991; Kim 1996; Yan and Luo 2001). 
The following is a summary of several of the most prominent reasons for formation of 
international joint ventures, namely, government policy, gaining access to overseas 
markets, risk sharing, the tapping of outside resources, and strategic behaviours. 
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o Government Policy 
Although the push for multinational firms to make direct foreign investment may come 
from forces associated with products and markets, many intemational joint ventures 
result from the pull by host govemments. According to previous studies (Beamish 1985; 
Harrigan 1985; Datta 1988; Pearson 1989; Yan and Luo 2001), govemments, particularly 
in developing countries, exert pressure on multinational companies to use the form of 
equity joint ventures rather than wholly owned subsidiaries. For the foreign firm, a joint 
venture with a local organisation, whether business or govemmental, may be required in 
order to enter these countries. Shenkar (1990) argued that there are, in fact, various other 
ways of developing new markets and acquiring raw materials, rather than through the 
formation of joint ventures. Nevertheless, a host govemment's insistence can lead to the 
formation of joint ventures. 
Beamish (1985) demonstrated that developed countries and developing countries 
represent different extemal environments, with the latter being a more complex and 
difficult one in which to establish and manage a joint venture. Beamish (1985) examined 
characteristics, including reasons for joint venture formation, autonomy, stability, 
performance, frequency of govemment partners and ownership, while placing particular 
emphasis on ownership and control and their relationship to performance. He discovered 
that joint ventures in developed countries and developing countries differ in eight 
characteristics. In his studies, 64 per cent of joint ventures in developed countries were 
created because each partner needed the other partner's skills, whilst only 38 per cent of 
the joint ventures in developing countries were created for this reason. Moreover, 17 per 
cent of the joint ventures in the developed countries sample were created as the result of 
host govemment mandate, while 57 per cent of joint ventures in developing countries 
were created for this reason. Many developing countries seek to maintain their national 
identities by protecting and controlling economic activities within their borders 
(Reynolds 1984). 
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11 Gaining Access to Overseas Markets 
Gaining access to overseas markets has been a classic reason for firms to form joint 
ventures. This is true for both the multinational and the local pminer firm (Y an and Luo 
2001). On the one hand, one advantage of a joint venture is that a foreign firm can 
piggyback on a local partner to gain access to the local market. On the other hand, in 
many cases, it is also the aim of the local partner to gain access to the international 
market. In his study of 52 Indian/US joint ventures, Reynolds (1984) discovered that the 
Indian partner hoped to export in order to generate foreign exchange for the import of 
equipment, whereas the US partner aimed at entering the market with a broad product 
line that would have competed against products already offered by the Indian partner's 
sister companies. 
• Risk Sharing of Market Entry 
Risk sharing is another frequently observed motive for forming international joint 
ventures. First, if an investment project is financially too large or too risky for single 
firms to handle alone, they may join forces to share the financial risk. This is the case 
with oil exploration and commercial aircraft manufacturing where large, risky projects 
call for inter-firm collaboration. Second, if the business environment in a host country is 
highly uncertain or unfriendly to foreign firms, a joint venture with a local firm may 
allow a multinational company to share political risks and to defuse xenophobic local 
reactions, a strategic action to amend the 'liability of foreignness' (Yan and Luo 2001). 
Datta (1998) also stressed that motivations for setting up international joint ventures also 
included the sharing of heightened economic risks in new joint ventures, satisfying 
nationalistic demands and reducing risks of expropriation, and maintaining good relations 
with host governments. 
• Tapping of Outside Resources 
Formation of international joint ventures allows a firm to tap outside resources in order to 
build competitive strength at significantly reduced costs - with capital investment much 
lower than if the firm either developed it alone or achieved it through acquisition. For 
example, access to a partner's technology enables a firm to enjoy the fruits of research 
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and development while avoiding the rapidly increasing R & D costs. According to Kaiser 
(1998) and Contractor and Lorange (1988), in the international joint venture context, 
foreign firn1s join forces with local partners for their knowledge of business practices, 
consumer behaviour, distribution networks and legislation. They join forces to generate 
economies of scale, exchange technology, overcome government-mandated trade or 
investment barriers, and to facilitate initial international expansion of inexperienced 
firms. The local partner is expected to bring in financial, technical and human resources 
that eventually reduce the foreign firm's resource commitment. 
Yan and Luo (2001) argue that in addition to cost considerations, joint venturing is an 
effective, if not the most effective, avenue for companies in developing countries to learn 
about new business processes and to catch up with the substantial technological 
advantages possessed by their counterparts in developed economies. Harrigan (1985), 
Habib (1987), Bieszki and Rath (1988) also established that local partners frequently 
want to import sophisticated technologies and brand names, whereas host governments 
and foreign finns might want to establish joint ventures in order to use technologies that 
exploit the country's low-cost labour. 
• Strategic Behaviour 
Kogut (1988) argued that joint ventures were formed for strategic reasons, to enhance 
their competitive positioning in the market. From this perspective, the ultimate objective 
is to maximize profits through improving the venture's competitive position rather than 
minimizing costs. Harrigan (1988) argued that the increasing use of joint ventures 
represents an exciting change in competitive behaviour that enables managers to build 
strengths for their firms' business units. By forming joint ventures, firms can change 
industry structures to the disadvantage of competitors. She further states that different 
industry characteristics, such as demand growth, market attractiveness, market 
standardisation, and uncertainty, as well as competitor traits, can affect the strategic use 
of joint ventures. 
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Raveed and Renforth's study (1983) of US joint ventures in Costa Rica cited the need to 
keep operational control of the joint venture as one of the most important motives for 
forming joint ventures, in addition to obtaining country-related knowledge, reducing the 
risk of expropriation, and obtaining favourable government treatment in areas of taxation, 
protective tariffs, foreign exchange, and input permits. 
Within the strategic behaviour thesis of joint venture forn1ation, a most recent and rapidly 
expanding argument is organisational learning (Yan and Luo 2001). This explanation 
views joint venture as a mean by which firms learn from their partners to build their own 
capabilities. In this view, joint venture partners are driven by the motive of acquiring 
knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge. Hamel (1991) in particular, argued that the 
sponsors of joint ventures form horizontal alliances to extract and internalise the skills 
and competencies of their partners, and thus either strengthen their own competitive 
position or erode the competitive advantage of their partners. This learning-oriented 
motive for forn1ing joint ventures, however, can create significant inter-partner 
competition and conflict, which in turn can destabilise joint ventures. Moreover, this 
motive could hardly be regarded as a long-term strategy. 
2.1.3 Joint Venture Ownership and Control 
(1) Joint Venture Ownership Structure 
According to Child, Yan and Lu (1997), m formal tenns, ownership is the legal 
possession of assets. It is normally defined in terms of three fundamental rights: to 
possess an asset or its financial value; to exercise influence over the use of the asset; to 
possess inforn1ation about what is owned. Yan and Gray (1994) regard equity as the 
provision of a capital resource to a joint venture by its partner companies; this is usually 
financial, but sometimes comprises land, buildings, and plant. They distinguished the 
equity resources and what they categorised as 'non-capital resources' (Yan and Gray 
1996). A comprehensive concept of ownership applicable to international joint ventures 
would incorporate equity and contractual and non-contractual inputs (Yan 1994). The 
distinction between the three types of resources is likely to be significant for the 
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understanding of joint venture control because of the different nature and scope of the 
power that stems from each type of resource (Yan and Gray 1996). 
The ownership stmcture of an international joint venture is generally defined by the 
division of the equity investment in the joint venture among the sponsoring firms. From 
the perspective of each individual joint venture partner, there are three generic types of 
ownership stmcture to choose from: (1) majority ownership, (2) minority ownership, and 
(3) equal split of ownership (50-50 per cent in the case of two partners). Not surprisingly, 
each stmcture has its strengths as well as it own problems (Killing 1983; Lecraw 1984; 
Beamish 1985; Yan 1993; Yan and Gray 1994; Yan and Luo 2001). 
Joint venture ownership has a strong effect on risk sharing and resource commitment of 
the partners, and on the vulnerability and strategic flexibility of the joint venture. The 
ownership stmcture in a particular joint venture may also have an impact on the firm's 
overall strategy with respect to its strategic control over joint ventures, bargaining power 
with local interests and joint venture operations (Yan and Luo 2001). 
(2) Joint Venture Control 
Control is the authority over operational and strategic decision-making (Hill et al. 1990). 
It is the ability to influence operational systems, methods and decisions (Anderson and 
Gatignon 1986) and a continuing adjustment to given and changing conditions, not a one-
time intervention (Miles and Snow 1984). Control plays an important role in the capacity 
of a firm to achieve its goals with joint operations (Davidson 1987; Geringer and Hebert 
1989; Young et al. 1989). Geringer and Hebert ( 1989) suggest that control refers to the 
process by which one-entity influences, to varying degrees, the behaviour and output of 
another entity through the use of power, authority, and a wide range of bureaucratic, 
cultural, and informal mechanisms. 
(3) Relationships between Ownership and Control 
According to the economics literature, ownership serves as a mechanism to claim 
'residual rights of control'- the right to make decisions concerning an asset's use that is 
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not explicitly stipulated by law or contract (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). A parent firm 
can use ownership as a leverage to protect its firm-specific capabilities. Because these 
capabilities are often intangible, a crucial factor determining the returns a parent can 
expect is its degree of control over the venture's operation. Blodgett (1991) argued that 
many Western companies have corporate policies that prevent the firm from contributing 
proprietary resources to minority-owned joint ventures. Therefore, firms increase their 
ownership holdings in joint ventures in order to protect their non-equity, proprietary 
resources committed to the joint venture. Lecraw (1984), Anderson and Gatignon (1986), 
and Yan (1993) shared a similar view that the choice of a desired level of ownership 
reflects the interplay between the firm's desire to secure control and its attitudes towards 
investment risks. Although the exercise of managerial control over a joint venture can be 
gained also through non-equity-based mechanisms, ownership control remains the most 
significant determinant of management control. 
Based on the results of their investigations into sixty-seven Sino-foreign joint ventures,· 
Y an and Gray ( 1996) suggested two distinctions relating to international joint venture 
ownership and control. The first distinction is that between contractual and non-
contractual ownership resourcing, and the second is that between strategic and 
operational control. The relationship between international joint venture ownership and 
control is found to be sensitive to these distinctions. 
The ownership structure is expected to have a significant effect on the structure of control 
over the joint venture's operations. Killing (1983), Lecraw (1984), Yan and Gray (1994) 
differentiated ownership control and managerial control at the conceptual level. 
However, Yan and Luo remarked that empirically, a joint venture's ownership structure 
has been found to be a critical factor in the structure of managerial control exercised by 
the partners. For example, in Killing's (1983) study of joint ventures in developed 
countries, 70 per cent of the 'dominant control' ventures were majority owned by the 
managerially dominant partner. Using the same research framework, Beamish (1985) 
found that 76 per cent of the 'shared control' joint ventures were equally owned by their 
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parent firms. Lecraw (1984) and Yan (1993) each found a significant positive correlation 
between the two variables, 0.57 and 0.60, respectively. 
When operating in a highly complex, dynamic environment, an international joint venture 
tends to be more vulnerable to environmental changes and conflict between partners. 
Environmental change and uncertainty become serious external threats to the structure of 
joint venture ownership. Nevertheless, the limitation of the existing body of literature on 
the ownership of international joint ventures is that although control and ownership do 
not necessarily have to correspond, none of previous studies argued that with the external 
environment changes, whether joint venture ownership structure could be quietly 
(unofficially) transferred between venture partners, even the transfer was restricted by 
host government laws and regulations. 
2.1.4 Joint Venture Partners 
It is widely assumed that firms establish joint ventures only when the perceived 
additional benefits from joint venturing outweigh expected extra costs (Beamish and 
Banks 1987; Geringer 1991). These additional benefits will accrue, however, only 
through the selection and retention of a partner that can provide the complementary skills, 
competencies, and capabilities that assist the local firm to accomplish its strategic 
objectives (Buckley and Casson 1988; Harrigan 1985; and Hamel 1991). From the 
complementary needs perspective, partner selection determines the right mix of strategic 
resources within an international joint venture (Hamel et al. 1989; Prahalad 1989; 
Harrigan 1985). In a dynamic market particularly, the importance of partner selection to 
the success of the partnership is magnified, because the right partner can spur the 
adaptability of the joint venture, improve the strategy-environment configuration for both 
the venture and the parent firms, and reduce uncertainty in the venture's operation 
(Teagarden and Von Glinow 1990; Zeira and Shenkar 1990). 
A desirable local partner can make it possible to invest in industries that are subject to 
local government restrictions against foreign direct investment, and can help a 
multinational firm gain access to marketing and distribution channels that are available 
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only to local businesses. In addition, a well-connected local partner can significantly 
reduce local political risks and gain political advantages in the host country. For the local 
firm, on the other hand, selection of an appropriate foreign pariner is also critical. A 
desirable foreign partner can bring to the joint venture advanced technologies, know-how, 
management expertise, and channels to the international marketplace (Geringer 1988; 
1991; Hamel1991; Yan and Luo 2001). 
Previous literature (Beamish 1987; Scherer and Ross 1990; Zeira and Shenkar 1990; 
Parkhe 1991; 1993, Geringer 1991; Hamel1991; Ellis and Shenkar 1996; Li and Shenkar 
1996; Yan and Luo 2001) created an inter-partner fit model for international joint venture 
partner selection. This depends on the complementarity and congruence of the strategic, 
organisational, and financial traits of the partners. Strategic fit refers to the degree to 
which international joint venture partners are congruent to or complement one another's 
strategies and capabilities in the light of industry, market, products, customer, capital, or 
technology-related issues. Organisational fit is the match between each partner's 
administrative practices, control mechanisms, cultural practices, and personnel 
characteristics, which may directly affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
partnership. Conceptually, both strategic and organisational strengths are crucial for joint 
venture performance. A partner with superior strategic traits but lacking organisational 
strength can make the joint venture unstable, while the possession of desirable 
organisational attributes without corresponding strategic competence leaves the joint 
venture unprofitable (Parkhe 1993; Ellis and Shankar 1996; Li and Shenkar 1996). 
Finally, financial fit concerns the degree of match in cash-flow position and capital 
structure between partners. Profitability is usually one of the major operational 
objectives for joint venture partners. Failure to achieve it will give rise to venture 
instability, inter-partner conflict, and even dissolution. 
However, the limitation of the inter-partner fit model was that it did not address the 
interrelationship between strategic, organisational, and financial fits. Secondly, the 
existing literature on joint venture partner selection focuses only on the mutual adaptation 
between joint venture partners, and neglects competition between joint venture partners. 
17 
International Joint Ventures Chapter 2 
The existing literature also fails to address the negative impact of the local joint venture 
partner may bring to the foreign partner once the original 'joint strategy' splits and goes 
in different directions. For example, a good relationship between a local partner and local 
government might cause even more damage to the foreign partner when things go wrong 
within the joint venture, as frequently happens in China-based joint ventures. 
Most joint ventures are formed on the assumption that each of the partner firms will 
provide organisational strengths that are needed by other partners. However, false 
expectations about partner capabilities can cause problems within joint ventures, 
sometimes leading to termination. Since the partners fully expect the resources they 
contribute to the venture to be effective, when one or both partners' presumed 
competencies or strengths fail to generate the expected results, joint ventures have to 
confront the risk of dissolution. The wider the perceived gap between what partners 
pledged and what they actually deliver, the greater the difficulties for the joint venture. 
2.1.5 Joint Venture Operation 
The success or failure of an international joint venture depends largely on the joint 
operation (Datta 1988; Lane and Beamish 1990). Compared with wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises, joint ventures are much more difficult to operate (Rugman et al. 1985), since 
in a joint venture more than one firm is involved in decision-making. The behavioural, 
cultural and administrative differences among joint venture partners make joint operation 
a demanding and difficult task. For example, a foreign management team might have a 
different attitude towards strategies, style of operation and management, workforce 
recruitment, business opportunities and risks than the local partner, and the corporate 
decision-making would then be affected (Killing 1982, 1983). Killing (1983) established. 
that operations in dominant parent joint ventures, shared management joint ventures and 
independent joint ventures are all different. Schann (1988) found that, ofthese, the shared 
management joint ventures are the most difficult to manage. 
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(1) Congruence of Strategic Objectives 
Joint venture operation depends on congruence between the two sets of strategic 
objectives of the partners in respect to the particular joint venture. Compatible partner 
interests are a primary factor in joint venture's successful operation (Tomlinson and 
Thmpson 1997; Inkpen and Currall1998). 
Congruence of joint venture partners' strategic objectives does not necessarily require 
commonality, however, although perfect congruence occurs when both partners share a 
common set of strategic objectives. However, Yan and Luo (2001) argued that a high 
level of congruence could also be reached when the partners' goals were different but 
complementary. Complementary goals occur when the foreign partner is interested in 
penetrating an underdeveloped country market for a specific product, while the local 
partner is currently importing the product but desires to manufacture it locally. Conflicts 
of interest and incongruent strategic objectives between joint venture partners are not 
uncommon, however, in which case it is difficult for the joint venture to satisfy both 
partners. 
(2) Complementarity of Resources 
Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) argues that firms cooperate to 
enter into joint ventures for critical resources. The interdependence between joint venture 
partners in terms of skills and competencies entails the notion of complementarity 
(Harrigan 1986). Chi (1994) stated that "complementarity exists between two sets of 
resources when a joint use of them can potentially yield a higher total return than the sum 
of returns that can be earned if each set of resources are used independently of the other". 
In more specific terms, Hill and Hellriegel (1994) argued that complementarity occurs 
"only when the partners bring distinctive competencies that are different and non-
overlapping," thereby stressing the 'non-redundant' nature of partner resources. 
For achieving their strategic goals, each joint venture partner will make great efforts to 
influence joint venture operations. The top management team is a highly focused issue as 
most parent firms attempt to manoeuvre their own personnel into the joint venture, owing 
19 
International Joint Ventures Chapter 2 
either to their work expenence or to ~ost considerations. Lane and Beamish (1990) 
argued that the decision whether to recruit a large proportion of local managers depends 
upon the joint ownership position of foreign partners. Killing (1983) found that dominant 
parent joint ventures do not employ managers from their passive parents, whereas, in 
order to enhance information flow and to capture the skills of parent companies, shared 
management joint ventures employ managers from both sides. 
The joint venture management's objectives are important to its operation. Dymsza (1988) 
noted that a key factor that leads to success or failure of a joint venture is achievement of 
the major goals set for the joint venture management. Although theoretically it is ideal 
that these goals integrate the goals of both parents in a congruent manner, in many cases, 
the joint venture management's goals stand as a separate system existing in parallel with 
the parents' goal sets. 
It is worthwhile noting that marketing considerations play a pnmary role when 
international finns evaluate the joint venture approach. Lack of local market knowledge 
is usually the foreign firm's major disadvantage when entering a host country, such as 
China, in which the cultural background and business practices are unique. Therefore, 
joining with a national firm may be the best way to obtain the critical local marketing 
skills and contacts as well as distribution channels. A local partner can usually provide 
quick access through its existing market position. 
Yan and Luo (2001) developed a refined model for the assessment of joint venture 
operation to take into consideration inter-partner fit both at the time of founding and 
during the post-formation dynamics. This model predicates: (1) joint venture partners' 
strategic objectives; (2) contribution of critical resources; (3) agreement upon the 
ventures' operation strategy, policies, and culture; (4) the structure of the partners' 
relative bargaining power and control over the venture's operation. 
The existing literature on the operation and management of international joint ventures 
had paid significant attention to the fits or how to make the fits within joint venture 
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strategic objectives, in organisational structure, and in inter-partner relationship. 
However, it has paid very little attention to the misfits within joint venture partners' 
strategic objectives, organisational structure, and inter-partner relationship, especially, the 
subsequent manoeuvres of each joint venture partner if a misfit takes place. None of 
these aspects has been fully addressed. 
2.2 International Joint Venture Evolution 
For the purpose of a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamic evolution of 
international joint ventures, this section firstly gives a brief review of existing literature 
on the development of international joint ventures. It then introduces theoretical 
discussions on joint venture instability. Finally, it introduces the theory of joint venture 
structural reconfiguration by presenting both the driving and the restraining forces for 
restructuring over the course of joint venture development. 
2.2.1 Joint Venture Development 
Joint ventures, like any organisation, undergo a cycle of creation, institutionalisation, and, 
with high probability, termination (Kought 1988). The existing literature has paid 
significant attention to the early stages of joint venture development, such as formation. 
Researchers have focused on comparing joint ventures with other entry modes and on the 
associated incentive schemes from the foreign firm's perspective (Anderson and 
Gatignon 1986; Beamish and Banks 1987; Hennart 1988, Gomes-Casseres 1990; Hill, 
Hwang and Kim 1990; Tallman and Shenkar 1994; Li 1995; Chi and Mcguire 1996; 
Nordberg, Cambell and Verbeke 1996), selection of appropriate partners and/or parent 
control structures (Tomlinson 1970; Killing 1983; Harrigan 1986; Geringer 1988; 
Gerigner and Hebert 1989), and formulation of strategies for, and management of joint 
venture negotiations (Tung 1984; 1988; Weiss 1987, 1990). 
These research streams have generated useful insights into conditions leading to joint 
venture formation, and have inhanced our understanding about a series of important 
decisions regarding alternative organisational designs, partner selection, control 
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structures, and negotiation strategies. Previous studies that have examined joint ventures 
beyond the formation stage have, with few exceptions (Killing 1983; Blodgett 1992), 
focused on the termination of joint ventures, such as acquisition, liquidation, or 
bankruptcy, in order to characterise venture instability. Hence, the argument is that the 
existing literature on joint venture development has only focused on the formation (and 
termination) of international joint ventures, whilst missing the most exciting and arguably 
the most challenging implementation part of their development. Studying the 
development process by which international joint ventures evolve over time promises to 
be one of the most important areas in the research into international joint ventures. In 
supporting this argument, Yan and Luo (2001) also argued that the dynamic development 
of joint ventures after their establishment is not sufficiently understood, along with the 
evolving process by which the joint operation relationship between the partners unfolds. 
Another critical aspect of joint ventures concerns changes in joint venture control 
structure over time. Because of the potential effect of control structure on venture 
performance, it is particularly important to study the process of structural change. 
Previous researchers (Hamilton and Singh 1991; Yan and Gray 1994; Doz 1996; Inkpen 
and Beamish 1997; Yan and Luo 2001) examined the specific forces driving toward or 
against structural reconfiguration. They identified that, in the process of development, 
joint ventures change their structure of governance over time, so that significant 
reallocations of management control occur between the partners. A joint venture is 
structurally unstable if control over its strategic and operational management shifts 
frequently between the partners. However, it is structurally more stable if its control 
structure remains unchanged for extended periods of time. 
Nevertheless, changes in corporate strategies always transform an organisation (Johnson 
and Scholes 1993; Mintsberb; Ahlstrand and Lampel 1998). As changes in the control 
structure of a joint venture often imply changes in the overall joint venture strategies, it is 
therefore logical to think that a joint venture may evolve or be transformed into another 
business form, or to some extent, that there should be certain evolving patterns, in the 
context of the change in control structure of joint ventures. Obviously, previous studies 
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on joint venture development (Hamilton and Singh 1991; Yan and Gray 1994; Doz 1996; 
Inkpen and Beamish 1997; Y an and Luo 2001) failed to address this issue. 
2.2.2 Joint Venture Instability 
An international joint venture as a transitional form of organisation is inherently unstable 
in design (Davidson 1982; Porter 1990). The additional complexity of an international 
joint venture is that its creation is the product of two or more existing firms, which jointly 
exercise control by right of equity ownership. Harrigan (1986) concluded that joint 
ventures are a transitional form of management - an intermediate step on the way to 
something else. Thus, it is a widely accepted premise that international joint ventures 
represent an inherently unstable and problematic form of organisation (Franko 1971; 
Porter 1990; Das and Teng 1999). 
In the context of the dynamic nature of international joint ventures, reported instability 
rates within international joint ventures have ranged from 25 to 75 per cent (Chowdhury 
1988; Geringer and Hebert 1991; Blodgett 1992; Lee and Beamish 1995; Makino 1995; 
Hennart, Park and Russo 1996; Park and Ungson 1997; Kim and Zeng 1998). For joint 
ventures formed in developing or transforming economies, the turbulent political and 
economic environments, together with the inter-cultural and inter-organisational 
dynamics, have made managing international joint ventures particularly challenging 
(Reynolds 1979; Child and Markoczy 1993; Beamish 1993; Peng and Heath 1996). 
Previous studies on the instability of international joint ventures have employed two 
major approaches: (1) an outcome-oriented approach, which characterises instability as 
termination of joint ventures through various avenues or as change in the partners' 
ownership structure and (2) a process-oriented approach, which defines instability as 
major reorganisations or contractual renegotiations (Yan and Luo 2001). 
(1) Instability as Termination or Change in Ownership Structure 
The dominant approach treats instability as termination of the joint venture or change in 
its ownership structure. This approach was originated in Franko's (1971) pioneering 
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study of U.S. manufacturing joint ventures abroad and was later adopted by a variety of 
scholars (e.g. Gomes-Casseres 1987; Lee and Beamish 1995; Makino 1995; Hennart and 
Zeng 1997). 
Franko (1971) considered three categories of instability: (1) where the U.S. firm 
increased its ownership to more than 95 per cent, thus converting it to a wholly owned 
subsidiary; (2) where the U.S. firm increased it equity holding from a minority or 50-50 
split to a majority under 95 per cent; and (3) where the joint venture was sold out or 
liquidated by mutual consent. Franko reported an instability rate of 28.5 per cent. 
Adopting Franko's measures, Gomes-Casseres (1987) studied 5933 U.S. manufacturing 
subsidiaries abroad and reported that about a third of the ventures went through some 
form of ownership changes. Outright sales occurred in 3 7 per cent of the ventures, and 
changes in ownership structures accounted for the remaining 52 per cent of the unstable 
ventures. More recently, using similar measures, Hennart and Zeng (1997) studied 
Japanese joint ventures in the United States and observed very high ownership instability 
(68 per cent). In contrast, relatively low instability rates have been reported among 
Japanese (Makino 1995), Korean (Lee and Beamish 1995), and China joint ventures 
(Beamish 1993). 
Harrigan (1988a) reported that about 55 per cent of the 895 inter-firm alliances in her 
study were terminated and thus unstable. Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) built a 
longitudinal database of foreign entries by twenty-five Dutch multinationals in seventy-
two countries between 1966 and 1994. Of the 228 international joint ventures in the 
database, 49 per cent were terminated before 1994. Kogut (1989, 1991) examined 
international joint venture termination by focusing on either dissolution or acquisition. 
Of the ninety-two joint ventures in his sample, twenty-seven were terminated through 
dissolution and thirty-seven through acquisitions. Dissolution was found to be driven by 
changes in competitive rivalry within the venture's industry, while acquisition was driven 
by changes in partners' strategies. Park and Russo (1996) found that, in a sample of 204 
joint ventures in the electronics industry, 56 were terminated through liquidation and 82 
through acquisition, representing an overall instability rate of 68 per cent. 
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(2) Instability as Reorganisation or Contractual Renegotiation 
In addition to termination, several studies have paid attention to the structural and 
operational aspects of joint ventures. Killing (1983) classified a joint venture as unstable 
when it had experienced a drastic shift in the venture's parent control structure. During 
the two-year observation period, seven out of the thirty-five joint ventures were 
terminated and five others underwent a major reconfiguration of their control structure 
due to poor performance. Therefore, about 35 per cent of the ventures in this relatively 
small sample were categorised as unstable. The use of major reorganisation as a measure 
of instability was also found in several other studies (Beamish 1984; Lee and Beamish 
1995). 
Blodgett (1992) investigated instability by focusing on inter-partner renegotiations of a 
prior contract. The unit of analysis of Blodgett's study was the partnership contract 
rather than the venture itself, and incidence of contract renegotiations was used to 
indicate instability. The process-oriented perspective represented by Killing (1983) and 
Blodgett (1992) is important because the focus has moved from documenting the 
termination rates of international joint ventures to investigating factors triggering or 
contributing to instability in operating these ventures. 
More recently, Y an and Luo (200 1) argued that in the majority of prior studies, instability 
has been treated as a dependent variable to signify the venture's ultimate destination. 
Consequently, various factors contributing to instability have been identified, including 
conflicts in shared management, control/ownership structures, the impact of the external 
environmental forces and cross-cultural differences. 
11 Inter-Partner Conflicts in Shared Management 
Joint ventures motivated on the basis of competition are vulnerable to changes in the 
competitive structure of the market, in each partner's competitive position and in the shift 
in bargaining power of the partners. Whereas the design of the venture and overall 
partner relationship can mitigate competitive incentives, the sources of destabilising pulls 
are often inherent in the original motivations to establish the venture (Kogut 1988). 
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A key feature of a joint venture is shared management between partners from different 
countries. Partners could disagree on just about every aspect of a venture's management. 
Therefore, inter-partner conflict in shared management is often a driving force for 
instability (Killing 1983; Kogut 1989). Harrigan (1988) found that differences between 
the partners in founding goals, strategic resources, and corporate cultures were 
responsible for shorter joint venture duration. Das and Teng (1999) argued that joint 
venture instability occurs as a result of internal tensions, which develop within the 
partnership. Joint venture partners often find significant differences in terms of how to 
run the joint venture. One party may prefer to replicate its operational procedures within 
the joint venture whereas the other stresses the venture's need for autonomy, in order to 
adapt to new markets, technologies, or products. 
• Control/Ownership Structures 
The structure of controVownership has been found to influence joint venture instability. 
Schann (1985), and Beamish (1985) argued that since dual control is inherently 
problematic, joint ventures, which are dominated by one of the partners are more likely to 
be stable than shared joint ventures. Killing (1992, 1993) also found that a joint venture 
with a dominant partner could minimise coordination costs and hence outperform shared-
control joint ventures. However, an unequal division of ownership may give the majority 
holder greater power, which may be used to the detriment of the minority owner. 
In contrast, Harrigan (1988) argued that a balanced ownership joint venture in which each 
partner's bargaining power is evenly matched is more likely to produce mutual 
accommodations. Empirically, Bleeke and Ernst (1991) found that joint ventures with an 
evenly split ownership had a higher success rate (60%) than ventures dominated by one 
party (31 %). 
• Impact of External Environments 
The environment, presenting itself to an organisation as a set of general forces, is the 
central actor in the strategy-making process. An organisation must respond to these 
forces, or else be 'selected out'. Leadership thus becomes a passive element for the 
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purposes of reading the environment and ensuring proper adaptation by the organisation 
(Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel 1998). No matter what the initial agreement on 
control and ownership may have been at the start of a venture, environmental changes 
over time may shift the relative bargaining power among the partners and prompt new 
dynamics around the partnership, which then affect the joint ventures' stability. 
Changes in external environments, such as local government policies and industry 
structures, may also influence joint venture instability. Kogut (1988) argued that changes 
in the environment over the time of the joint venture's development can affect 
dramatically a partner's initial strategies and the initial balance of bargaining power and 
further affect the stability of the joint venture. It has been widely documented that 
unanticipated major changes in local political environments (e.g. changes in government 
policies regarding foreign direct investment) affect international joint venture operations 
and contribute to venture instability (Blodgett 1992; Brewer 1992; Boddewyn and Brewer 
1994; Vernon 1997). The past several decades have witnessed such drastic changes in 
many countries (Contractor 1990; Yan and Gray 1994; Vachani 1995). 
• Cross-Cultural Differences 
Cultural differences often influence the way in which the partners in a joint venture make 
strategic decisions and solve problems. Although the positive effect of cultural 
differences on joint venture instability has been evidenced in empirical studies with larger 
samples (Hennart and Zeng 1997; Li and Guisinger 1991; Pennings, Barkema and Douma 
1994; Shenkar and Zeria 1992), nevertheless, the findings of several recent studies 
demonstrate that the relationship between partners' cultural differences and venture 
stability may be more complex and inconclusive than previous research has suggested. 
For example, Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) argue that the different dimensions of 
cross-cultural differences between joint venture partners might have different effects on 
the venture's instability. Park and Ungson (1997) tested the effect of inter-partner 
cultural differences on the dissolution of joint ventures but found no support for most of 
the hypothesised relationships. However, they found a significant effect of inter-partner 
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nationality on venture termination, but in an opposite direction to previous findings: the 
greater the cultural distance, the less likely the venture is to dissolve. 
The existing literature on joint venture instability has clear limitations: the research has 
been dominated by a static approach that treats instability of an international joint venture 
in terms of the end status (e.g. termination or liquidation), whereas the evolution process 
and evolving patterns of joint ventures have not been thoroughly studied. 
2.2.3 Joint Venture Reconfiguration 
Although international joint ventures represent an inherently unstable and fragile form of 
organisation, previous studies, with one exception (Yan and Luo 2001), reported various 
factors contributing to joint venture instability but failed to explain why many 
international joint ventures have managed to survive and succeed over a long period of 
time. 
Like independent organisations, it is assumed that joint ventures are affected by both 
stabilising and destabilising forces. Because of their inter-cultural and inter-
organisational hybrid nature, as well as the competitive and opportunistic behaviours in 
which the partners are likely to engage (Kogut 1989; Hamel 1991), there are tensions 
between stability and change in joint ventures, which are considerably more complex 
than in single, stand-alone organisations. 
Yan and Luo (2001) have identified that there are two contrasting sets of forces to drive 
or restrain joint venture instability and stability. Based on these two sets of forces, they 
have created a framework of structural reconfiguration in international joint ventures 
(Figure 2.2-1 ). 
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Figure 2.2-1 Model of Structural Reconfiguration in International Joint Ventures 
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Source: Adapted from Yan and Luo 2001, p.264 
Y an and Luo (200 1) argue that the structural stability of international joint ventures 
depends on the balance and interactions between the two sets of forces. A complete 
understanding of joint venture dynamics and evolution requires consideration of both 
sets. 
(1) Driving Forces for Structural Instability 
Based on the dynamic nature of international joint ventures, Yan and Luo (2001) 
identified four distinct explanations for structural changes and instability: instability 
prompted by unexpected contingencies, undesirable venture performance, an obsolescing 
bargain with the local parties, and inter-partner competitive learning. 
• Unexpected Contingencies 
The contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) attributes structure changes to 
organisational adaptation in which organisations alter their internal configurations to fit 
the new, changing environment. In the joint venture setting, structural instability is 
caused by contingencies unforeseeable at the venture's founding. As Harrigan (1986) 
notes, changes will occur in every venture's design because managers can rarely 
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anticipate exactly how their agreement to cooperate will evolve. She further identifies a 
range of change stimuli leading to inter-partner renegotiations. These stimuli emerge as a 
result of changes in the partners' strategies and bargaining power, changes in the 
venture's strategic importance to the parents, shifts in the parent-venture balance with 
respect to coordination and control, and dynamics in the venture's industry structure. 
Lecraw (1984) indicates that renegotiations will lead to an adjustment of ownership share 
if the relative bargaining position between the partners changes. 
A maJor source of unanticipated changes is the local political environment, such as 
government policies regarding foreign direct investment. Over the past several decades, 
drastic changes in the attitude of the host government towards foreign direct investment 
have been witnessed in Canada, Mexico, Taiwan, Korea, India, and China (Contractor 
1990, Vachani 1995). Blodgett (1992) provided evidence that ownership structures 
change as the host government shifts its policies on foreign direct investment from 
'restrictive' to 'non-restrictive'. In their study of U.S. joint ventures in China, Yan and 
Gray ( 1994) also found that unexpected changes in local government policies over time 
served as a stimulus for shifts in the partners' relative bargaining positions and the parent 
control structure. 
11 Undesirable Venture Performance 
The second driving force for structural changes is the joint venture performance 
undertaken by venture partners. The effect of joint venture performance on control 
structure can result in two mutually opposing outcomes (Yan and Luo 2001). Superior 
performance of a joint venture may serve as a stabilizing force, while undesirable 
performance triggers instability. Poor performance implies that the venture has failed to 
achieve the objectives of at least one of the partners. Thus, unsatisfied partner needs 
create stimuli for restructuring or reallocation of control. Killing (1983) observed that 
when the joint venture had not performed well, parent companies increased their 
intervention, and thus reduced the level of autonomy of the joint venture management. 
Yan and Gray (1994) noted that the performance of a joint venture could reshape the 
relative bargaining power between joint venture partners, because superior performance 
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creates an additional bargaining chip for the dominant partner to enhance its control. On 
the other hand, poor performance provides a stimulus for the subordinate partner to 
propose a more active role in governing the venture's operation, thus affecting the 
structural stability. 
• Obsolescing Bargain 
The third driving force for structural changes is the bargaining relationship between 
overseas joint venture partners and the local government/partner. In this regard, the 
central concern has been the foreign partner's gradual reduction of its ownership and/or 
management control. From this point of view, structural reconfiguration results directly 
from an 'obsolescing bargain' (Vernon 1977; Vachani 1995), which occurs when the 
foreign partner's relative bargaining power vis-a-vis the host government/partner erodes 
over time as it invests irreversible, transaction-specific resources in the local economy 
that it actually becomes hostage to the host government/partner (Fagre and Wells 1982). 
As a result, foreign participation in a joint venture may be reduced, which eventually can 
lead to expropriation (Davidson 1982). Dymsza (1988) suggests that in joint ventures 
between developed and developing country partners, the importance of the developed 
country partner's contribution to the partnership tends to decline over time, at least from 
the local partner's perspective. When this occurs, structural changes are necessary in 
which major management responsibilities are turned over to the local partner. The 
conclusion is that the foreign partner's management control over the venture will 
decrease over time as a result of an obsolescing bargain, prompting structural instability. 
• Inter-Partner Competitive Learning 
The fourth driving force for structural instability focuses on inter-partner competition. 
Joint ventures are mixed-motive games in which the partners cooperate and compete 
simultaneously (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad 1989). Das and Teng (1999) argued that the 
tension between cooperation and competition create one of the key dilemmas existing 
throughout the lifetime of a joint venture. Kogut (1989) attributed joint venture failure to 
potential competition between the partners. Instability and the limited duration of joint 
ventures may be a direct result of inter-partner competitive learning (Hamel 1991; Inkpen 
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and Beamish 1997). From this perspective, stmctural changes in joint ventures are 
inevitable. 
Hamel ( 1991) argues that venture sponsors form alliances to extract and internalise the 
skills of their partners, and thus either improve their own competitive position or reduce 
their partnership's capability for autonomous action within and without the partnership. 
This competitive motive, however, complicates the partnership. The potential for 
misunderstanding and mistmst increases when alliances involve learning-oriented versus 
output-oriented goals (Westney 1988). Learning changes partner inter-dependency, and 
can shift the relative bargaining power between the partners, and thus make the original 
bargain obsolete, because the faster learner is likely to raise its 'price' for further 
cooperation (Hamel 1991 ). Consequently, reallocation of control becomes necessary and 
stability will suffer (lnkpen and Beamish 1997). 
(2) Restraining Forces for Structural Stability 
Another aspect of stmctural reconfiguration is that there are forces in organisations that 
counter changes and help retain certain organisational characteristics. Scott (1992) noted 
that the form organisations acquire at their founding is likely to affect the stmcture they 
retain throughout their lives. Previous studies have suggested that organisational factors, 
such as the characteristics of the founding executives (Kimberly 1980; Mintzberg and 
Waters 1982), or the top management team (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990), as well 
as the firm's initial business strategy (Boeker 1989), can create stmctural stability. 
Yan and Luo (2001) identify four principal sources of structural stability: the local 
political and legal environments at the venture's founding, partner initial resource 
contributions, the original match of inter-partner bargaining power, and pre-venture 
relationships between the partners. 
• Local Political and Legal Environment 
The first restraining force for stabilising stmctural changes is the local political and legal 
environment, which refers to the elaboration of social nmms, laws, rules, and 
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requirements to which an individual organisation must conform in order to receive 
legitimacy and support (Meyer and Scott 1983). Organisations formed at the same time 
under the same institutional pressures exhibit the same structural features (DiMaggio and 
Powel11983; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Thus, an organisation's initial structure reflects 
institutional forces present at its founding. Even though the institutional environment 
may change over time, its imprint on the structure of the organisation is sustained. 
However, previous studies have failed to address the fact that this driving force for 
structural stability would very much depend on the other variables, such as joint venture 
performance, the partners' individual strategies and inter-partner leaning. It is not 
rational to suppose that with a drastic change in the local political and legal environment, 
one of the venture partners could gain a great deal by prompting a structural change, but 
would take no action simply because of structural inertia. 
8 Partner Initial Resource Contributions 
The second restraining force with the effect of stabilising structural changes is the 
partners' initial resource contributions. Scott (1992) explained that, once acquired, the 
mix of initial resources out of which an organisational structure is created has a lasting 
effect on the attributes of that structure. Unlike single organisations whose initial 
resources are obtained directly from the environment, a joint venture's starting resources 
(including capital, technology, local and/or export marketing channels, and management 
expertise) are, for the most part, made available by its partners (Yan and Luo 2001). 
Blodgett (1991) and Hebert (1994) argued that the specific types of resource contributed 
by a partner might significantly affect the particular domains in the venture's operation in 
which this partner exercises control. Similarly, Killing (1983), Yan and Gray (1994), 
Child et al. ( 1997) stated that the relative amount of critical resources contributed by the 
partners constitutes the key source of relative bargaining power, a primary determinant of 
management control structure. 
According to Yan and Luo (2001), there are four reasons for joint ventures to retain their 
initial configuration of resources: Firstly, the availability of a specific resource to one 
(rather than the other) partner is relatively stable because of the imperfect imitability or 
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imperfect mobility of the resource (Chi 1994). Therefore, once a partner initially 
contributes a specific type of resource, the same partner tends to continue this 
contribution over time. Secondly, contractual agreements may be reached between the 
partners that require them to continue their contribution of the resource committed at the 
venture's formation. Thirdly, it IS likely that the joint venture's initial 
production/operation technology is designed in such a way that it depends exclusively 
upon the types of inputs available at the founding. Therefore, the inflexibility of the 
venture's technological system may prevent it from shifting to resources other than the 
mix that was initially available. Finally, anti-opportunism arrangements, such as 
guaranteed dominant control by the contributing partner over its resource contribution, 
help maintain the initial mix of resources. Collectively, these four factors help to keep 
stable the initial areas of management control by each partner. 
m The Initial Balance of Bargaining Power 
The third restraining force, which stabilises structural changes, is the initial balance of 
bargaining power. Partner resource contributions to joint ventures have been argued to 
be the most critical base of bargaining power (Harrigan 1986; Harrigan and Newman 
1990). In addition, empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between bargaining power and parent control (Fagre and Wells 1982; Lecraw 1984; Yan 
and Gray 1994; Child et al. 1997). Many researchers have provided convincing 
arguments and empirical evidence that partner bargaining power does change as a result 
of environmental, inter-organisational, or organisational dynamics (Harrigan 1986; 
Hamilton and Singh 1991; Yan and Gray 1994; lnkpen and Beamish 1997). However, the 
balance of relative bargaining power achieved at the venture's formation is the real 
stabilising force, and is resistant to change (Yan and Luo 2001 ). 
Lax and Sebenius (1986) and Hamel et al. (1989) concluded that the inter-partner 
competitive motive for bargaining power and control provides the incentive for both 
partners to monitor the changes in their power position, and for the partner which loses 
power to take remedial action. Similarly, Yan and Gray (1994) illustrated, with their 
comparative case data, the process in which a dynamic equilibrium of bargaining power 
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is maintained. In several cases, the joint venture depended upon the foreign partner for 
importing inputs, such as raw material or components. As joint ventures started to 
localise raw material sourcing, the foreign partner's bargaining power diminished while 
the local partner gained power. At the same time, however, new power accrued to the 
foreign partner, who either brought in new products, or raised the price of future 
technology transfers when the technology agreement was open to renewal. Although the 
power bases for each partner change over time, the overall initial control structure of a 
joint venture will be retained as a result of the partners' ongoing adjustments to regain 
their lost bargaining power. 
• Inter-Partner Pre-Venture Relationship 
Finally, the fourth restraining force for stabilising structural changes is the pnor 
relationship between joint venture partners, which can range from cold calls to blind 
dates, arm's-length trade relationships, and contractual collaborations (Gray and Yan 
1997). Prior relationships appear to be particularly significant in developing a trusting 
relationship between the partners (Parke 1993; Ring and Van de Yen 1994; Gulati 1995). 
Trusting partners tend to behave in a trustworthy manner in dealing with each other, and 
expect to generate a trustworthy response in return. Lack of trust between the partners at 
the venture's fom1ation can be a major source of structural instability (Kogut 1989). The 
pre-venture experience can also provide the partners with insights into the building of 
consensus about what control structures should be adopted. Such a decision is likely to 
be made by considering the best interests of the entire partnership, rather than the one-
sided interest of an individual partner in attempting to control the venture and in 
safeguarding against the other's opportunism (Yan and Luo 2001). In this case, important 
management decisions are made by consultation between the partners, rather than by 
attempts to impose the division of power as prescribed by the contracted formal control 
structure. Thus, the conclusion is that the pre-venture relationship between the partners 
affects the joint venture's structure by leaving an imprint on its initial design, as well as 
by reducing reliance on the formal control structure, thereby minimising the need for 
structural reconfiguration (Ring and Van de Yen 1994; Gulati 1995; Gray and Yan 1997; 
Yan and Luo 2001). 
35 
International Joint Ventures Chapter 2 
The limitation of Yan and Luo's (2001) model is that although they have addressed the 
balance of the two sets of forces for joint ventures' stability, they did not deal with 
adequately the interrelated and interacting relationships of the two sets of forces. Under 
certain circumstances, the two sets of forces may be changed over and work as opposing 
forces. Hence, the model is modified to address the interrelated relationship of the two 
sets of forces: 
Figure 2.2-2 The Modified Model of Structural Reconfiguration in International Joint Ventures 
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To summarise, as both sets of forces influence the venture, actual changes in its structure 
depend upon the relative strength of the two sets of forces. In other words, structural 
reconfiguration will not occur unless the overall destabilising forces are stronger than the 
overall stabilising forces. 
2.2.4 Joint Venture Exit Reasons 
Although there are partners who deliberately create joint ventures for short-term benefits, 
joint venture partners usually establish long-term strategic objectives but may have to 
face a premature termination of the venture. Clearly, it is important to be alert to factors 
that potentially lead to the demise of the joint venture. These factors may be hidden at the 
start but become more evident over time. Kogut (1988) also argued that the causes for the 
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termination of a joint venture frequently lie in those causes responsible for its creation. 
Yan and Luo (200 I) identified five major reasons for exit from joint ventures: 
• Unnoticed Yet Irreconcilable Inter-Partner Strategic Differences 
It quite often happens that two firms create a partnership before they fully understand 
each other, particularly the significant differences between them. There are several areas 
in which the partners can differ significantly. First, incompatible strategic goals and 
directions set for a joint venture can intensify as the venture evolves. When such 
incompatibility cannot be overcome, partners are often left with no choice but divorce. 
Second, joint venture partners often find significant differences in terms of how to run the 
joint venture. Conflict is likely to follow, which can lead to the dissolution of the joint 
venture. Also, the partners may be unable to reach an agreement on senior management 
appointments. Third, the challenge of overcoming differences in managerial culture and 
styles between cross-cultural partners is often extremely difficult to cope with. For 
instance, strains in Western-Japanese joint ventures from corporate, industrial, and 
national cultural differences abound. Disputes arise over clashes in work ethics, corporate 
culture, human resource practices, decision-making styles, incentive structure, and reward 
systems. Inter-partner conflicts in these areas can swell into insurmountable problems 
and cause the failure of the venture. 
• Changes in Partner Strategies 
It should not be a surprise that, as joint ventures evolve, significant changes may occur in 
the parent finns as well as in the venture's operational environment. These changes 
prompt new dynamics around the partnership and often contribute to a venture's 
tem1ination. 
• Inability to Meet Partner Expectations 
Non-perfonnance can doom a joint venture to failure. Targets may be missed as a result 
of inadequate resources, time, or effort, or perhaps because of unrealistically ambitious 
goals. On the other hand, the targets set for the venture may shift due to rapid market 
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developments, changing strategies, or uncontrollable events. However, joint ventures 
might also be tenninated due to the failure to meet a partner's expectations. 
o Unrealised Partner Commitment 
When one or more partners fail to make a financial commitment as specified in the 
founding or renegotiated agreement, the venture can collapse. For instance, many Sino-
Korean joint ventures in Dalian had to be dissolved during 1997-1998, due to the 
financial problems that Korean parent firms suffered as a result of the Asian financial 
CDSlS. 
Another aspect of unrealised partner commitment concerns the partner's resource 
contributions to the joint venture. Most joint ventures are formed out of the assumption 
that the partner firms will provide the organisational strengths that are needed by other 
partners. However, false expectations about partner capabilities can cause joint venture 
termination. Since the partners fully expect that the resources they contribute to the 
venture would be effective, when one or both partners' presumed competencies or 
strengths fail to generate expected results, joint ventures have to confront the risk of 
dissolution. The wider the perceived gap between what partners pledged and what they 
actually deliver, the greater the difficulties for the joint venture. 
11 Mission Fulfilled 
The best scenario for joint venture dissolution is when the venture has achieved its 
strategic goals as set by the partners. In particular, when the partners join forces in order 
to acquire knowledge from each other, imitation is frequently the goal of each joint 
venture partner, and when imitation is fully achieved, the sign of success is termination 
(Kogut 1988). 
2.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a set of variables relating to international joint venture and especially Yan 
and Luo's (2001) framework for structural reconfiguration in international joint ventures 
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have been discussed and analysed. A theoretical platform has been established for further 
analysis of China-based joint ventures. 
The review of existing literature on joint ventures reveals that previous studies have 
focused mainly on joint venture formation and termination. The evolution process of 
international joint ventures, with few exceptions, has not been thoroughly studied and no 
adequate analysis has been made of the pattern of international joint ventures' evolution, 
especially of joint ventures in transitional economies. 
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Clhtapter 3 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter moves China-based joint ventures into the centre of attention. For a better 
understanding of China-based joint venture activities, this chapter is divided into four 
main sections. The first one highlights the characteristics of China-based joint ventures 
and to review the development of these joint ventures over the 1980s and the 1990s. The 
second one aims to establish a model framework to address the internal variables 
affecting development strategies of China-based joint ventures over time. The third 
section reviews China's transitional business environments in the middle and the late 
1990s and identifies changes and their implications for the development of China-based 
joint ventures. The final section summarizes main findings of this chapter. Findings 
derived from this chapter will be used for subsequent analysis. 
3.1 Overview of China-Based Joint Ventures 
3.1.1 Background! 
(1) Joint Venture as A Political Compromise 
In order to speed up its industrial reconstruction, China introduced foreign capital and 
technologies in the 1950s from the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. 
But during the 1960s and the 1970s, the Chinese economy was closed. No foreign capital 
and technology were used by China for almost two decades. 
At the Third Plenum of the Tenth Party Central Committee in December 1977, Deng 
Xiaoping emerged from political disgrace for a second time and began aggressively to 
reassert his leadership (Kau and Marsh 1993). 
According to Li (1995), although the political atmosphere in the late 1970s was more 
liberal due to the end of the Cultural Revolution, the greatest problem China faced was its 
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backward technology, which limited its economic development. Hence, China started to 
actively seek foreign technology in the late 1970s, with a view to accelerating its 
modernisation process. However, it soon became clear that to revitalise the economy, 
China would need not only advanced technology and but also capital and management 
skills. Therefore, the choice was clear to the Chinese leadership. For a rapid regeneration 
of capital, technology and management skills, China had to use foreign resources. Total 
self-reliance would greatly restrict its economic development (Li 1995). 
However, there were different views among the Chinese leadership. The reformers were 
pushing for profound reforms and opening up of the economy, but conservatives were 
afraid that reliance upon foreign resources would lead China towards capitalism. The 
reformers placed a high value on the potential economic benefits to be gained from using 
foreign resources and were willing to reap these benefits. In contrast, the conservative 
were less certain of the value of foreign capital, technology, and management skills. 
Pearson (1989) reported that when the open-door policy was initiated in 1979, the 
reformers also shared two concerns about foreign investment with the conservatives: 
protection of Chinese sovereignty, and maximisation of China's potential benefits from 
foreign investment. A consensus on these issues led to a shared belief in the need for 
strict controls over foreign capital. As a result, the policy towards foreign direct 
investment in the late 1970s was formulated to promote growth and the efficiency by 
absorbing foreign capital, technology and management skills only in selected offshore 
Chinese while guarding against loss of control to foreign capitalists (Li and Xu 1994). 
Chapter 2 shows that a host country would benefit more from joint ventures than from 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises (J anger 1980; Killing 1982; Harrigan 1984; Beamish 
1988; Kogut 1988). In view of the realities in China, the Chinese leadership chose the 
joint venture option to achieve their goals. They believed that joint ventures could secure 
access to foreign resources, help to reform China's large state-owned enterprises, create 
employment opportunities, and also allow maximum control over foreign investors. As a 
result, the joint venture entry mode was accepted as a political compromise for the 
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Chinese leadership, as it matched the goals of both reformers and conservatives. The 
wholly foreign-owned enterprise mode was dropped at this early time. 
(2) Joint Venture as A Compromise On Entry Strategies 
Previous studies on China-based joint ventures (Daniels 1986; Davidson 1987; Tai 1988; 
Beamish 1989; Pearson 1989; Shenkar 1990; Aiello 1991; Bleeke and Ernst 1991; 
Newman 1992; Glaister and Wang 1993; Kim 1996) concluded that Chinese and overseas 
investors' motivations for entering joint ventures in China were different, and joint 
venture deals were always a result of compromises. Many overseas firms might have 
preferred a wholly foreign-owned venture in the first place, but ended up with a joint 
venture due to the Chinese government's policy and preference. As a result of the 
compromises made at the entry stage, a joint venture deal could be set up, but both 
Chinese and overseas partners might then pursue their own individual strategies during 
the operational stage, creating scope for conflicts and differences over technology 
transfer, exporting, product range, equity sharing, and management styles. 
(3) Origin of Overseas Investors 
China's official statistics (www.moftec.gov.cn 2001) show that Hong Kong and Macao 
have been the primary sources of investment in China-based joint ventures. However, 
since the early 1990s, the number of Taiwanese investment projects began to increase 
remarkably and Taiwan became one of the top five overseas investors. In effect, 66.85 
per cent of foreign direct investment projects in China were not particularly 'foreign' 
(Table 3.1-1 ). 
Beamish's study (1993) confirmed Chinese official statistics, which show that the origin 
of most overseas partners was 'overseas Chinese' rather than Western or Japanese 
investors. Indeed, investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan account for 63 per cent 
of total overseas investment in China. 
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Table 3.1-1 Top Ten Investors in China (1979- 2000) 
No. Country origin Number of Percentage of total Actual investment value 
projects projects (billion $US) 
-
Total 341538 100% 3076.31 
I Hong Kong 184824 54.12% 1547.94 
2 USA 28702 8.40% 256.48 
3 Japan 18769 5.50% 248.86 
4 Taiwan 43516 12.74% 238.63 
5 Singapore 8500 2.49% 148.20 
6 Virgin Islands 2031 0.59% 93.95 
7 Korea 12726 3.73% 88.37 
8 Britain 2554 0.75% 75.84 
9 Germany 2128 0.62% 48.11 
10 Macao 6418 1.88% 36.36 
II France 1583 0.46% 35.82 
12 Holland 722 0.21% 22.01 
13 Canada 4351 1.27% 20.49 
14 Malaysia 1913 0.56% 20.02 
15 Australia 3864 1.13% 18.04 
16 Others 18937 5.40% 177.16 
Source: (1) International Trade1993, (2) Yang Canying, 1997 and (3) htt://www.moftec.gov.cn 2001 
3.1.2 Development of Foreign Direct Investment in China 
International studies (Pearson 1991; Pan et al. 1993; and Fan 1996) earlier classified 
development of foreign direct investment in Cina into four phases: Foundation Period 
(1979 - 1984), Legislation Period (1985 - May 1989), Temporary Setback (June 1989 -
1991), and New Surge Period (1992- present). The Chinese official classification is 
similar: Experimental Stage (1979 - 1983), Primary Development Stage (1984 - 1986), 
Adjustment and Consolidation Stage (1987- 1991), and High Development Stage (1992 
-present) (Li and Xu 1994; Li 1995; Yang 1997): 
(1) Experimental Stage (1979 -1983) 
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign 
Investment was promulgated on 81h July 1979. The general guideline behind this law was 
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that where foreign direct investment is concerned, China should permit it on terms over 
which the Chinese government can maintain substantial controls (Li 1995). As a result, 
despite considerable interests aroused by the new regulation, the initial inflow of 
investment activity was fairly slow (Table 3.1-2). 
There were several reasons for the slow inflow of foreign investment. First, lacking 
experience in dealing with joint venture projects, the Chinese authorities took a very 
restrictive approach to setting up joint ventures and applied strict control over hard 
currency income and expenditure. Second, most bylaws were in the process of 
finalisation and the government was slow in their implement action. Third, foreign 
businessmen were wary of lack of supporting legal structures and tax regulations in 
China. Thus, in the first year after the joint venture law came into effect, only two joint 
ventures were approved by China's Foreign Investment Control Commission, and 90 
percent of joint venture enterprises established during this experimental period were 
located in the four Special Economic Zones (Yang 1997). 
Table 3.1-2 China's Utilisation of Foreign Direct Investment (1979-1983) 
Year No. of firms involved in foreign investment % Increase compared with previous year 
1979 2 -
1980 83 -
1981 320 285.5% 
1982 518 61.8% 
1983 638 23.1% 
Source: Yang Carrying, 1997; MOFTEC official statistics: www.moftec.gov.cn 2001 
In May 1983, the State Council hosted the first national conference in Beijing concerning 
the utilisation of foreign direct investment. This meeting led to the publication of the 
Joint Venture Law Implementation Regulations on 201h September 1983. This represents 
an important step in relaxing restrictions on the setting up of joint ventures in China (Li 
and Xu 1994). 
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(2) Primary Development Stage (1984 -1986) 
In May 1984, the Chinese government opened up a further 14 coastal cities - Dalian, 
Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningpo, 
Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai. Meanwhile, the State Council 
delegated the power for approving foreign direct investment to the provincial 
governments. 
On 15111 November 1984, the State Council promulgated the Temporary Regulations for 
Exempting and Reducing Corporate Income Tax, and Industrial and Commercial Tax in 
Special Economic Zones and the 14 Coastal Cities. Foreign invested enterprises in 
Special Economic Zones and Open Cities could enjoy a long period of tax holidays or 
considerable tax reductions. Later on, the government further approved setting up of 27 
Economic and Technology Development Zones, where foreign invested business could 
enjoy similar preferential tax treatment. 
Following successful expenence m Special Economic Zones, establishment of joint 
ventures in coastal cities was speeded up. In 1984, the number of approved joint ventures 
was three times of that in 1983. In 1985, the government opened a further 40 coastal 
cities and 215 counties to foreign direct investment, and provided financial incentives to 
foreign invested enterprises in the first 14 coastal cities. These steps finally led to the first 
wave of inward foreign direct investment in China. Approved foreign investment projects 
in 1985 increased by 66 percent compared with that in 1984 (Table 3.1-3). 
Table 3.1-3 China's Utilisation of Foreign Direct Investment (1984-1986) 
Year No. of firms involved in foreign investment % Increase compared with previous year 
1984 2166 239.4% 
1985 3073 41.8% 
1986 1498 -51.2% 
Source: Yang Canying, 1997; MOFTEC official statistics: www.moftec.gov.cn 2001 
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o Lifting of Ban om Whonty Foreign-Owned EID.terprises 
According to an informal interview in 1998 with a deputy director of Dalian Economic 
and Technological Development Zone told that although no official notice has been 
issued, Chinese government officials at provincial and municipal levels attributed the 
lifting of the ban on wholly foreign-owned enterprises to the following two reasons: 
[] 
ll 
Deng Xiaoping and his followers gained the upper hand within the Chinese 
leadership. 
The sharp drop in foreign direct investment in 1986 impelled the government to 
change its policy. 
The Law of the People's Republic of China Governing Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises was adopted at the fourth session of the Sixth National People's Congress on 
1ih April 1986. This law contributed to the surge of foreign direct investment in 1988. 
At this stage, most foreign investors were from Hong Kong and Macao. Joint ventures 
were mainly labour intensive ones, such as hotels, manufacturing factories and service 
projects. Most joint venture projects were located in the provinces of Fujian and 
Guangdong, and in some coastal cities. Foreign direct investment in the hinterland had 
hardly started (Li and Xu 1994). 
(3) Adjustment and Consolidation Stage (1987 -1991) 
From 1979 to 1985, the number of approved joint venture projects was on the increase for 
every year. In 1986, however, it dropped for the first time. The major reasons for the 
drop included joint ventures encountered difficulties in balancing their foreign currency 
books, the very complicated approval formalities, the bureaucracy of government 
departments and many operational problems (Li and Xu 1994). In a bid to reverse the 
slip, on 11th October 1986, the State Council promulgated the Provisions of the State 
Council ofthe People's Republic of China for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment. 
This document offers joint ventures further incentives in land usage, infrastructure, loans, 
corporate income tax, sales, imports and exports, and operational autonomy. On 3rd July 
1988, the Provision of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for the 
46 
China-based Joint Ventures Chapter 3 
Encouragement of Taiwan Compatriots was promulgated to promote investment from 
Taiwan. In 1990, the State Council approved the development of Pudong, Shanghai. In 
the same year, the government approved the establishment of duty free zones in Shanghai 
and 13 other Cities. 
In April 1990, the State Council amended the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. This law guarantees that joint 
ventures will not be nationalised. It also for the first time allows an expatriate investor to 
be chairman of the board of a joint venture. With the promulgation of this legislation and 
efforts by all levels of the Chinese government, the slowing down of foreign direct 
investment in 1986 was reversed and the second surge of foreign direct investment 
appeared in 1988 (Table 3.1-4). 
Table 3.1-4 China's Utilisation of Foreign Direct Investment (1987-1990) 
Year No. of firms involved in foreign investment % Increase compared with previous year 
1987 2233 49.0% 
1988 5945 166.2% 
1989 5779 -2.7% 
1990 7273 25.8% 
Source: Yang Canying, 1997; MOFTEC official statistics: www.moftec.gov.cn, 2001 
o The 1989 Setback 
Chinese official studies (Li and Xu 1994; Li 1995; Yang 1997) believe political turmoil 
in 1989 adversely affected inflow of foreign direct investment. Many foreign companies 
withdrew their equity from China and even more potential investors suspended their 
investment plans or negotiations. In response, the government took a more liberal attitude 
towards reform and the opening-up policy. China's regulatory framework and business 
environment for foreign direct investment further were improved. In 1991, the State 
Council promulgated the Law of the People's Republic of China on Corporate Income 
Tax of Joint Ventures and Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, and further clarified 
preferential treatments for foreign invested companies in implementation bylaws. 
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Fan ( 1996) believed the drop in inward foreign investment in 1989 only a temporary 
setback. Wascher (1992) suggested that the slow down was caused by the retrenchment 
programme for combating inflation in 1989 and a programme in 1990 that attempted to 
reduce investment and money supply, and selectively controll credit expansion. Seo 
(1993) also argued that the sudden switch to a tight money policy, the reduction of 
available credit, the increasing interest rates, and the reduction of loan guarantees, slowed 
down the whole economy. 
(4) High Development Stage (1992- 2000) 
In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited South China and gave his famous South China tour 
speech. This accelerated China's reform and opening up to the rest of the world. In 
October 1992, the 14111 Party Congress approved the establishment of a 'socialist market 
economy'. In November of the same year, the general framework for establishing such an 
economy was approved by the Chinese leadership. Consequently, China was put on track 
for the creation of a socialist market economy. The economy grew fast, with an average 
GDP increase of around 8 per cent from 1992 to 2000, and the supply of basic production 
materials improved considerably. All of these factors contributed to a new surge of 
foreign direct investment in China (MOFTEC Annual Report 2001). 
According to China Enterprise Daily (September 15, 1994), by the end of 1993, the 
Chinese government had approved another Special Economic and Technology 
Development zones, 32 national Economic and Technology Development Zones, in 
addition to 52 high technology development zones, 339 opening cities and 919 opening 
counties. The number of registered enterprises with overseas investment and the amount 
of actual utilisation of foreign capital in 1992 exceeded the total number of the past 12 
years (Table 3 .1-5). 
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Table 3.1-5 China's Utilisation of Foreign Direct Investment (1991-2000) 
Year No. of firms involved in foreign investment % Increased compared with previous 
year 
1991 12978 78.4% 
1992 48764 275.7% 
1993 83437 72.2% 
1994 47549 -43.0% 
1995 37001 -22.1% 
1996 24556 -33.6% 
1997 21046 -1.42% 
1998 19846 -5.70% 
1999 17100 -13.8% 
2000 22532 31.7% 
Source: Li Lanqing, 1995;Yang Canying, 1997; MOFTEC official statistics: www.moftec.gov.cn 2001 
In total, the Chinese government approved 283,820 foreign invested enterprises by the 
end of 1995. Among them, 216,143 were equity joint ventures and co-operative joint 
ventures, making them the dominant form of foreign direct investment (Table 3.1 - 6). 
Table 3.1-6 Foreign Direct Investment (1989- 1995) 
Type of Investment No. of projects Percentage Vol. of actual capital utilised 
Joint ventures 174014 61% US$907.26 million 
Co-operative joint ventures 42129 15% US$280.34 million 
Wholly foreign-owned firms 67677 24% US$425.51 million 
Total 283820 100% US$1765.92 million 
Source: Statistics from Chinese Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 201h May 1997. 
o The 1997 Setback 
1997 witnessed a sharp one-third decline in foreign direct investment. According to an 
official briefing by the deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Sun 
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Zhenyu, (People's Daily - Overseas Edition, 26th March 1998), the sharp drop was due 
to the following reasons: 
El The Chinese government's adjustment of the foreign investment structure. 
[OJ The desire to attract foreign investment into infrastructure, high technology, 
agriculture, export orientation enterprises, and technology reform. 
[] Taxation on imported equipment for foreign-invested enterprises. 
o Significant Increase in Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises 
Because of favourable government policy and further opening up of the hinterland in the 
mid 1990s, the possibility of setting up wholly foreign-owned enterprises became 
attractive to overseas investors frustrated by the under-performance of existing China-
based-joint ventures. They began to move towards wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
even before China changing legal and regulatory codes (Li and Xu1995; Yang 1997). 
Table 3.1-7 Foreign Invested Projects (1996-2000) 
Form ofFDI 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
I Joint ventures 12628 9046 8146 7065 8560 
2 Contractual joint ventures 2849 2371 2010 1654 1755 
3 Wholly foreign-owned enterprises 9062 9604 9674 8370 12199 
4 Others 17 25 16 11 18 
Total 24556 21046 19846 17100 22532 
Source: MOFTEC official statistics- www.moftec.gov.cn 2001 
Official statistics (Table 3.1-7) show a significant decrease in joint venture projects and 
an increase in wholly foreign-owned enterprises in the 5 years from 1996 to 2000. In 
1997, for the first time, the number of wholly foreign-owned enterprises exceeded that of 
joint ventures. 
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3.2 China-based Joint Ventures- The Model Framework 
It has been established in Chapter 2 that international joint ventures in developing 
countries represent an unstable form of organisation (Franko 1971; Poter 1990; Das and 
Teng 1999; Yan and Luo 2001). For joint ventures formed in developing or transitional 
economies, the turbulent political and economic environments, together with the inter-
cultural and inter-organisational dynamics, have made these joint ventures even more 
problematic (Reynolds 1979; Child and Markoczy 1991; Beamish 1993; Peng and Heath 
1996). 
Beamish (1993) reported that China-based joint ventures were different from those in 
developed and less developed market economies. Based on eleven studies carried out 
prior to 1989, and his own investigation of 22 joint ventures in China in 1993, Beamish 
compared 12 characteristics of international equity joint ventures in China with joint 
ventures in less developed market economies. He found four characteristics unique to 
China - frequency of association with state-owned partners; ethnically-related origin of 
overseas partners; use of joint ventures with pre-determined duration; and joint venture 
stability. However, in the early 1990s the question of how Chinese and overseas joint 
venture partners may manage their strategies in China's transitional business environment 
remains unanswered. 
Shenkar (1994) reported that previous studies on joint ventures in China can be divided 
into several groups: descriptive accounts of joint venture activities by origin of investors 
and industry sector (Beamish and Wang 1989; Ho 1990), small-sample studies dealing-
with foreign parent's motivations and political risks (Daniels, Krug, and Nigh 1986; 
Davidson 1987), management problems (Nenley and Nyaw 1987), large-scale studies of 
mainly strategic issues (Campbell and Adlington 1988; National Council for U.S.-China 
Trade 1987, 1990; Pomfer 1988, 1991; Shapiro et al. 1991), and journalistic accounts of 
bilateral or multiple joint venture cases (Goldenberger 1989; Mann 1990). Fan (1996) 
argued that previous studies of China-based joint ventures share a common topic of 
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creating or managing international joint ventures in China, although they differed in their 
purpose of research, research methods, and in particular, analytical focuses. 
Yan and Luo (2001) criticised previous research on international joint ventures, claiming 
that much attention has been paid to the early stages of joint venture development and the 
eventual destination of ventures, but little has been given to the dynamic development of 
joint ventures after their inception, and the subsequent process by which the relationship 
between the partners unfolds. Previous studies of China-based joint ventures are locked 
into the theories and strategies of the entry and operational stages. As a result, little 
research has been carried out on how China-based joint ventures evolve over time by 
shifting their strategies to adapt to internal difficulties and to changes in the Chinese 
transitional environment, and how those transformed joint ventures manage to sustain 
their business activities on the Chinese market. 
Figure 3.2-1 The Model Framework for the Research 
Driving forces for instability: 
Unforeseen environmental 
contingencies 
Undesirable venture 
performance 
Bargaining power 
Inter-partner competitive 
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~ 
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This research adapted and modified Yan and Luo's framework of structural 
reconfiguration in international joint ventures (Figure 2.2-1, Chapter 2) to examine 
patterns of evolution ofChina-basedjoint ventures (Figure 3.2-1). 
Based on this model framework, the joint venture inter-partner fit and related variables 
are reviewed under the categories of joint venture formation motives, joint venture 
ownership and control, joint venture partners, joint venture operations, and joint venture 
evolution. 
3.2.1 Joint Venture Formation Motives 
Previous studies on China-based joint ventures have produced a substantial body of 
literature on the motives driving foreign and local Chinese businesses to enter a joint 
venture project (Daniels et al. 1985; Tai 1988; Beamish 1987, 1988, Pearson 1989; 
Shenkar 1990; Grub and Lin 1991; Aiello 1991; Newman 1992; Glaister and Wang 1993; 
Gledhill1994). 
During the 1980s, the prime motivations for international firms to invest in China were 
the prospects of gaining access to what they perceived to be a huge market (Davidson 
1987; Campbell1988; Beamish 1988; Pearson 1989; Shenkar 1990; Luo 1998). Shenkar 
(1990) reported that for the foreign partners, the desire for profits and the utilisation of 
outdated technology were of supreme importance, whilst for the Chinese partners, the 
obtain of technology and foreign exchange were the chief motivating forces. Yan (1993) 
also indicated that the leading strategic objective of U.S. firms in their joint ventures in 
China was to earn a profit, whereas the most important motive of Chinese partners was to 
acquire advanced Western teclmology. 
For foreign compames, the desire for profits from a huge market is a persistent 
motivation for doing business in China. However, Young et al. (1989), Laughton (1995), 
Dutta ( 1988) argued that making profits is not a sufficient motivation for overseas firms 
to establish joint ventures, since profits could also be achieved by exporting products 
from home to the host country or by setting up a wholly owned subsidiary. A joint 
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venture approach is usually selected when the foreign company has no access to 
alternative modes of foreign direct investment, or exporting, due to the host government's 
regulations, tariff or non-tariff barriers. In fact, import substitution polices and quota 
restrictions as well as problems of negotiating with agents and licensees often prevent the 
establishment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises, or exporting to and licensing in 
China. 
Glaister and Wang (1993) investigated 21 British companies withjoint ventures in China, 
and found that the most important strategic motivation for the British companies was to 
conform to Chinese government policy rather than to purse their own ends. This was also 
discovered by Beamish (1993) in 19 of his 22 samples of Sino-foreign joint ventures in 
China. In fact, Gledhill (1994) in his study of 121 UK companies with direct investments 
in China found that it was, in fact, the potential size of the Chinese market that is the 
primary motivation for investing in China for 92 per cent of respondents. Aiello (1991) 
reported that establishing a joint venture was the only way that allows American car 
manufacturer Chrysler access to the huge Chinese market. 
According to Beamish (1993) and Teagarden (1990), during the 1980s, a major reason for 
overseas investors using the joint venture form in China was government pressure. China 
needs foreign capital, advanced technology, new products and management skills, and in 
addition needs to create employment opportunities. Pan (1997) showed that the joint 
venture forn1ation strategies adopted by companies from different nations differ. 
Examining five variables of joint venture fonnation (selection of joint venture partners, 
foreign equity ownership, foreign capital contribution, joint venture business scope and 
joint venture location), the author revealed that the joint venture strategies of USA, 
Japanese and Hong Kong partners differ significantly in their characteristics and also 
over time. Beamish (1993) pointed out that in addition to government pressure to use the 
joint venture form, there are also solid theoretical reasons that underpin the moves. 
When multinational enterprises from developed countries are faced with higher 
adaptation and information requirements than they are accustomed to, particularly in 
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culturally dissimilar countries, the joint venture form may be indicated. Most foreign 
investors in China have to confront such requirements. 
The findings ofGlaister and Wang's research (1993) showed that UK partners viewed the 
joint venture as crucial to gaining knowledge of the local market and local culture, and 
subsequently linking with major buyers and distribution channels. These are exactly the 
kind of inputs that UK firms would find it difficult to obtain when operating alone, and 
where the local knowledge and contracts of the Chinese partners are paramount. The 
importance of these largely intangible inputs significantly outweighs the importance of 
access to more clearly definable inputs such as labour, materials and capital. Moreover, 
the most important strategic motivation advanced for joint venture formation by overseas 
investors was their rapid entry to China's domestic market, and the efforts they made 
were consistent with achieving this. 
Compared with other less risky entry options such as contractual processmg and 
assembly, compensation trade, licensing, counter-trade, and export/import activities, the 
joint venture option can provide the foreign parent with some control over management 
and production and thus protection of quality and reputation. Pearson (1989) argued that 
in a positive sense, the legal and policy environment for equity joint ventures throughout 
the 1980s was better defined compared with that of wholly foreign-owned enterprises in 
China and hence it was somewhat less risky than other forms of direct investment. 
Davidson (1987) revealed that over 90 percent of the U.S. firms interviewed state that the 
primary market focus of their joint venture was entry to the Chinese market. Chinese. 
partners, however, express a primary interest in foreign export markets. Chinese partners 
want to 'flood' foreign markets with low-priced products, whereas the US partners have 
contrary goals. Davidson finds that Chinese state-owned enterprises sought technology, 
funding, and ways to survive and to keep their staff employed. As soon as the joint 
venture was formed, the Chinese sought hard currency as quickly as possible. Chinese 
managers appear to desire a faster pace of technology transfer. The U.S. partners prefer 
to provide the joint venture with older technology. Fan's study (1996) confirmed this 
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vital difference and stressed that gaps between the perceptions or expectations and the 
objectives held by the joint venture partners frequently cause conflicts in managing joint 
ventures and can even threaten their survival. 
Beamish (1993) identified the motivations of Chinese partners in setting up joint ventures 
as obtaining the overseas partners' technological and managerial skills as well as cash, 
patents, raw-material sources. Another important factor was that the Chinese were more 
interested in using a joint venture to export their products to the foreign market 
(Davidson 1987; Beamish and Wang 1989; Shenkar 1990). Hamill and Pambos (1997) 
also reported that China's aim in allowing joint ventures was to gain access to advanced 
technology and to promote exports through the overseas partner's international 
knowledge and distribution cham1els. The overseas partners, on the other hand, often 
view the joint venture as a means of gaining access to lower production costs or of 
entering and developing China's domestic market. 
Motivations on the Chinese side to set up joint ventures can also be found in official 
Chinese studies, such as Li and Xu (1994), Li (1995), and Yang (1997). Anlong them, 
perhaps the most authoritative was by Li Lanqing (1995), China's former first deputy 
premier. Li (1995) listed China's motivations for setting up joint ventures as follows: 
11 To Supplement China's Construction Capital 
Shortage of capital has long restricted China's economic development. Therefore, setting 
up Sino-foreign joint ventures may mitigate China's capital shortage. In the past twenty 
years, inward flows of foreign investment have significantly contributed to China's 
economic growth (Li and Xu 1994; Li 1995; Yang 1997). 
111 To Upgrade China's Industry 
This would enable advanced technology brought in by overseas partners to fill in the gaps 
in China's industry. Technology transfer can upgrade many state-owned enterprises and 
their products. 
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o To Introduce Advanced Management Skills 
Overseas partners can bring in modern management skills, including management of 
production, quality assurance, sales and services, human resources, and finance. 
o To Increase Financial Revenue and Create Jobs 
With a large number of joint ventures established, they can make a significant 
contribution to government revenue through corporate income tax. Joint ventures can 
also create jobs for China. 
o To Promote Development of an Internationalised Economy 
As overseas partners have extensive links with the international market, the Chinese party 
can also benefit form their overseas partners' international connections including 
marketing networks, loans, facilities, and access to research and development. Increases 
in the exports of joint ventures can expand China's export volume and so improve 
China's hard currency revenue. All of these can promote the internationalisation of the 
Chinese economy. 
There are significant differences in the motives for setting up joint ventures between 
Chinese and overseas partners. In all the six cases of China-based joint ventures with 
British partners, which he looked at, Yang (1996) also found that despite the fact that 
Chinese and British partners did have some important consensus in the early stage, which 
contributed to a joint entry strategy, there exist motivational differences: 
Overseas partner 
Government incentives/cheap land/labour 
Bank loans from China's domestic banks 
Local marketing and sales networks 
Targeting maximum China domestic market 
Chinese partner 
Western technologies/management skills 
Maximum utilisation of foreign capital 
Creation of new jobs 
Targeting maximum overseas market 
As the Chinese and the overseas partners' strategic objectives for setting up a joint 
venture are different, even contradictory to some extent, most joint ventures' entry 
strategies are inevitably the products of compromise (Table 3.2-1). 
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Table 3.2 -1 Strategic Differences between Chinese and British Partners 
Objectives Overseas partners Chinese partners 
Investment motivation Cash profits Political, economic and social benefits 
Market orientation China's domestic market orientation Overseas market orientation with tightly 
controlled domestic sales 
Capital Expecting bank loans from China Expecting foreign capital or bank loans from 
overseas 
Equipment Intent on providing just out-of-date or even Expecting latest and band new equipment 
second-hand equipment 
Technology Single, not advanced, high value Latest, series, dynamic, low value 
Top management Maximum control Learning, joint management, maximum control 
Source: Yang, 1996 
The compromise inherent in joint venture strategies may help potential venture partners 
reach their deals, but the differences will inevitably stand out during the operational 
stage. 
In summary, there exist significant differences between the Chinese and overseas partners 
in motivations for setting up joint ventures. The Chinese want to get into overseas 
markets while foreign investors target China's domestic market. These differences lead 
to different expectations of the joint venture's operation and long-term strategy, and 
could ultimately be fatal to its stability. As these differences will cause conflicts and 
problems in various areas, Killing (1983) and Dutta and Merva (1990) argued that the 
motivations of the partners need to be balanced, though often they are not. 
• Bargaining Power 
Pearson's study (1989) suggested that the extent to which a host government can assert 
control in relation to foreign firms depends upon its bargaining power and the possibility 
for increasing it. Standard bargaining power scenarios postulate that each party brings to 
negotiations a set of attributes or strengths that it can use to influence on outcome. 
Despite many potential conflicts between partners, there is a range of conditions within 
which the interests of a host country and a foreign investor may converge to generate an 
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outcome advantageous to each side. Although the strengths of the negotiating parties are 
by no means necessarily equal, no party needs entering negotiations unless it can gain. 
The norms of bargaining also presume that, because both sides must gain, neither can 
unilaterally control the outcome at the expense of the other. 
The prospect that China will open what overseas investors have long believed to be a 
huge domestic market has made it a highly desirable location for new investment. The 
Chinese government can use this strength, particularly when bargaining with overseas 
investors with respect to industries in which there is fierce international competition to 
enter. Pearson (1989) has an in-depth analysis of China's bargaining power in the late 
1970s and the 1980s and points out that although China brings to the bargaining process 
weaknesses as well as strengths, on the whole, its market potential is immense. The 
combination of three features - the relatively centralised control of the economy, the 
absence of a national bourgeoisie, and the huge potential market, means that China is 
better situated to control the terms of foreign investment than any other developing 
country, which wishes to attract foreign investment. China's potential weaknesses are 
also evident but these often parallel the strengths of foreign firms, which offer foreign 
capital, advanced technology, international marketing networks, and management skills. 
During the 1980s and the early 1990s, because of the repetitive importation of the same 
technology, the same production line, or the same products, fierce domestic competition 
took place between state-owned enterprises. Most state-owned enterprises turned to the 
joint venture solution for survival. This provided potential overseas investors with plenty 
of choices for selecting their Chinese partners. For example, nearly all the world's big 
car manufacturers have engaged in negotiations with every Chinese car manufacturer. 
Most Chinese state-owned enterprises are well positioned for selection, but have no 
strength at all in bargaining for 51 per cent stakes (Pearson 1989). Most Chinese 
enterprises attach great importance to control over teclmology rather than over equity, 
and this is especially the case with those needing technology or new products. With 
control over technology or products, Chinese partners can speed up the process of self-
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strengthening. But this has further enhanced bargaining power of foreign investors as a 
result. 
3.2.2 Joint Venture Ownership and Control 
(1) Joint Venture Ownership Structure 
The distribution of equity in a joint venture is determined by each partner's individual 
contributions of assets and attributes, including: financial resources, machinery, patents, 
trademarks, technology, management know-how, and distribution networks. It is also 
determined by the legislation of the host nation. Hence, the percentage of the equity held 
often reflects the percentage of control over a joint venture. In most joint ventures 
outside China, control over decision-making is directly tied to the division of ownership 
between partners - the partner with majority ownership has the majority of votes on the 
board of directors. Host governments in both planned and market economies commonly 
restrict the percentage equity held by foreigners to 49 percent or less, as a means of 
retaining control over jointly owned companies (Pearson 1989). 
China's policy on joint ventures breaks with this tendency. According to Article 4 of 
China's Joint Venture Law, "In the registered capital of a joint venture, the proportion of 
the investment contributed by the foreign participant shall in general be not less than 25 
percent". The Joint Venture Law does not specify a maximum limit on foreign 
ownership, thereby offering the possibility of 99 percent foreign ownership of a joint 
venture. The precise division of equity is to be left to negotiation. 
However, in practice, as Pearson (1989) indicates, Chinese officials are clear in their 
preference for Chinese majority or fifty-fifty ownership, for the 'comfort of control' over 
management. Reflecting this preference, Chinese majority or equal ownership was far 
more common than foreign majority ownership for joint ventures formed before 1985. 
Most overseas investors did not oppose minority or 50 percent ownership, and in some 
cases even preferred it. The lack of opposition from overseas partners was due, in part, to 
the fact that their major incentive was to explore the Chinese market and maintain a 
60 
China-based Joint Ventures Chapter 3 
defensive position against international competition. Beamish and Wang (1989) also 
found that foreign firms had a minority equity position in most of the 805 equity joint 
ventures formed in China before 1986. Similar results were reported by Engholm ( 1989), 
Boisot and Child (1990). 
Yan and Luo (2001) argued that institutional pressure for joint ventures, or for a 
particular type of joint venture, were imposed not in the form of formal laws or 
government regulations but of strong social, cultural, or industrial nom1s. For example, 
the significant rise of 50-50 shared joint ventures made Western researchers and 
practitioners speculate that it was Chinese law that required the equal split of equity 
ownership. In fact, all versions of Chinese joint venture law states that the foreign 
partner's equity holdings should be 'at least 25 percent' while no ceilings were stipulated. 
In effect, joint ventures with majority foreign ownership have been legally allowed since 
the very outset of the policy. 
However, in practice, as Hamill and Pambos (1997) point out, China's policy towards 
foreign direct investment remains complex and difficult to interpret. There is often 
confusion between what is allowed legally and what can be done unofficially, and 
between state-level policy and the interpretation of that policy by regional and local 
officials. In the different areas, which are opening up, local government departments 
have their own detailed regulations on joint venture ownership, which could well be 
different from those of the national joint venture law. For example, in certain industries 
in China, overseas companies' maximum stake has been limited to a minority holding of 
49 per cent. In some sectors, such as defence industry, there was no foreign entry (Li and 
Xu 1994). 
The official requirements for the ownership of joint ventures in Dalian (Table 3 .2-2) were 
not in line with Chinese joint venture law. But these locally adjusted regulations have 
been dominating the formation of joint ventures in Dalian during the period under 
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examination. According to a senior Dahan official1, such local ownership regulations 
resulted from the Dalian government's 'interpretation' of the national joint venture law, 
which was based on its own economic situations. 
Table 3.2-2 Official Ownership Proportion for Setting up Joint Ventures (Dalian) 
Period Chinese Partner Overseas Partner 
1980- 1984 At least 51% 49%max. 
1985- 1991 At least 25% 75% max. 
1992- 1998 At least 5% 95%max. 
Source: Joint Venture Supplementary Regulations for Ownership Proportion, Dahan (1998) 
The implication of the evolving ownership requirements is that most of Dalian's large 
and dedium-sized state-owned enterprises have difficulties in finding finance for forming 
joint ventures. Potential overseas investors are not always impressed by the Chinese 
partner's old factory buildings, out-of-date equipment, low productivity, and staff. That 
was a major reason why Chinese government at all levels has encouraged wholly foreign-
owned enterprises rather than joint ventures 2 . 
Chen (1998) also revealed that Chinese state-owned enterprises have encountered several 
difficulties in controlling majority equity within joint ventures in the 1990s. Many state-
owned enterprises had serious difficulties in actual operation. They needed overseas 
capital, up-to-date technology and products in order to consolidate their business 
positions. China's state-owned enterprises thus were not in a good bargaining position for 
controlling majority equity within joint ventures. As a result, controlling majority equity 
was not a major concern to most state-owned enterprises in joint venture negotiations. In 
contrast, most overseas investors, especially those who had contributed capital and 
1 Jin Richen, Deputy Director of the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee of the Dalian 
Municipal Government (interview, 1998). 
2 Cheng Shaofang, Deputy Secretary-General ofDalian Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment 
(Interview, 1998). 
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equipment, attached great importance to majority equity m order to maintain their 
decision-making power. 
Since 1993, the Chinese government has encouraged state-owned enterprises to 
contribute their entire rather than a part of the fixed assets to form joint ventures with 
overseas investors3. This also supports Beamish' s (1993) study, which pointed out that 
the perceived foreign ownership ceiling has recently been lifted in China and predicted 
that the number of majority foreign owned joint ventures would increase, with a 
corresponding increase in the amount of dominant foreign control. 
Pan's study (1997) confirmed that it was not only possible for overseas firms to take 
larger equity shares but the Chinese government started to encourage the development of 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Pan (1997) showed through his sample that over time, 
the Japanese and U.S. investors have shifted gradually from a 50-50 per cent to a majority 
equity position, especially between 1991 and 1993, whereas U.S. contributions were 
generally less than 50 percent equity in the period 1988 to 1990. Osland and Cavusgil 
(1996) revealed that large U.S. multinationals have used relatively small-capitalised joint 
ventures as a means to enter the Chinese market and when these joint ventures have 
become profitable, the U.S. parents have attempted to acquire a larger share of the 
operation. 
(2) Joint Venture Contron 
Control is particularly important in joint ventures in the uncertain context of developing 
countries (Child and Yan 1999). The share of ownership of the joint venture is perceived 
to be a mechanism of control (Osland and Cavusgil 1996). But Child (1984) pointed to 
the fact that within an international joint venture there are two kinds of control that 
investors might hope to attain: strategic control and operational control. Strategic control 
is the control over the means and methods on which the whole conduct of a joint venture 
depends, including the deployment of capital, the determination of strategic priorities and 
the making of senior appointments. Operational control is the control over the production 
3 Cui Xiaodong, Dahan Foreign Affairs Office (Interview, 1998) 
63 
China-based Joint Ventures Chapter 3 
process within a joint venture, in the sense of determining how the employees perform 
their work. It focuses on production and related activities such as purchasing, sales and 
distribution, and quality. Kim (1996) argued that external variables seem to be more 
important than internal ones in affecting joint ventures' operations. The partner who 
controls the external variables appears to have more influence on the direction of joint 
venture development. In most cases, overseas partners have controlled external variables 
and the internal variables are mostly controlled by Chinese partners, except production 
and operation. 
Shenkar (1990), Teagarden (1990) and Beamish (1993) indicated that it was effective to 
divide up control along functional lines. To have one partner making nearly all the 
decisions increases the probability of poor performance in China. The local economy, 
politics, and culture in China are so far removed from the experience of most Western 
firms that dominant overseas control is extremely risky. Similarly, the lack of technology 
and management skills of the Chinese could make dominant control by them equally 
risky. The fact that in17 out of22 joint ventures in Beamish's (1993) study there was split 
control, suggesting that this was the most common control system. 
Dong et al. (1993) investigated the control over decision areas by individuals of different 
nationalities. Their study made the distinction between Western and overseas Chinese 
investors. They found that in both groups, foreign partners had much more control over 
such areas as product planning and quality control, and a little more over marketing. On 
the other side, local partners had more control over production planning, wages, 
recruitment, and labour policy. They also found that on dividend policy, organisation, 
purchasing, budgeting and accounting, as well as exports and imports, control was 
roughly equally shared between the partners. Compared with Western partners, overseas 
Chinese were found to have more control over pricing policy, quality control, and export 
and import and their local partners have more control over matters such as wage and 
labour policy and organisational issues. However, disagreement often existed in decisions 
over pricing policy, accounting, and marketing. 
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Killing (1983) presented vanous examples where foreign firn1s could control joint 
ventures even when in a minority equity position. Beamish (1993) suggested that in 
China, overseas firms are typically able to exercise somewhat greater control than their 
equity levels would suggest. However, all previous studies failed to identify whether this 
is due to the nature of the overseas partners' contribution, or to a more sophisticated 
knowledge of the control mechanisms available. 
3.2.3 Joint Venture Partners 
Selecting the right partner has been considered very important in the China-based joint 
venture context (Campbell 1989; Glaister and Wang 1993; Shaw and Meier 1993; 
Gledhill 1994). The local partner has been required to be resourceful and well connected 
(Shenkar 1990; Kim 1996). In developed countries, a successful joint venture requires 
partners to have compatible and comparable capabilities and experience; for example, the 
partners should complement one another in management capacity and experience. It was 
difficult, if not impossible, however, in East Asian countries to find a local firm that has 
comparable management capacity and experience to a Western firm (Kim 1996). 
Foreign investors perceive that good Chinese partners can assist in setting up day-to-day 
operations: for example, in securing plant space, personnel, sources of raw materials, and 
ready-made sales and distribution channels. Others desire access to project opportunities, 
markets, flexible rulings on the use of foreign exchange or state funds, and sometimes 
even fiscal concessions (Shaw and Meier 1993). But the most important characteristic in 
a Chinese partner is the ability to negotiate with the host government. It is perceived that 
all the large state-owned enterprises have a stronger ability than private companies to 
negotiate with relevant government departments. 
Casson and Zhang (1992) argued that the necessary characteristics and skills required of 
Chinese partners relate to important inputs which the overseas partners expect from them: 
the ability to negotiate with the Chinese government; involvement in related business; 
trust between top management teams; established marketing and distribution systems; 
reputation; experience in technology applications. Hence, the necessity to find partners 
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who are involved in a related business is shown as the second most important 
characteristic. A strong argument is advanced in the theoretical literature on joint 
ventures that the fundamental basis of the relationship does rest on trust between the 
management teams. 
Beamish (1993) revealed that owing to government pressure, joint ventures in China are 
frequently created with state-owned partners. None of the 22 joint ventures in Beamish's 
(1993) study were with private Chinese partners. Glaister and Wang's study (1993) 
showed that consistent with the Chinese business system, most Chinese partners of joint 
ventures are linked with the relevant government departments that put as their priority the 
reform of state-owned enterprises by means of introducing Western technology. This can 
explain why most Chinese partners were state-owned enterprises in the 1980s and the 
first half of the 1990s. 
Overseas investors have hoped that their local partners can add value to their joint 
ventures in a variety of ways. In practice, however, the value added by local operating 
partners is usually quite low to begin with, and steadily declines over time. Chinese 
partners, in general, are much less interested in winning market shares and breaking 
through entry barriers than in gaining access to technology, know-how, new jobs, foreign 
markets and foreign exchange (Shaw and Meier 1993). 
Hamill and Pambos (1997) discovered that with different strategic motivations for setting 
up joint ventures, each partner seemed to be trying to gain advantage over the other 
during the operational stage, rather than working together for their mutual benefit. Some 
Chinese partners, moreover, had used the technologies and management skills transferred 
to improve their own competitive positions in their other core businesses rather than for 
the benefit of the joint ventures. The Western partners had received very little in return 
and, more seriously, had created strong local competitors for themselves in the host 
country. 
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In contrast, Child and Tse (2001) argued that as China's economic reform proceeds, and 
drawing from two decades of experience of operating in China, overseas investors have 
gradually learned how to operate in China context. As a result, their resource dependency 
on Chinese authorities or Chinese partners can be expected to decrease. Similarly, as 
Chinese firms improve their technology, knowledge and other capabilities, they are 
becoming less dependent on foreign partner, and the competitive advantage that foreign 
firms have enjoyed in technology and management expertise is likely to decrease. 
The limitations of the previous literature on partner issues in China-based joint ventures 
are firstly that it has paid too much attention to state-owned Chinese partners while 
ignoring private partners. There is no research that has studied the attitudes of private 
Chinese partners and compared them with state ones. With the rapid increase of 
involvements in joint ventures by the private sector, research into private Chinese 
partners is crucial. Secondly, in-depth studies on the changes in inter-partner dependency 
and its evolution are absent in the existing literature. 
3.2.4 Joint Venture Operation 
Making a deal and making it work are the last two stages of the strategic framework for 
foreign market entry. Making the deal involves partner selection, negotiations, financing 
the project, and in many cases the transfer of technology. Making the deal work involves 
management, factory construction, materials and components sourcing, labour and 
personnel issues and marketing (Campbell 1988). The key to success for the foreign 
company lies in a joint operation and management shared between the joint venture 
partners. 
Managing a joint venture in China is different from managing it in a developed country 
(Zamet and Bovamick 1986) or in a less developed country (Fan 1996). Hofstede (1991) 
has argued that contrasting cultural characteristics of nations give rise to distinctive 
patterns of managerial behaviour. The hazards of joint venture management are 
particularly intense in China-based joint ventures, due to huge differences in managerial 
systems and philosophies (Davidson 1987). 
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It has been established earlier that Chinese and overseas joint venture partners have 
different motives for setting up joint ventures. In establishing a joint venture, each party 
hopes to achieve its strategic objectives maximally - a win/win solution. Thus, when 
creating a joint entry strategy, those motivational differences are temporarily put aside by 
the Chinese and overseas partners in order to make the entry deal work. Nevertheless, 
although the joint venture deal is made with significant compromises, the different 
expectations of the joint operation still remain and cause constant conflict between joint 
venture partners. 
"' The Parent Companies of Chinese Partners and Chinese Managers 
Chinese parent companies will exert continuous influence on the day-to-day operation of 
joint ventures as long as some of the staff and workers of the joint venture are recruited 
from these Chinese parent companies. Osland (1990), Shenkar (1990) and Beamish 
(1993) indicated that a Chinese parent company can, whenever it suits the interests of the 
parent company, dispatch and recall its workers to and from the joint venture, as if the 
joint venture is merely a branch office of the parent company. A foreign manager still 
lacks the means to defend himself against such abuse unless he is able to replace the 
personnel manager, who is more often than not simply an extended arm of the Chinese 
parent company. 
Davidson (1987) noted that the influences of culture, central planning, and the political 
solutions to all problems have created four distinct characteristics in the typical Chinese 
manager. First of all, the manager does not concern himself with the relationship 
between costs and revenues. Second, he or she is very cautious. Changes, in any form, 
are extremely difficult to implement. The consequences of failure or of making mistakes 
far outweigh any potential rewards from innovation. Indeed, innovation and 
progressiveness have not been desired qualities in the Chinese managerial system. Third, 
there is a lack of interdepartmental communication in Chinese enterprises. The fear of 
making mistakes and the distrust created by the Cultural Revolution have created a 
situation where departments have become separate spokes of a wheel, which 
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communicate only through the head office. Fourth, the relationship between workers and 
managers IS poor. 
IJ Overstaffing Problem 
The Joint Venture Labour Recruitment Procedures requires joint ventures to recruit their 
staff and workers from the pool of workers belonging to the Chinese parent company, 
provided that they are available and competent (Shenkar 1990). However, many joint 
ventures have encountered the problem of excess workers (Ruggles 1983; National 
Council for U.S./China Trade 1987). The problem may be particularly severe in those 
joint ventures that have taken over operating plants from the Chinese parent. In many 
cases, when skilled workers are available, the Chinese parent is often reluctant to transfer 
them to the joint venture, and would prefer instead to transfer superfluous and less 
qualified personnel (Shenkar 1990; Beamish 1993). 
Cardio-Pace, the U.S. parent of a joint venture in Baoji City, found that the Chinese 
parent company wanted to staff the joint venture with a few dozen of its excess assistant 
managers and workers (Times, 2nd June 1986). Although similar problems have also 
been found in joint ventures in other countries, it may be more serious in China where 
many enterprises and state enterprises have been over-staffed for years (Shenkar 1990; 
Beamish 1993; Li and Xu 1994). 
Therefore, the preferred option is to build a new organisation for the joint venture rather 
than taking over existing facilities from the host parent company. The reason is that it is 
much more difficult to change institutionalised work norms than to instil new ones into 
younger employees who are still amenable to such socialisation (Shenkar 1990). 
m Export Requirements and Domestic Market Restrictions 
China's joint venture law itself does not make it clear that joint venture products must be 
exported. However, according to Article 61 of the 'Regulation on the Implementation of 
the Joint Venture Law' (1983), "the products of joint ventures which China urgently 
needs or imports may be sold mainly to the Chinese market". However, whether a joint 
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venture product is urgently needed or not will be defined by the central or the local 
governments. 
Joint ventures are free to import and export as they wish. However, in order to do so, 
import and export licenses are required and these are difficult to obtain unless the 
company has predicted the need to do so months in advance, having built this into its plan 
for that period and had the process approved (Hamill and Pambos 1997). 
From 1980 to 1995, the general practice in most of the opening cities was to fix the 
percentage of a joint venture's domestic sales according to the Chinese party's registered 
capital shares. The remaining products would have to be exported (see Grub and Lin 
1991 ). Chinese government researchers Li and Xu (1995) reported that in the case of 
processing joint venture projects, 70 percent of their products must be exported and the 
average export share in their sample of 50 joint ventures were more than 60 percent. 
The huge Chinese market has been regarded as being the most appealing factor for 
overseas investors. The problem is that the Chinese government generally keeps the 
domestic market away from foreign investors, partly to protect domestic industries and 
partly to force joint ventures to sell their products abroad, thus eaming foreign exchange. 
Limited access to the domestic market was the key barrier to the establishment of wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises in the late 1980s. To establish a joint venture then was the 
only way to gain access to the Chinese domestic market. Accepting exports from China 
was the price overseas investors had to pay for gaining access to the Chinese domestic 
market (Daniels et al. 1985). 
Pearson ( 1989) revealed that the Chinese govemment had set up a number of controls to 
discourage domestic sales by joint ventures. The government was able to use the state 
plan to press for exports. By including joint ventures in these state marketing plans, the 
government was able to direct how and where joint ventures should make sales. It could 
also use its pricing authority to impose much higher prices for joint venture products than 
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for the comparable local product, making domestic sales difficult. And in theory the 
government could also use its Chinese managers within joint ventures to direct sales. 
Only in 1995 did the Chinese government relax the restrictions on the domestic sales and 
on wholly foreign-owned enterprises whose products initially had to be exported in full 4• 
Li and Xu (1995) pointed out that the opening up of the domestic market is a difficult 
problem linked with the protection of national industry. However, with China' s 
accession to the WTO, the Chinese government is no longer allowed to force joint 
ventures to sell to international markets. 
!I Joint Venture Performance 
Empirical evidence from previous studies suggests that international joint ventures in 
general perform poorly. Estimated failure rates from 30 to 60 percent, with the incidence 
of failure being highest in the joint ventures in developing countries. One could expect 
the failure rate of joint ventures in China to be just as high, or even higher given the 
complex economic, political, market, legal and cultural difficulties involved in doing 
business in China (Hamill and Pambos 1997). 
According to McKinsey Research Worldwide, about 80 percent of international joint 
ventures around the world collapsed within first decades after their establishment. China 
does not seem to have bucked this trend (China-Britain Trade Review, February 2000). 
With different motives of Chinese and overseas venture partners, it is problematic to 
define a joint venture's success or failure. Each side has its own judgement. One party's 
success might be the other party's loss. In general, running a joint operation in China is 
difficult and foreign companies do leave in frustration (Teagarden and Von Glinow 1991; 
Beamish 1993; Yan and Gray 1994; Osland and Cavusgil1996). 
Beamish (1993) suggested that the longer a joint venture has been in operation, the 
greater will be the amount of reorganisation/liquidation, as performance problems arise. 
4 Jin Richen, Deputy Director of the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee of the Dalian 
Govetnment (Interview, 1998). 
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Beamish's (1993) research showed that performance problems accelerated over time. 
Most foreign partners have indicated their dissatisfaction with joint venture performance 
and this is unlikely to change. 
Pei (1999) and Wong (1999) also identified a high failure rate for China-based joint 
ventures. Similarly, according to the China Economy Blue Book (2000, P.256), by the 
end of 1999, of 325,000 approved foreign invested projects, there were only 145,000 
projects left; 180,000 projects had disappeared. The failure rate was 55 percent. 
In contrast, Davidson (1987) found that more than two-thirds of 47 Sino-U.S. joint 
ventures achieved or exceeded performance expectations. Campbell ( 1989) found that 1 0 
of 13 Sino-U.S. joint ventures claimed to have good or very good profitability. Eiteman 
(1990) found that 10 out of 17 Sino-U.S. joint ventures were an economic success. 
Pearson (1991) reported that most of the managers interviewed were positive about their 
joint venture performance. Stelzer et al. (1992) indicated that nearly two-third of the 
Sino-U.S. joint venture met or exceeded performance expectations. Dong et al. (1993) 
reported that foreign partners were satisfied with their joint venture perfom1ance. Ding 
(1993) gave evidence that 53 percent of the Sino-U.S. joint ventures expressed a high 
level of satisfaction with financial performance. Osland and Cavusgil's (1996) 
demonstrated that. 43 managers and government officials were satisfied with the 
performance of eight Sino-U.S. joint ventures. Each joint venture in the sample was 
profitable and in seven of the eight cases, profit levels exceeded both partners' 
expectations. However, Osland and Cavusgil (1996) discovered some instability in their 
sample of Sino-U.S. joint ventures. 
3.2.5 Instability of China-Based Joint Ventures 
Davidson (1987) noted that although a joint venture appears to offer greater revenues, 
lower costs, and less risk than the commitment of a wholly owned subsidiary, it was still 
the most difficult option. Vanhonacker (1997) argued that China is vast and varied, with 
a culture and traditions profoundly different from those of the West, and its social, 
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governmental, and economic systems are particularly complex. Those obstacles alone 
would make a joint venture difficult. After all, joint ventures are notoriously hard to 
sustain even in the relatively stable environments of the United States and Europe. 
Joint venture stability depends greatly upon qualitative variables such as external 
environment, individual personalities, organisational cultures, administrative styles, and 
management philosophies. Causes for the instability of China-based joint venture 
management were many. For example, changes in government policy, issues of staffing, 
operating procedures, price transfer, sourcing of raw materials, technology selection, 
dividend policies, product lines, pricing, costing and investment allocation, market 
priorities, management control, and many other factors, all could be obstacles to the 
stability of a joint venture. 
The causes have been extensively covered in the literature (Killing 1982; Harrigan 1984; 
Harrigan 1985; Kogut 1988; Pearson 1989; Fan 1996). Mamill and Pambos (1997) 
suggested that the problems arising from different partner objectives and cultural 
conflicts are likely to be particularly acute in China-based joint ventures. They argued 
that the most important factor affecting the stability of a China-based joint venture is 
whether there is mutual adaptation between the overseas partner and the Chinese 
partner/the Chinese Government. 
Fan (1996) argued that gaps between the perceptions, expectations and objectives held by 
the joint venture partners frequently cause conflicts, and the cultural differences in 
organisation, structure and management style complicate the inter-partner relationship in 
managing the joint venture and exacerbate its instability. However, although Fan (1996) 
indicated mutual adaptation between joint venture partners as the most important factor 
for joint venture success, he nevertheless fails to address the impact of changes in the 
Chinese business environment on inter-partner adaptation and joint venture evolution. 
Several official Chinese studies (Li 1995; Li and Xu 1995; Yang 1997) on joint venture 
instability also revealed some key factors responsible for instability of China-based joint 
73 
China-based Joint Ventures Chapter 3 
ventures. In contrast to international studies, those official researchers believe that 
instability factors are mainly the following reasons: 
l!l The unbalanced structure of foreign direct investment 
1'1 Importation of out-of-date technology 
o Operational losses and transfer pricing 
o Fraudulent application for tax relief based on false high export prices 
o 'Shell' joint ventures and abuse of state funds 
o Misunderstandings caused by cultural differences 
11 Lack of understanding of managerial styles between Chinese and overseas 
partners 
11 Violation of laws or contracts causing losses to Chinese partners as well as a 
reduction in national assets 
Some researchers (Child 1994; Fan 1996; Kim 1996; Hamill and Pambos 1997; 
Vanhonacker 1997; Weir 1997; Bulcke et al.l999; Weldon and Vanhonacker 1999; 
Selmer 1999; Wong et al 1999) pointed out that China's economic environment is a 
continually changing influence on the stability of China-based joint ventures, so a 
continual readjustment of strategy does make a great deal of sense for a joint venture. 
However, there are other variables, such as the ability of mutual adaptation between the 
Chinese and the overseas partners, strategic differences that could also affect the stability 
of China-based joint ventures. 
Beamish (1993) concluded that joint ventures in China are likely to be less stable the 
longer they are in business. The longer a joint venture has been in operation, the greater 
will be the number of reorganisations/liquidations, as performance problems arise. 
However, with the relaxing of government pressures on setting up joint ventures, some 
overseas investors might consider converting their minority equity venture to a majority 
or wholly owned business. 
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3.3 China's Business Environment in the 1990s 
Like many emerging markets, China represents tremendous opportunities for growth and 
expansion as well as potential risks. As China's economic reforms unfold, China 
continues to present new challenges for foreign firms. In the 1980s, China was 
characterised by political instability, enormous uncertainty in market demand, sudden 
policy changes, lack of foreign currency, and government control (Cui 1998). In contrast, 
over the 1990s, in line with its economic boom, China has also enjoyed political stability. 
During this decade, there were dramatic changes in China's business environment. First 
of all, further reform of the large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises led to 
thousands of workers being laid-off, forcing the Chinese government to make job 
creation, rather than restrictions on foreign investment, its priority. Second, China's 
policy towards overseas investment became more favourable since the government 
removed the ban on investment in several sectors for wholly foreign-owned enterprises, 
such as banks, insurance companies, and wholesale businesses. Third, the further opening 
up of China's hinterland provided more choice for the location of international 
investment. Fourth, with encouragement from the government, the private sector became 
actively involved in joint venture projects. These changes have enhanced the bargaining 
power of overseas investors and put them in a more favourable position to adjust or 
reformulate their strategies in China. 
3.3.1 Economic Reforms 
China started its economic reform in 1979. As it has progressed, massive institutional 
changes have gradually dismantled many barriers to international business operations 
(Child and Tse 2001). However, institutional changes in China are highly complex, 
because in this formerly closed, state-dominated system, institutions have developed into 
massive inter-dependent, multi-level networks whose logic of operation depends as much 
on political influence and personal relationships as on concerns for efficiency (Nee 1992, 
Nolan 1995). It has also been consciously experimental with the result that multiple 
systems ofbusiness ownership and governance have emerged (Boisot and Child 1996). 
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Child and Tse (2001) identified several positive impacts of China's reforms on 
international business: (1) the shift from plan to market has increased China's 
attractiveness as an environment for international business as the relaxation of 
institutional constraints upon firms permitted both local and foreign firms to pursue their 
preferred business strategies with fewer restrictions than before. (2) China's increased 
exposure to the international market has allowed overseas investors more flexibility in 
their choice of entry and operating modes. For overseas investors, whether to form joint 
ventures and how do they choose their Chinese partners are determined less by the 
Chinese partner's ability to work with the government, and more by venture partners' 
mutual complement. (3) The growing spread of ownership and governance forms in 
China has led to a greater variety of types of cooperation between Chinese and overseas 
firms. (4) Policies on China's business support systems are now increasingly tailored to 
the needs of its privately owned and foreign-invested firms. 
s :Reform of State-Owned Enterprises 
Since 1984, China has implemented several policies in order to reform the industrial 
sector, aiming to improve the productivity of state-owned enterprises. The reform has 
produced some positive results, but the scale of improvement has not been sufficient to 
allow state-owned enterprises to compete with the non-state sector and their losses 
continue to increase. In 1992, Chinese officials at all levels signalled their intention of 
leading the country towards a socialist market economy, opening the economy wider to 
the rest of the world with an ambitious programme of economic reforms. These moves 
have allowed China to build an economy that is second only to the U.S. economy in size. 
A gradual, rather than a 'big bang' strategy has enabled China to develop and expand a 
pro-reform constituency, which have helped push forward the reform momentum (Liew 
1999). 
However, the success of the reforms is threatening the existence of many state-owned 
enterprises and efforts to keep these enterprises afloat are undermining the financial 
system because many of the loans made by state-owned banks are to enterprises that are 
loss-makers. In 1996 and 1997, 46 percent of state-owned industrial enterprises were 'in 
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the red' and the annual losses were 79.1 billion RMB (Lin 1998). The Chinese 
government was aware that the country needed to change course. Hence, they started 
cutting back bank loans to favoured projects. The austerity drive left many state-owned 
companies starve for funds and forced to lay off workers. The easy days of export-led 
growth were ending and the task of building a domestic economy lay ahead (Business 
Week, March 16, 1998). 
At the Fifth Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress held in September 1995, the 
Chinese leadership launched the policy of 'Grasp the large enterprises and let go the 
small ones'. The stated aim was to 'support the excellent and the strong state-owned 
enterprises' (Xie 1998). 
However, the employment effects of this 1995 decision soon emerged. In 1997, RMB 30 
million was set aside by the government to facilitate approved cases of enterprise 
bankruptcy following a RMB 20 million injection in 1996. A further RMB 30 million 
was injected for this purpose in 1998 (Lardy 1998). In 1996, 420,000 workers were either 
dismissed or moved elsewhere in five cities in Liaoning Province (Chan 1998) and in the 
first month of 1997, 35,000 employees in state-owned enterprises in Guangzhou were 
made redundant (Ngai 1997). Layoffs of state enterprise employees were occurring 
elsewhere in China too, and became common after 1995. In 1997, the Chinese Labour 
Minister Li Boyong announced that 6 million urban workers in state enterprises would be 
laid off from state enterprises by the end of that year. The Ministry followed this up with 
an announcement in February 1998 that 8 tolO million workers in state enterprises would 
be made redundant over the next three years (Chan 1998). According to China Report 
(1st December 1999) the number of urban unemployed was about 12 million in 1998. 
This number did not include the 3 - 4 million workers who were being laid off each year 
from failing state-owned enterprises. The worsening unemployment situation is 
increasing the pressure on all levels of local government to create jobs. Naturally, the 
government regards foreign invested enterprises as a major source of job creation. 
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o Difficulty of Obtaining Bank Loans 
Unemployment and the threat of unemployment are causing workers to increase their 
savings and decrease spending. This in tum leads to deflation, which causes households 
to postpone consumption and increase savings further. However, with the reform of state-
owned enterprises, banks are now held responsible for the quality of their loans, and 
therefore are reluctant to lend (Liew 1999). The pressure is so serious that some bankers 
are reported to be pleading illness and staying at home to avoid the risk of making a bad 
loan (Sender 1998). This situation also affects the availability of loans to China-based 
joint ventures. More and more potential and existing Chinese joint venture partners are 
finding themselves unable to secure the bank loans needed for forming their joint 
ventures or for expanding their businesses. 
• Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis 
The Asian financial crisis has had a serious impact on China's economy, causing China's 
exports to slow down and overseas investment to drop in 1998. It has also adversely 
affected Chinese enterprises, particularly those dependent on exports to East Asia. 
Competition from South Korean companies, for example, has hit the shipbuilding 
industry in China. It is estimated that the depreciation of the won has diverted a billion 
USD worth of shipbuilding business from China to South Korea. The cashmere and 
computer industry has also been hit by the crisis (Liew 1999). 
Vanhonacker (1997) and Wong et al. (1999) also noted that the Asian financial crisis put 
the Chinese economy under stress. Foreign investment inflows slowed down because 
cash-starved Asian companies could no longer afford to invest in China. Exporters saw 
business shifting to cheaper factories in Thailand and Malaysia. The real estate boom in 
the rich coastal areas came to a halt. Unemployment rose and bad loans kept piling up in 
the state banks, threatening the health of the entire economy. As a result, the Chinese 
government turned to stress the importance of developing stock-holding economies and 
using overseas capital (Liew 1999). 
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3.3.2 Changes in State Policy towards Foreign Direct investment 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese government's policy towards foreign direct 
investment has been evolving, from only allowing joint ventures to pem1itting wholly 
foreign-owned subsidiaries, and then to actively encouraging wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises. This tendency was accelerated by China's domestic economic difficulties, 
and by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The evolution of the policy is summarised 
below (Figure 3.3-1 ). All these changes have made a strong impact on the development 
of foreign invested projects, especially on the long-term strategies of joint ventures (Li 
and Xu 1994; Li 1995; Yang 1997). 
Figure 3.3-1 Evolution of Government Policy towards Foreign Direct Investment 
Permitting only joint 
ventures and banning 
wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises 
Permitting wholly foreign-
owned enterprises while 
_____. encouraging joint ventures 
Encouraging wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises 
and welcoming joint 
ventures 
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises represent a firm commitment to foreign markets and 
offer the foreign investors increased flexibility and control. Within the constraints of the 
Chinese system, wholly foreign-owned enterprises allow managers to expand business 
quickly without the burden of an uncooperative partner. This mode also requires foreign 
companies to set up, manage, and protect their own processes and procedures, which 
leads to more careful strategic, operational and cost oversight (Vanhona.cker 1997). 
Before the adoption of the law of wholly foreign-owned enterprises in 1986, the State 
Council had approved some wholly foreign-owned enterprises, but these were all located 
in the four Special Economic Zones. Even after the law was adopted, the establishment 
of wholly foreign-owned ventures was under the direct control ofthe central government. 
China started to relax its control over wholly foreign-owned enterprises in 1987. Since 
then, the number of wholly foreign-owned enterprises has steadily increased each year. 
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Vanhonacker (1997) argued that although joint ventures can still be seen in some sectors, 
setting up wholly foreign-owned enterprises is a growing trend. Joint ventures and wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises are substantially similar in terms of taxation and corporate 
liability. They also operate under same foreign-exchange rules import and export 
regulations for licensing, quotas, and duties. Their only real difference is that a wholly 
foreign-owned venture takes less time to establish than a joint venture and is not required 
to have a board of directors 
Table 3.3-1 highlights the similarities and differences between a joint venture and a 
wholly foreign-owned venture. 
Table 3.3-1 Comparison of Joint Ventures and Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises 
Items Joint venture Wholly foreign-owned enterprise 
Relevant laws passed gth July 1979 201h April 1986 
Documents required Agreement, contract, and business plan Agreement and business plan 
Business status Joint ownership Sole ownership 
Legal person status Chinese independent legal person Chinese independent legal person 
Highest authority Board of directors Parent company 
Management mode Joint management Sole management 
Investment Cash, technologies, land, factory ... Fixed assets or cash 
Market orientation Overseas and domestic markets Overseas market (before 1995) 
Overseas and domestic markets (after 1995) 
Profit distribution According to proportion of each party's Wholly owned by the foreign investor 
ownership share 
Closedown clearance After clearance of debt, the rest of After clearance of debt, the rest of property 
property and capital will be distributed and capital are wholly owned by the foreign 
according to ownership shares investor 
Taxation 33%* 33%** 
Duration limitation 5years to 50 years or longer 5years to 50 years or longer 
* 30% tax goes to the central government and 3% tax goes to the local government 
** Before 1'1 July 1991, the overall tax for foreign invested enterprises was 50% (40% to the central 
govetnment and 10% to the local government). 
Sources: The Chinese Joint Venture Law (1979) and Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise Law (1986) and 
MOFTEC official website: www.moftec.gov.cn, 2001. 
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Some foreign investors mistakenly believe that for wholly owned enterprises have higher 
export quotas than joint ventures. In reality, wholly owned enterprises probably do 
export more of their products. That is, however, not a result of Chinese regulations but an 
outcome of negotiations for the approval of the enterprise. Unless the venture brings 
something China wants, the Chinese authorities will demand an export quota of at least 
50 per cent from wholly owned enterprises as a kind of fee for not working with a 
Chinese partner. Moreover, the authorities use this fee as a way to justify their approval 
of the wholly foreign-owned enterprises to higher officials in the bureaucracy. Similarly, 
Chinese scholars (Li and Xu 1994) pointed out that the law and regulations on joint 
ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises do not specify what percentage of their 
output to be exported or how many they are allowed to sell domestically. 
Over the 1990s, some pioneering companies, frustrated by the limitations and under-
performance of joint ventures, began experimenting with wholly owned enterprises. 
Many of those companies met only minimal resistance from the authorities. Chinese 
officials proved far more concerned about what outside investors can bring to the country 
in terms of jobs, technology, and foreign exchange - than how the deals are structured. 
At the same time, foreign investors find that wholly owned enterprises provide them with 
flexibility and managerial controls and make an excellent fit with China's competitive 
situation (Vanhonacker 1997). 
The commitment to openmg to the world economy and the transition to a market-
orientated economy have led to increasing competition within China and forced the 
central government to adopt policies that comply with international standards (Child and 
Tse 2001). As a result, overseas investors can enter China in many different modes with 
greater confidence. This is in contrast to previous practice under which many industries 
(e.g. import and export, internet services, retail, insurance and banking services) were 
exclusively reserved for local firms or restricted to joint ventures. As a part of China's 
move towards privatisation, business operations are increasingly detached from 
government ties. For overseas investors, this disengagement implies that in deciding on 
their entry mode or in their choice of partners will be determined less by their local 
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partners' ability to work with the government and more by how the two firms 
complement each other, and the ability of the joint entity to develop sustainable 
competitive advantages (Child and Tse 2001). 
3.3.3 Further Opening Up of the Hinterland 
In order to effectively attract foreign direct investment, the central government has 
opened up its vast hinterland for foreign investment. All levels of government in the 
hinterland have more offered incentives for overseas investors than that in the coastal 
region. As a result, the opening of the hinterland becomes attractive to those overseas 
investors already in the coastal areas. This creates competition pressure on local 
governments and business partners in the coastal region and gives overseas investors 
more bargaining power in the reformulation of their China strategy. 
3.3.4 The Private Sector's Involvement 
With increasing unemployment due to the reform of state-owned enterprises, private 
enterprises and rural enterprises have been viewed as major employers. However, the 
development of the private sector is still inadequate. 
In the early 1980s, the Chinese government started to encourage the private sector, 
aiming to improve the overall efficiency of the economy and to create jobs. By the 
1990s, China's private sector showed progress in efficiency, product quality, job creation 
and financial strength. In the early 1990s, several large private enterprises in Guangdong 
province were approved to set up joint ventures with Hong Kong partners on a trial basis. 
In 1995, in line with their policy of encouraging wholly foreign-owned enterprises, the 
Chinese government started to encourage the private sector's involvement in foreign 
direct investment (Li 199 5; Yang 1997). 
Involvement by the private sector has helped to increase the number of joint venture 
projects and jobs. However, as local government have less control over the private sector 
(Li and Xu 1994), the emergency of joint ventures with private Chinese partners means a 
further loss of their control over joint ventures. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has further developed the framework for analysis of China-based joint 
ventures. Yan and Luo's research framework (2001) relating to structural reconfiguration 
in international joint ventures has been adopted and modified to investigate into the 
evolution process of China-based joint ventures and identify the patterns of evolution. 
Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has started to shift its priorities with 
regard to foreign direct investment, moving from encouraging joint ventures to wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises. Changes in both Chinese government policies and the 
economic environment have had a strong impact on the strategic evolution of China-
based joint ventures. This chapter has attempted to identify the two set forces, i.e. the 
driving and restraining forces for the stability of China-based joint ventures. 
83 
Objectives and Methodology Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 Objective§ and Methodology 
4.0 Introduction 
The methodology adopted in this thesis is designed to be compatible with the exploratory 
study of China-based joint ventures. It is essentially both quantitative and qualitative, 
allowing the flexibility to explore a wide range of issues, and also to generate convincing 
evidence. The research objectives, methods, location of fieldwork, sample, and the data 
collection approach are discussed in what follows. 
4.1 Research Objectives 
This research was based on a 3-month of fieldwork in Dalian, China from 6th June to 5th 
September 1998. The overall objectives were to investigate the nature of the Chinese 
transitional economy and to identify its impact on foreign direct investment, and then to 
establish a evolving profile of China-based joint ventures. The issues addressed include: 
o Drift of joint venture strategies 
n The impact of the changes in Chinese business environment on the state policy 
towards foreign direct investment 
8 Changes in joint venture partners' strategies, ownership structure, management 
and operations 
11 The evolution patterns of China-based joint ventures in the 1990s 
4.1.1 Development of the Research Theme 
Previous studies (Campbell1989; Pearson 1989; Weldon and Vanhonacker 1999; Wong 
et al. 1999; Guthrie 2002) have indicated that China's business environment is 
exceptionally complex. Peng (2000) emphasises that the transformational path taken by 
China is not predetermined. Rather, it is continually emerging through strategic choices 
made by government and firms, and this implies that researchers need to closely look at 
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how those choices are made. As a result of exploratory research, the main theme of the 
thesis is established as follows (Figure 4.1-1 ): 
Figure 4.1-1 Main Theme of the Research 
Changes in China's business environment 
in the transitional period 
Impact on joint ventures: 
s Drift of joint venture strategies 
m Initial balance of bargaining powers between partners 
a Interdependency between partners 
Changes in ownership 
structure 
Changes in partners' 
- strategies f--
The resulting pattern of evolution of 
China-based joint ventures 
Changes in operational 
management 
Chapter Two shows that intemational joint ventures have vastly different in strategies. 
However, explanations for such strategic differences have been couched in 'macro' terms 
of politics and economics when other variables such as cultural factors, social structure, 
and technology development can explain this variability equally well. 
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Based on the results of exploratory research, Figure 4.1-2 summarises the key trends in 
China's business enviromnent and development of joint ventures, taking into 
consideration ofboth external and internal factors. It also lists areas to be tested. 
Figure 4.1-2 Emerging Trends and Areas to be Tested 
(I) China's Economic Transition 
Emerging trends 
Impact of refmm of state-owned enterprises 
including: 
• Increased unemployment 
• Need for alternative employment 
• New financial problems 
The impact of the Asian financial crisis 
including: 
• Reduced inward investment 
• Export slowdown 
• Changing competitiveness 
(II) Business Environment Impact on Joint Ventures 
• Initial balance of bargaining powers 
between joint venture partners 
• Interdependency between joint 
venture partners 
Impacts to be tested 
• 
• 
Limited finance for joint venture projects 
Less government pressure on setting up joint 
ventures 
• More private involvement in foreign direct 
investment projects 
• Less restrictions on wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises 
• Further opening up of domestic market for FDI 
• Further opening up of hinterland areas for FDI 
Changes to be tested 
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• Increased bargaining power of overseas 
partners 
• Reduced bargaining power of Chinese partners 
• Reduced needs for joint venture partner 
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(III) Changes within Joint Ventures 
( 1) Changes in partners' individual strategies 
Chinese partners - Emerging strategies 
• Increased control along functional 
management lines 
• Increased domestic sales 
• Withdrawal from unprofitable joint 
ventures 
• Outward investment 
Overseas partners -Emerging strategies 
• Long-term commitment to the China market 
• Efforts to convert joint ventures into Q wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
• Efforts to maintain overseas sales 
• Localisation of management with 
own choices 
Chapter 4 
Changes to be tested 
• Market priority shifted from overseas to 
domestic market in order to increase control 
• Efforts to expand domestic sales, aiming to 
prevent 'transfer pricing' 
• Efforts to maintain majority ownership 
replaced by withdrawal from unprofitable joint 
ventures 
• Setting up alternative joint ventures outside 
China 
Changes to be tested 
• Acquiring complete ownership in order to 
reduce managerial and operational uncertainties 
• Further investment aiming to buy out Chinese 
partners 
• Efforts to control domestic sales 
• Efforts to recruit senior Chinese managers 
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(2) Changes in joint venture. ownership 
Emerging ownership trends 
• Shift of ownership 
between joint venture partners 
• Transition from joint ventures 
to wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
• More token joint ventures 
• More transition from joint ventures 
to wholly Chinese-owned enterprises 
(3) Changes in management and operations 
Emerging trends in operational management 
• More one-partner domination 
• Changes in workforce recruitment 
channels 
• China parent company's influence 
reduced 
q 
Chapter 4 
Changes to be tested 
B More official ownership transfer from Chinese 
to overseas patiners 
8 More reinvestment from overseas investors 
controlled joint ventures 
g Increase in token joint venture ownership 
through unofficial deals between partners 
• Chinese partners take over joint ventures when 
overseas partners exit 
Changes to be tested 
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• Dominant partner emerges from transfer of 
ownership 
~ Chinese partners are side-lighted in ventures 
dominated by overseas partners 
• Workforce recruitment switched from Chinese 
partner's parent company to local job centres 
• Declining number of staff and workers from 
Chinese parent companies 
• More Chinese general managers from third 
party entrants 
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c Establishment of joint ventures' 
own domestic sales forces 
c Predicted joint venture performance 
c Changes in the nature of cross-cultural 
management difficulties change. 
c Shift of marketing and sales channels from 
Chinese parent companies to own marketing 
and sales forces 
c Chinese party controlled joint ventures least 
unprofitable 
c Overseas party controlled joint ventures more 
profitable 
c Transformed joint ventures more profitable 
c Less occurrence of mutual adaptation in one 
party dominated operation 
c Increased workforce loyalty resulting from 
foreign investors' provision of housing, meals 
and medical care scheme for employees. 
Based on the key trends in China's business environment and inside joint ventures, 
several hypotheses can be made, which are to be tested in the context of China's 
economic transition: 
1. The changes in China's business environment work as a major driving force for 
the Chinese government to relax state control over foreign direct investment. 
2. The relaxation of state control over foreign direct investment affects the initial 
power relationships of joint venture partners. 
3. The new power relationships drive the changes in partners' strategies, ownership 
structure, and operational management. 
4. A more rapid evolution of China-based joint ventures results from the above 
changes. 
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4.2 Research Methodology 
4.2.1 Choosing the Research Method 
Traditional research usually adopts two basic strategies for data collection. One follows a 
positive, or quantitative route, and the other a qualitative strand of thought. Positivist 
epistemology has frequently been criticized for assuming that social sciences can be 
investigated in the same way as the natural sciences (Smith 1989). This implies the 
reduces of human action to the status of automatic responses produced by external stimuli 
(Gill and Johnson 1991). By limiting its conception of valid knowledge to that which is 
considered to be clearly observable 'sense-data', the quantitative method has been 
criticised for missing out important data when dealing with complex phenomena (Smith 
1989; Gill and Johnson 1991; Wright 1996). Through an artificial distancing from the 
phenomenon under investigation inherent in positivist epistemology, the researcher is not 
sufficiently close to the phenomenon to understand it fully (Smith 1989). 
The natural consequence of this criticism of quantitative research was the extolling of 
qualitative research in the psychology, economics and management branches of the social 
sciences. Wright (1996) defined qualitative research as any research where number 
counting and statistical techniques are not the central issues, but where an attempt is 
made to get close to the collection of data in its natural setting by applying, among other 
things, case studies and participant observation. Both Smith and Wright argued that 
qualitative research methods give the researcher added flexibility in capturing social 
complexities, which detect how factors are related and what underlying psychological, 
economic, or social dynamics explain how they relate together. On the other hand, a 
principal criticism of qualitative research methods, such as case studies, is that they are 
unrepresentative, and only suitable for exploratory studies at best, whereas quantification 
is necessary to establish the tlue overall validity of research findings. Wright proposed to 
'minimise' this drawback by using more than one case, and matching cases as far as 
possible along some variables, including industry, similar size and entering a foreign 
market within the same time period. Although Wright's argument may minimise this 
drawback of qualitative research, it is not strong enough to eliminate it, and the 
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implication of Wright's choice of the word 'minimise' is that there remains something 
undesirable left over. 
Various authors have accepted a position of triangulation, where qualitative and 
quantitative research methods are combined, such as Rohner (1977), Bennett (1983), 
Smith (1989), Snow and Thomas (1994), Yin (1994) and Wright (1996). A strategy of 
triangulation implies combining principal research methods, such as historical research, 
case studies, surveys, and field experiments. Snow and Thomas (1994) noted that studies 
that employed a triangulated methodology have an impressive record in the strategy 
literature. However, the multi-method approach also has its limitations. For example, the 
use of more than one field method introduces analytic diversity, though such diversity is 
low, relative to the entire range of research methods. Indeed, the use of multiple field 
methods may only be sufficient to create within-method triangulation (Denzin 1978), 
which means that the researcher has examined a phenomenon or relationship from 
various angles. 
However, the research methodologies in 43 previous Westem studies on Sino-foreign 
joint ventures in the 1980s and the 1990s were mainly interviews (16 studies- 37.2%), 
case studies (15 studies- 34.8%) and questionnaires (12 studies- 27.9%). See Table 4.2-
1, 2, 3 for details. 
Table 4.2-1 Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Studies- Interviews (16 studies) 
Date Authors 
1985 Daniels et a!. 
1988 Campbell 
1989 Li et al. (in Chinese) 
1989 Pomfret 
1990 Child et al. (in Chinese) 
1990 Dutta & Merva 
1991 Pomfret 
1993 Beamish 
1993 Pan,Vanhonacker et al. 
Foreign 
Partner 
USA 
Various 
Various 
Various 
Various 
USA 
Various 
Various 
Various 
Research 
Method 
Interviews 
Interviews 
Interviews 
Interviews 
Interviews 
Interviews 
Interviews 
Interviews 
Interviews 
91 
Studies 
Investment motivation and risk management 
A strategic guide to joint ventures in China 
Management of JVs: structure, style and adaptation 
Joint ventures in Jiangsu Province, China 
Management: control, decision making and culture 
US-China joint ventures: economic appraisal 
Characteristics of joint ventures and evaluation 
. The characteristics of joint ventures in PRC 
Operations and potential closing down of JVs in China 
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1994 Gledhill R. UK Interviews Interest in investing in China 
1996 Lan Ping Various Interviews Role of IJVs in transferring technology to China 
1996 Osland G.E & Cavusgil S.T. us Interviews Performance issues in US-China joint ventures 
1997 Pan Y. Japanese/USA Interviews The formation of Japanese and US JVs in China 
1999 J. Walsh, E. Wang & K. X in USA Interviews Same bed, different dreams: working relationships in 
Sino-American joint ventures 
1998 A. Sergeant & S. Frenkel Various Interviews Managing people in China: perceptions of expatriate 
managers in China-based joint ventures 
1999 Y. Wang, T. Maher, R. Various Interviews Are joint ventures losing their appeal in China 
Jenner, A. Appell & L. 
Hebert 
Table 4.2-2 Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Studies- Case Studies (15 studies) 
Date Authors Foreign Research Studies 
Partner Method 
1986 Hendryx USA Case studies Technology transfer in joint ventures 
1988 O'Reilly USA Case Studies A CEO's perspective 
1988 Goldenberg USA+UK Case studies Managing joint ventures in China and Japan 
1990 Crub & Lin Various Case studies Foreign direct investment in China 
1990 Hakam& Chan Singapore Case Studies Key factors in negotiation process 
1990 Mayer et al. Various Case studies Performance in joint ventures 
1990 Oded Shenkar US,UK,HK Case Studies Joint venture problems in China: risk and remedies 
1991 Aiello P. USA Case studies Building a joint venture in China: Beijing jeep 
1991 Paul Aiello USA Case Studies The Case of Chrysler and Beijing Jeep Corporation 
1991 Shapiro et a!. USA Case studies Chinese environment and negotiation 
1992 Newman USA Case Studies Stages in starting a viable JV 
1993 Bruijn & Jia Various Case studies Product selection strategy 
1994 Weiping Wu Various Case Studies Guanxi and its managerial implications 
1996 Kim S.C. Hong Kong Case studies Analysis of strategic issues for IJVs 
1997 Luo & Min Chen Various Case Studies Does guanxi influence firm performance? 
Table 4.2-3 Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Studies- Questionnaires (12 studies) 
Date 
1987 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1992 
Authors 
Davidson W. H. 
Baird et al. 
Henley & Nyaw 
Nyaw 
Brunner et a!. 
Foreign 
Partner 
USA 
USA 
Various 
Various 
USA 
Research 
Method 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
92 
Studies 
Creating and managing joint ventures in China 
Attitudinal differences in JV investment 
Management systems and organisation 
Roles of trade unions in joint ventures 
Chinese perception of issues 
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1992 Casson & Zheng Various Questionnaire Testing joint venture theory 
1992 Stelzer et al. USA Questionnaire JV performance in terms of location 
1993 Glaister,K.W. & Wang,Y. UK Questionnaire UK JVs in China: motivation and partner selection 
1994 Au and Enderwich New Zealand Questionnaire Small firms' perception on JV investment 
1996 Ping Lan Various Questionnaire Role of JVs in transferring technology to China 
1997 Dong, Buckley & Mirza Various Questionnaire JVs in China from a managerial perspective: 
1999 Jan Selmer Various Questionnaire Effects of coping strategies on adjustment of Western 
expatriate managers in China 
Analysis of the 43 studies suggests that, firstly, international researchers or overseas-
based Chinese researchers carried out their surveys mainly through their personal 
connections, such as diplomatic agencies (embassies, consulate-generals) or China-based 
representative offices. Although many international researchers had tried hard to contact 
as many respondents as they could, the sample size generally was small and the response 
rate low, because of the limited access to general population and the lack of official 
assistance. Hence, the primary research contacts of international researchers were limited 
to joint ventures with home country partners, and therefore overseas partners and 
expatriate managers were the main focus of most previous studies. Less first-hand data 
was obtained from Chinese partners and government officials who oversee joint venture 
activities. 
Secondly, with several exceptions, extant research projects have rarely used multiple 
methods that combining questionnaires, interviews and case studies. Because of the time 
limited and resources, researchers often had to choose qualitative rather than quantitative 
method, as it is nearly impossible to generate an ideal survey sample whose size is 
sufficiently large and response rate in China is usually too low (Kaiser and Kirby 1996). 
China-based joint ventures, and Chinese partners/managers in particular, are still 
controlled in many ways by the Chinese government. Governments are sensitive to 
criticisms and negative reports, including those about joint ventures (Guthrie 2002). 
Hence, government officials and Chinese joint venture managers often would ignore 
private questionnaires or refuse requests for private interviews fearing that their answers 
and comments might be offensive to government departments. 
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Third, there were no joint research projects involving both international researchers and 
Chinese government departments or local authorities, except for that of Guthrie (2002). 
As a former government official, my own experience proved that Chinese government 
and local authorities in general had a negative attitude towards international studies 
(fieldwork in particular) on joint ventures in China. Guthrie (2002) pointed out that a 
researcher must have a host organisation (for visa purposes) if she wants to conduct 
research over an extended period of time in China. The foreign affairs office of a local 
govenm1ent is often an arm of the Party, one of whose jobs is to watch for the activities 
of foreign researchers. These officials are concerned with the flow of information across 
China. It is customary that anyone must be introduced to get into an organisation to talk 
to managers. Hence, it is no simple matter to conduct a survey with the Chinese 
govermnent or a local authority. 
To compensate for the shortcomings of previous studies, the methodology adopted by 
this research was adjusted to employ both the questionnaire survey and in-depth 
interviews, to combine the merits of both methodological strands. The first requirement 
of this research was a large-scale questionnaire survey of joint ventures in collaboration 
with relevant Chinese government departments. The questionnaire data collection would 
reveal how many joint ventures were operating in the transitional period. This type of 
data (gathered through questionnaires sent to joint ventures by the government 
departments), would not, however, allow the author to see firsthand how the joint 
ventures are actually structured in their internal organisation, whereas an on-site 
visit/interview would be able to so. Any substantive and contextual discussions on the 
issues raised would be difficult. In addition, when joint venture managers are asked by 
government officials to fill out questionnaires, as has been the case in previous studies, 
the quality of information is often problematic. Guthrie (2002) argued that there was a 
remarkable difference between infonnation gathered through state channels and that 
gathered independently, as some information would never have been revealed in a state-
sponsored questionnaire. 
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The second requirement of this research was to gather information through in-depth 
interviews. Although the data emerged from a questionnaire survey conducted in the 
name of local authority can generally be trusted, the questionnaire approach would not 
afford an opportunity to clarify or discuss issues from the managers' own points of view, 
and one could never be certain that the joint venture managers were interpreting the 
questions in the way originally intended. Furthermore, the questionnaire data collection 
would not allow further exploration of what joint venture managers thought about 
specific issues. This proved to be crucial to the current research, because their points of 
view could consolidate one's confidence in the quality of the data collected. In-depth 
interviews allow for the deepest contextual understanding of issues and questions that 
arise in the field. The researcher can gain a deep and textured perspective on the social, 
political, and institutional structure of one or more specific research sites. However, the 
obvious question that arises from in-depth interviews is the extent to which the specific 
cases examined are generalisable. As the 43 previous studies showed a mainstay for 
China research is in-depth interviewing of joint venture partners and managers. This type 
of research has several strengths. The researcher can often learn more about context and 
thought processes than is possible in a large-scale questionnaire survey. The researcher 
can probe, clarify, and ask follow-up questions about a given topic, questions, or 
response. Exploring a subject across a large number of issues allows the researcher to 
examine ideas of political and institutional structure in a number of different contexts. 
The weakness of in-depth interviews, however, is that while the population of joint 
ventures is larger than that explored in interviews, it is not possible to know to what 
extent, if any, this population of joint ventures or managers is representative of any 
universe of China-based joint ventures. Since the joint ventures and managers in these 
types of surveys are typically not selected in a random sample, it is likely that systematic 
biases are built in. In addition, it is likely that organisations (and individuals) with 
particular characteristics (e.g., opem1ess to the outside, high performance) will be more 
willing to talk to foreign researchers than those without these traits. Whether these 
include attitudes toward foreigners, openness about China's transition, or specific aspects 
of the organisation's institutional structure, they are likely to be correlated with the 
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dependent variables. A random sample eliminates these problems because the errors are 
random and therefore uncorrelated with the dependent variables. 
As a contrast to conducting a questionnaire jointly with the local authority, the third 
requirement was that I carried out in-depth interviews with Chinese and expatriate joint 
venture managers and local government officials consucted by the author as an 
independent, overseas-based researcher. Thus, all the interviews would be handled 
without being attended by government officials, so that official elements could be 
eliminated wherever possible. Walder (1989), who also conducted in-depth interviews 
with Chinese industrial managers, pointed out that they are far more open and candid in 
private interviews than they are in those that are public, formal, or set up by state 
officials. No long ago in China, many barriers still existed for foreign and overseas 
Chinese investigators to conduct research independent of state interference. Even in 
China today, although foreign researchers are permitted to set up private interviews 
without an official presence or intervention, it is not a simple matter. Finally, the 
interviews are to be conducted on-site, i.e. on the joint venture grounds. This would 
allow the researcher to compare the manager's story with what was actually seen 
occurring in the factory. Previous researchers, such as Guthrie (2002), argued that joint 
venture managers tended to be more at ease and open in their own setting. Naturally it 
would be easier to build rapport in these situations. 
The fieldwork was started with a private contact according to a pre-arranged fieldwork 
approach network (Figure 4.2-1). From the private contact, an official and a private 
contact route were derived. The two parallel fieldwork routes were pursued throughout 
the data collection. 
To initiate the fieldwork of this study, a former colleague 1 in the Dalian municipal 
government was contacted from the UK, a copy of the fieldwork proposal was presented 
to him and he was asked for a copy of the local joint venture directory. A few weeks 
1 Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office ofDalian municipal government. He was my immediate 
superior between 1988 and 1995. 
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later, the former colleague told that local government officials were not interested in any 
kind of research on joint ventures by overseas researchers for two reasons. First, the local 
authority had received numerous requests for this kind of research and had no intention of 
assisting any of them. Second, they feared that some negative elements of joint ventures 
might be made public having a negative effect on Dahan's image. As for the directory of 
joint ventures, it was told that although there was an official one, which listed all foreign 
invested enterprises (including wholly foreign-owned enterprises and joint ventures), it 
was not accurate, because many ventures had actually closed-down. As the local 
government had no intention to make it public, those closed-down ventures were not 
removed from the directory. 
Figure 4.2-1 The Fieldwork Approach Network 
Researcher 
Official approach Private approach 
-. 
Deputy director 
~'-
A former colleague in 
Dalian Municipal Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Committee Foreign Affairs Office of Dalian municipal government 
• ~ Official approach 
~ 3 district-level Administration Comprehensive committees of Department of Planning Bureau 
FDI department officials Foreign Trade Foreign Invested of 
and Economic Enterprises in Dalian High-tech Dalian Municipal Foreign Trade and Cooperation Dalian Economic Industrial Park Economic Cooperation Committee Development 
Zone 
I 
1 Official approach and private approach Dalian Association of Foreign Invested Enterprises • (Semi-governmental organisation) ,, 
(In-depth Interviews) 
12 government officials 
(Questionnaire survey) 30 Chinese managers and 7 expatriate managers 
from 30 Dalian-based joint ventures 
120 Dalian-based joint ventures 
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Further efforts were made by the contact to approach a deputy director of the Dalian 
Municipal Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee to persuade him to 
consider giving approval to a joint survey. Because of the special personal relationship 
(guanxi) between them, the deputy director agreed to meet the current author when he 
was in China. Before his setting out for China, a letter was sent to the Mayor of Dalian, 
under him the author used to work between 1988 and 1995. The Mayor was asked to 
give his support for the survey, which, it was stressed, would not only benefit the study, 
but also joint venture businesses in the region. The Mayor's office passed the letter to the 
deputy director mentioned above, with a note asking him to assist the research if possible. 
When the author arrived in Dalian, a dinner was arranged by the contact to meet the 
deputy director and several of his staff. The deputy director gave warm welcome and 
surprisingly, he mentioned the letter to the Mayor and told that the local government was 
interested in the study and would like to consider the proposal for a joint survey. 
In the next few days, several meetings were held with staff from relevant departments and 
the details of the survey plan were discussed. Overall, the personal relationships with 
former colleagues, the Mayor and the deputy director proved to be critically helpful to 
this study. In addition, in case no official assistance with interviews was available, some 
private contacts with Chinese venture managers were made as a backup to ensure an 
adequate interview sample size. 
(1) Questionnaire Survey 
Snow and Thomas (1994), when examining the variety of field research methods used in 
strategic management, proposed that a questionnaire survey might realistically reveal 
strategic processes. A questionnaire survey is particularly useful when large number of 
people have been contacted in order to obtain data on the same issues. Also, conducting 
a survey permits conclusions to be generalised (Jankowicz 1994). Some authors (Jobber 
and Saunders 1988) consider the use of a questionnaire survey as an inexpensive method 
of gathering data, making the carrying out of surveys possible. Elsewhere as in Snow and 
Thomas 1994, it is suggested that the questionnaire survey is an efficient, though less 
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flexible, substitute for observation or interviewing and cheaper to administer, while at the 
same time covering more respondents. 
Questionnaire surveys also have disadvantages, however. There are situations where 
alternative means of data collection are more promising. For instance, some authors 
(Gaedeke and Tootelian 1976; Snow and Thomas 1994) considered as a major limitation 
of questionnaire surveys the typically low response rates. This is especially true when 
surveys are mailed directly to respondents without prior contacts, or when the intended 
respondents are top managers (Snow and Thomas 1994). The low response rate tended to 
reduce level of confidence in the extent to which the results can be inferred about the 
population. Distributed questionnaires even may be totally ignored by respondents, 
particularly when questionnaires are too comprehensive, since respondents are likely to 
be careless (Jankowicz 1994). As a useful rule of thumb for postal questionnaires, 
Howard and Sharp (1983) suggested an upper limit of ten pages, or 15 minutes, for 
completion. Management has only a limited amount of time and filling in lengthy 
questionnaires is certainly not a priority. 
Studies on foreign direct investment experienced response rates ranging from 15 to 56 
percent (Habib 1978; Eiteman 1990; Lau 1992; Gledhill 1994; Glaister and Wang 1993; 
Leung and Yeung 1995), whereas studies of small and medium sized enterprises (Kaiser 
1998) found the response rates to be between 7.5 and 92 percent, with 25 to 50 percent as 
the mode. 
A review ofthe 12 previous questionnaire surveys on joint ventures in China showed that 
the overall response rate was lower than 50 per cent. This came as no surprise because 
after the author's approach to several local authorities in Beijing, Shenzhen, Xiamen and 
Dalian regarding a joint questionnaire survey, the feedback was quite negative. 
Respondents were increasingly tired of answering questionnaires, particularly faxed and 
posted ones. Similarly, Kaiser (1998) observed at a session of the German joint venture 
round table seminar in Shanghai, that participants complained that too many researchers 
kept sending metre-long questionnaires through their fax machines. 
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The design of the questionnaire was obtained from the literature on China-based joint 
ventures and findings of the exploratory research. The analytical research framework on 
the changes in joint ventures was developed in Chapters Two and Three. The 
questionnaire had 7 pages, exploring the general transitional profile of Dalian-based joint 
ventures. In addition to identifying the critical factors associated with the joint ventures' 
transitional strategies, the questionnaire was aimed at establishing a profile of Dalian-
based joint ventures. For joint venture managers, the questionnaire was short and direct. 
There was little scope for lengthy, open-ended questions, and technical terms were 
avoided where possible. In the light of past experience, joint ventures and wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises in China were sensitive to questions about turnover and 
taxation, often fearing the results might be used against them later on. Therefore, all 
turnover and taxation-related questions were excluded. The format of the questionnaire, 
both the Chinese and English versions, are included in Appendices I, II and III. 
Overall, 120 joint ventures participated in the questionnaire survey. All were members of 
the Association of Foreign-Invested Enterprises, and in the opinion of the local 
authorities were relatively formal joint ventures. Of the 120 questionnaires sent out, 103 
were answered and sent back. Although both Chinese and English versions of the 
questionnaire were provided, all the feedbacks were in Chinese because all the 
respondents were Chinese with only one exception, a Japanese general manager, who 
also speaks Chinese. Nevertheless, the biases of the questionnaire survey were 
compensated by the in-depth interviews. 
This was the first joint official survey jointly conducted by Dalian government 
departments and a researcher from an overseas university, and the response rate was 85.8 
per cent. In the feedback, most questions in the survey were answered, with the exception 
in two question groups: 
Section 6- Joint venture management (questions 42-55). These questions focused on the 
relationship between management and workforce as well as cross-cultural management 
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issues, which were intended to gather cross-cultural related information. These questions 
might be too sensitive, as answers could offend superiors or venture partners. 
Section 8 - Factors affecting the joint venture's operations (questions 75-77). These 
were about external and internal factors affecting the operation of the joint venture. The 
intention was to generate data about the changes in the joint venture's external and 
internal environments, and were needed to analyse strategic changes. Although most 
questions in this section were not judged by the researcher to be sensitive, to avoid 
annoymg the local authorities, many respondents did not complete the section. 
Nevertheless, the occasional lack of complete answers was offset by in-depth interviews 
that were carried out in a less official atmosphere. 
(2) In-depth Personal Interviews 
Although a questionnaire survey is a valuable way of identifying strategic changes, it 
provides limited opportunity to investigate further. Shenkar (1994) argued that 
questionnaires are less useful in a Chinese environment. To redress this imbalance, 
qualitative research methods, for example in-depth interviews, proved a better alternative. 
The purpose of in-depth personal interviews is to verify the questionnaire survey findings 
and to access more detailed, strategy r~lated information if possible. 
The qualitative data for this study were gathered through face-to-face interviews with 
joint venture managers and government officials directly involved in the joint venture 
activities. The core of this study is based on interviews with joint venture managers. To 
be sure, interviewingjoint venture managers might lead to a somewhat one-sided view of 
life inside China-based joint ventures. However, it was necessary to interview the 
individuals who had access to that information for each venture in the data set. Thus, 
most interviews (74%) were conducted with venture managers. Chinese and expatriate 
venture managers were all invaluable sources for this study, as they offered different 
perspectives on the practical meaning of the changes within joint ventures. The 
interviews, with four exceptions, were conducted with either the venture's general 
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manager (managing director) or a deputy general manager. Sometimes the general 
manager was away or unavailable, then a senior manager would be asked for interview. 
During the period under examination, significant policy changes had taken place, the 
implication of which would be made clearly if government officials could be enlisted for 
discussion. So apart from venture managers, 13 local government officials were also 
interviewed. Archival data were valuable, but there is no substitute for discussing the 
meaning of policy changes with individual officials who view the changes from different 
perspectives and their particular positions within the government departments. A joint 
venture manager can reveal how that policy is actually carried out at the level of the firm, 
but a government official may be able to discuss a policy as the government intended it to 
be implemented and carried out. With the questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews it 
was able to piece together a multifaceted story of what happened at the joint venture 
level. 
Through a deputy director of the Dalian Municipal Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Committee, the author was introduced to three district-level authorities who 
assisted in conducting in-depth interviews with officials, Chinese and overseas joint 
venture managers. After several preliminary meetings with officials, it was agreed upon 
an overall interview plan: (1) The author was introduced as an independent overseas-
based PhD student in order to dilute any official elements wherever possible. (2) Official 
interviewees were selected by the local authorities. (3) Joint venture interviewees were 
selected randomly from the questionnaire data set by the author. (4) Interview 
appointments were arranged by local officials, and when necessary, transport was 
arranged. (5) The author conducted interviews at each joint venture site. 
Most interviews took place in the interviewees' offices or their meeting rooms, as 
interviewees might feel more comfortable there and relaxed enough to talk. Most 
interviews lasted around one hour, but in some instances certain persons were 
interviewed several times, each session lasting several hours. Interviews with Chinese 
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managers were conducted in Chinese and interviews with expatriate managers were in 
English. 
Interview questions for different levels of local government officials were open questions 
focusing on changes in macro-environment, political pressures, the role of local 
government in foreign direct investment, the impact of changes in the business 
environment on Dalian-based joint ventures, and general trends of foreign direct 
investment in the region. Interview questions for joint venture managers were open 
questions as well. The interview results reported in Chapter Six were grouped into four 
categories: impact of changes in China's business environment, joint venture partners' 
strategies, joint venture ownership structure, operational management and future outlook. 
4.2.2 Choice of Research Location 
China's foreign direct investment position is complex. One can access most of the 
'positive' figures about foreign direct investment from central government, provincial 
and city-level governments, in terms of the number of projects with foreign investment, 
the contract volume of utilisation of foreign inward investment capital, and the number of 
jobs supposedly created by foreign-invested enterprises. However, it is very hard to 
access any 'negative' information regarding foreign direct investment. For example, 
although the figures for total joint venture projects established since 1979 in Dalian area 
are available, it is nearly impossible to obtain the figure for how many joint ventures 
were subsequently closed-down. Therefore, it is difficult to make an overall assessment 
of their stability, and almost impossible to carry out realistic research into these joint 
ventures across China as a whole. 
For the choice of the fieldwork location, it was initially targeted at several openmg 
regions hoping that joint venture activities in one of the opening regions can substantially 
reflect that of other such areas. Beijing, Shenzhen, Xiamen and Dalian, these four cities 
were originally chosen as the fieldwork locations. However, in Beijing, Shenzhen and 
Xiamen the attempts to carry out a joint survey with local government departments failed, 
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because contacts in these cities could only manage to arrange two or three joint ventures 
each for the fieldwork through their local cmmections (guanxi). 
Dalian was than chosen as the research location. Dalian holds a leading position among 
the 14 coastal cities of China, which have been opening up to the outside world since 
1984. A major seaport, Dalian is located on the eastern coast of the Eurasian continent 
and at the southern-most point of the Liaodong Peninsula in Northeast China. The city is 
well known in China for its fine natural harbour, well-established industries, flourishing 
trade and tourism. Among China's top 50cities, Dalian ranks sixth in terms of income, 
and eighth in terms of overall economic strength. It is also the third largest port in China, 
and the second largest export harbour in China. In this sense, Dalian is more 'open' to 
external enviromnent changes than many other cities. 
As one of China's economic centres, Dalian provides access to the outside world for the 
whole of Northeast China and Inner Mongolia. Eighty percent of the region's imports 
and exports are shipped through Dalian. It was also the venue for 40 international trade 
fairs from 1984 to 1997. Dalian's industrial development is characterised by the 
dominant position ofthe heavy industry, which accounts for 60 per cent of the value of its 
total industrial output. Because of Dalian's dynamic economy and its advantageous 
geographical location, nearly every major city in North China has set up a representative 
office there. In fact, Dalian's cormnunication facilities not only give access to northern 
China, but also to other markets in Northeast Asia, including Japan, South Korea, North 
Korea, plus Russia. 
More than two decades of economic reform have brought about profound changes in 
Dalian. The Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone was among the first 
to be authorised by the central government. Situated in a bonded area, the Dalian Hi-tech 
Industrial Park is also approved by the state, and offers preferential conditions for foreign 
investors. Dalian's opening up to the rest of the world happened 5 years later than that of 
the four Special Economic and Technology Development Zones. However, its 
development has also undergone similar stages: 1984 - 1992 Period of original 
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development, 1993 - 1996 Period of rapid development, 1997 - 1998 Period of 
slowdown. A senior Dalian official interviewed claimed that, by the end of May 1998, 
7054 foreign investment projects, including 1395 overseas representative offices had 
been approved by Dalian municipal government. This makes it one of the five cities in 
China with the highest concentration of foreign firms and representation of overseas 
businesses, trading companies, and financial institutions. Ten foreign banks had already 
started operations in Dalian by 19982. Overseas investors from over 70 countries have 
presence m Dalian, with activities ranging from manufacturing and international 
procurement to information technology. Famous multinationals that have made their 
presence in Dalian include BTR, Invensys, Pfizer, Matsushita, Canon, Toshiba, Sanyo, 
SEIKO, TDK, THK, Total, Hyundai, LG, Daewoo, Samsung. More than 1500 foreign 
companies have also chosen Dalian as a base, setting up representative offices and 
appointing agents. Moreover, 30 per cent of the local population are employed by 
foreign-invested enterprises (300,000 jobsl 
4.2.3 Creating the Research Sample 
As mentioned earlier, the survey was carried out by the author under the auspices of the 
Dalian municipal government. The local authority was involved in the selection of the 
survey sample. During the fieldwork, officials of the Dalian Municipal Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Committee launched a six-month compulsory training courses in 
the new taxation system for all Dalian registered joint ventures. Senior managers of joint 
ventures had to apply for a training session that fitted in with their own work-schedule. 
120 applicants applied for the first training session and they were selected by the staff of 
Dalian Association of Foreign-Invested Enterprises to be included the questionnaire 
survey sample. The interview sample was also randomly selected, based on the 
questionnaire survey sample plus several arrangements through private connections. 
Overall, 12 Dalian government officials at different levels, 30 Chinese and 7 expatriate 
venture managers were interviewed. 
2 Foreign Direct Investment Statistics, May 1998, the Planning Department of the Dalian Municipal 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee. 
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4.3 Strengths and Limitations of the Research Methodology 
4.3.1 Strengths of the Methodology 
The exploratory research and the review of previous studies have facilitated the adoption 
in this study of a combined research methodology. The strengths of this research are 
reflected in the following three aspects: 
(1) Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Methodologies 
Although the response rate was, due to help from official involvement, much higher than 
the average, the results of the questionnaire survey might still be not perfect, as 
respondents would inevitably leave some sensitive questions unanswered. The weakness 
of the questionnaire survey in this regard can be limited by a qualitative, on-site survey 
conducted at the same time. The local government department's involvement made it 
possible to conduct a series of in-depth interviews with government officials as well as 
Chinese and overseas joint venture managers. No joint venture managers refused an 
interview appointment arranged by the government department, and this provided the 
author with good opportunity to target senior joint venture managers, in order to gather as 
much information as possible. 
(2) Collaborative Survey with the Dalian Municipal Government 
The survey, as part of the current research, was the first survey on Dalian-based joint 
ventures to be officially sanctioned. The interest of local government proved to be vital 
to the generation of the 120 joint venture sample. Within Chinese local authorities, 
foreign-invested enterprise departments have controlling power over ventures in many 
aspects, such as any changes of joint venture's directors, ownership transfer, business 
scope, percentage of exportation and domestic sales, as well as the approval of overseas 
visits made by the joint venture's Chinese personnel. The use of the government's name 
in the survey helped achieve not only a larger sample size (120 ventures) but also a 
higher response rate (85%). As a result, the local government department's support and 
assistance made the survey more fruitful than could have been anticipated. 
3 Foreign Direct Investment Statistics, May 1998- the Planning Department ofCOFTEC, Dalian. 
106 
Objectives and Methodology Chapter 4 
(3) Informality in Personal Interviews 
In the in-depth interviews, to prevent interviewees giving 'diplomatic' answers and to 
encourage them to talk freely, official involvements were kept to the minimum. Apart 
from all the government officials interviewed, no links between the questionnaire survey 
and the interviews were mentioned. The author was introduced as the interviewer by 
several officials via telephone calls to both Chinese and overseas joint venture managers 
and was specifically introduced as Mayo's personal friend. It was stated that the 
interviews were for academic purposes, and would not be published in China. As a 
result, most Chinese and overseas senior managers made themselves available for 
interviews. Not a single appointment was cancelled, although in some cases only deputy 
general managers were available. 
4.3.2 Limitations of the Methodology 
The questioru1aire survey sample used was randomly selected by the local authority from 
a compulsory training course. However, it was limited to members of the Dalian 
Association of Foreign-Invested Enterprises. As they are relatively well-established joint 
ventures, the survey findings may not be entirely representative of Dalian-based joint 
ventures as a whole, irrespective of the detailed answers given. Secondly, with only one 
exception (a Japanese general manager), all the questionnaires were answered by Chinese 
managers or senior staffs. Although this was mended by personal in-depth interviews, the 
biases of the questionnaire survey could not be completely eliminated. Thirdly, all the in-
depth interviews were arranged by local officials, so the interviewees may have been 
influenced by the fact of official involvement and reluctant to tell their stories fully. 
Finally, the data published by the local government were employed in this research. 
However, it is difficult to access 'negative' data. For example, a number of joint ventures 
have closed down each year in most opening regions in China but no official data are 
available about the closure. A senior government official4 informally said that there had 
been about 2000 joint venture closures in Dalian, but local government would never 
allow disclosure of such figures officially. The public could only know that the number of 
4 A Deputy Director of the Dahan Municipal Conunittee of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
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Dalian-based joint ventures was increasing but not that many close-down cases were also 
being encountered. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the development of the research theme to advance the 
understanding of the Chinese transitional economy and changes in China's business 
environment, along with the impact of the changing state policy of foreign direct 
investment. The literature review and exploratory research have identified emerging 
trends of the development of China's business environment and changes in joint ventures, 
and areas needing to be investigated further with fieldwork. Secondly, a research 
methodology, which combined use of a questionnaire survey officially sanctioned by the 
Dalian municipal government and unofficial in-depth personal interviews, was designed 
to obtain further information. 
This chapter has also discussed the strengths of the combined methodology and the 
complementary relationship between the quantitative and qualitative surveys. 
Quantitative research strategies may be useful to identify specific changes in the 
strategies of joint ventures, but are not necessarily appropriate when trying to determine 
how and why joint venture partners perform as they do. Thus, in-depth personal 
interviews are proposed as a complementary alternative to provide more detailed 
information on the transitional strategies of joint ventures. 
This chapter has also pointed out that the major limitation of the research methodology is 
mainly related to the data management by Dahan government departments although 
official involvement in the survey is vital. 
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Chapter 5 QuestiOJI]lllaire Survey Results 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the Dalian questionnaire survey. These survey 
findings are supplemented by in-depth information derived from interviews with local 
government officials, and Chinese and overseas joint venture managers. The structure of 
the analysis follows the research framework developed in Chapter Four. 
The findings are reported in two separate sections. The first, which is essentially 
descriptive, draws together information from the survey in order to formulate an overall 
profile of joint ventures up to 1998. The profile has been established with respect to 
industry sectors, position of respondents, age of joint ventures, and country origins of 
overseas partners. The second section focuses on the internal characteristics of joint 
ventures. It reveals venture partners' strategy, ownership structure, and operational 
management variables. 
5.1 General Survey Profile 
With approval of a vice-mayor, the joint questionnaire survey was carried out in the name 
of the Dalian municipal government. Officials from Dalian Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Committee instructed the Dalian Association of Foreign Invested Enterprises 
to arrange for joint ventures to participate in the survey. Three members of staff were 
dispatched to work with the author as a temporary group of task force to conduct the 
survey, and 120 local joint venture enterprises were selected for the questionnaire survey. 
All these joint ventures were relatively stable ones judged by local government officials. 
As this was a joint survey with government departments, local officials and the author 
agreed that the names of individuals were to be disguised, while company names were 
not. 
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The 120 joint ventures selected were given five days to complete the questionnaires. By 
the end of the five days, 89 questionnaires were returned to the task group, which was an 
unusually high response rate. However, it took another five days to chase the rest of the 
companies via telephone in the name of the Association. The most frequent explanation 
for the delay was that their general and/or deputy general managers were out of town. To 
facilitate the matter, they were asked to have the questionnaires completed by a manager 
at the next level down. Eventually, of the 120 joint ventures surveyed, 103 companies 
responded, a response rate of 85.8 percent. The details of the 103 joint ventures that 
responded are in Appendix IV. 
Analysis of the survey data is now carried out by cross tabulations, which enable 
comparisons to be made between two groups of different attributes: (1) Industry sectors, 
positions of respondent (i.e. general manager), age of the company and size (number of 
employees) and country origins of overseas partners. (2) External impact on joint venture, 
joint venture strategies, joint venture ownership structure, and joint venture operational 
management. 
5.1.1 Industry Sectors 
The 103 respondents were divided into four different industry sectors: manufacturing, 
property development, hotel/restaurant, and services (Table 5.1-1 ). 
Table 5.1-1 Breakdown oflndustry Sector of Joint Ventures Surveyed 
No. Industry Sectors Number of Companies Percentage 
I Manufacturing 86 83.4% 
2 Property development 5 4.9% 
3 Hotel/restaurant 4 3.9% 
4 Services 8 7.8% 
Total 103 100% 
The distribution by sector of all the 103 respondents showed that manufacturing was the 
dominant sector (86 cases, including foot-wear, textiles, furniture, clothing, food and 
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electronic products), five cases in property development, four cases in hotel/restaurant 
business and eight cases in services. This suggested that labour costs were a strong 
consideration for overseas investors to set up joint ventures in Dalian as these enterprises 
are all labour-intensive. 
5.1.2 Respondent Positions 
All participants were told that the questionnaire should be answered by general managers. 
If the general manager was an expatriate, a Chinese deputy general manager could 
provide answers instead. However, only 25 questionnaires were answered by general or 
deputy general managers. In most cases (55 ventures), the respondents were department 
managers. Some respondents (23 ventures) were junior clerks (Table 5.1-2). 
Table 5.1-2 Breakdown of Job Titles of Respondents 
No. Job Title Number of Respondents Percentage 
I General manager II 10.7% 
2 Deputy/assistant general manager 14 13.6% 
3 Controller/ Accounting manager 32 31.2% 
4 Human Resources manager 2 1.9% 
5 Office manager/ Administrator 12 11.7% 
6 Sales manager 3 2.9% 
7 Public relations manager I 0.9% 
8 Department manager 5 4.9% 
9 Accountant 17 16.5% 
10 Office staff 4 3.9% 
II Statistician I 0.9% 
12 Secretary I 0.9% 
Total 103 100% 
It was surpnsmg that nearly half of the respondents were accounting managers or 
accounting staff rather than general or deputy general managers. One reason was that the 
survey was carried out in the name of the local government, which made top management 
of certain companies cautious about the purpose of the survey, suspecting that it was 
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actually concerned with turnover and taxation. As a result, many accounting 
managers/staff were asked to answer the questions instead. 
Of the 103 respondents, the longest service period with a joint venture was 11 years, and 
the shortest was under one year. There was only one expatriate a Japanese general 
manager of a joint venture restaurant, who spoke some Mandarin. Table 5.1-3 details the 
length of service among respondents. 
Table 5.1-3 Number of Years of Service 
No. of Years with JV No. of Respondents Percentage 
II I 0.9% 
10 I 0.9% 
9 4 3.9% 
8 4 3.9% 
7 2 1.9% 
6 13 12.6% 
5 19 18.4% 
4 16 15.5% 
3 16 15.5% 
2 12 11.6% 
I 10 9.7% 
Less than I 3 2.9% 
Total 103 100% 
In the cases where some respondents had been with joint ventures for only one or two 
years, it was possible that some details may be missing and this would be compensated 
for by in-depth interviews. Full details of all the 103 respondents are recorded in 
Appendix V. 
5.1.3 Age of Joint Ventures 
Ofthe 103 joint ventures surveyed, 12 were set up in the 1980s (between 1985 and 1989), 
and the majority (88 cases) were established after 1992 - the year when foreign direct 
investment in China entered a new stage of accelerated development. As Table 5.1-4 
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showed, the average age of joint ventures surveyed was 4.9 years. The distribution of 
joint venture's age suggested that a comparison of internal changes in joint ventures 
established in the 1980s, the early 1990s, the middle 1990s and the late 1990s could be 
meaningful for the study of joint venture evolution. 
Table 5.1-4 Age of Joint Ventures 
Time of Establishment Years of Operation 
1985 13 
1986 12 
1988 10 
1989 9 
1990 8 
1991 7 
1992 6 
1993 5 
1994 4 
1995 3 
1996 2 
1997 I 
1998 Less than I 
Total -
5.1.4 Origins of Joint Venture Partners 
(1) Chinese Partners 
Number of Enterprises Percentage 
I 0.9% 
I 0.9% 
4 3.9% 
6 5.8% 
3 2.9% 
4 3.9% 
12 11.7% 
25 24.3% 
16 15.5% 
18 17.5% 
9 8.7% 
3 2.9% 
I 0.9% 
103 100% 
According to local official statistics, 1 nearly 25% of Chinese joint venture partners in 
Dalian was from the private sector and established after 1995 when the ban on private 
sector involvement in joint venture projects was lifted. Among the 103 joint ventures 
surveyed, 84 Chinese partners were state-owned enterprises (81.6% ); the remaining 19 
were from privately owned enterprises (18.4%). This result was a broadly reflection of 
the official encouragement for private sector involvement in joint ventures. One can 
expect more involvements of private Chinese partners in foreign direct investment 
1 Dalian Economic Development Statistics, May, 1998. Provided by the Dalian Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Committee. 
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activities in the future. At the same time, because the Chinese government has less 
control over the private sector as compared to state-owned sector, it is reasonable to 
assume that more strategic changes will result. This issue is addressed further in the 
personal interviews. 
(2) Overseas Joint Venture Partners 
Among the 103 joint ventures surveyed, investors from Japanese, Hong Kong, and 
Korean had the highest number of established joint ventures. Dalian's geographic 
closeness to Japan and its historical link with Japan have undoubtedly influenced this 
distribution. This result was in line with the official statistics2 shown in Table 5.1-5. 
However, a senior Dalian government officiae privately explained that the number of 
South Korean investors had probably overtaken the Japanese in recent years and had been 
in the first position in Dalian. But during and after the Asian financial crisis, about 500 
South Korean partners had withdrawn. 
Table 5.1-5 Country Origins of Overseas Partners in Dalian 
No. Country origins of overseas partners Number of joint venture projects 
I Hong Kong (China) 2132 
2 Japan 1639 
3 USA 916 
4 Korea 827 
5 Taiwan (China) 599 
6 Canada 112 
7 Macao 48 
8 European countries 262 
9 Others 214 
Total 7054 
Source: Statistics of Foreign Direct Investment, May 1998, Planning Department of the Dalian Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee. 
2 Statistics ofForeign Direct Investment, May 1998, the Planning Department of the Dalian Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation Committee. 
3 He is deputy director of the Dalian Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee. 
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5.2 External Variables 
The following section reports findings about extemal influences upon joint ventures. 
They were derived from the responses to the question 'Do the changes in China's 
transitional economy influence foreign direct investment, particularly for joint ventures?'. 
Respondents were offered a range of possible answers, as derived from the literature 
review and exploratory study, and asked to mark 'the factors which had the greatest effect 
onjoint ventures'. Table 5.2-1 showed the detailed responses to this question. 
From the distribution of the responses, 'frequent changes in China's foreign direct 
investment policy' was ranked as having the greatest impact on joint ventures (78.6%) 
followed by 'changes in bureaucratic systems' (74.7%) and 'further opening up of 
domestic market' (49.5%). The perceived 'interference by Chinese parent company' 
received only 12 responses (11.6%). The other perceived impacts in the 1980s such as 
'political instability' and 'difficulty with repatriating profit to overseas partner's home 
country' received no responses. 
Table 5.2-1 External Influences on Joint Venture Activities 
No Influential external impacts on joint venture activities Responses 0/o 
1 Frequent changes in foreign direct investment policy 81 78.6% 
2 Changes in bureaucratic systems 77 74.7% 
3 Further opening up of domestic markets 51 49.5% 
4 Difficulties m obtaining high-quality raw materials or 39 37.8% 
components from China's domestic markets 
5 Interference from Chinese parent company 12 11.6% 
6 Inefficient infrastructure 4 3.8% 
7 Political instability 0 -
8 Difficulty in repatriating profits to overseas partner's home 0 -
country 
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5.3 Internal Va.riabBes 
The following section deals with internal variables under the headings of joint venture 
strategies, ownership, structure, and operational management issues. 
5.3.1 JToint Venture Strategies 
Joint venture strategies derived from the main motivations of both Chinese and overseas 
partners when setting up joint ventures. It has been established in Chapter Two that 
compromise often has to be made to embrace each partner's strategic considerations. In 
contrast to the literature, the top three strategies that emerged in the survey were 'long-
term commitment in China', 'further expansion of domestic sales', and 'making profits 
for parent companies'. Surprisingly, 'to export joint venture products to overseas 
markets', which used to be the priority of Chinese government for setting up joint 
ventures, was not on the list {Table 5.3.1-1 ). 
Table 5.3.1-1 Joint Venture's Comprehensive Strategies 
(Total survey respondents: 103) 
Joint Venture Strategies No. of Respondents Percentage 
Long-term commitment in China 76 74% 
Further expansion of domestic sales 75 72% 
Making profits for parent companies 69 67% 
Raw material localisation 63 61% 
Personnel localisation 49 48% 
Control of overseas sales 54 52% 
Desire to be viewed as a truly Chinese company 52 50% 
(1) Chinese Partners' Perspective 
Table 5.3.1-2 indicates that the three major strategies were 'to obtain foreign capital', 'to 
export joint venture products' and 'to obtain advanced technology'. Sixty-seven 
respondents (74%) answered that the major strategies of Chinese partners were to export 
their products and earn hard currency. 
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Table 5.3.1-2 Chinese Partners' Strategies 
(Total survey respondents: 103) 
Motives for setting up joint ventures No. of respondents Percentage 
To obtain foreign capital 69 67% 
To export products and earn hard currency 67 65% 
To obtain foreign technology and management skills 62 60% 
To create employment opportunities 32 31% 
To obtain advanced foreign products or foreign brand names 24 23% 
(2) Overseas Partners' Perspective 
Table 5.3.1-3 indicates that 60 respondents (58%) stated that the overseas partners' 
strategy for forming joint ventures was to enter China's domestic market. However, the 
Chinese government has strongly encouraged joint ventures to export. This would raise 
the question of whether mutual satisfaction exists. 
Table 5.3.1-3 Overseas Partners' Strategies 
(Total survey respondents: 103) 
Motives for setting up joint ventures No. of respondents Percentage 
Entering China's domestic markets 60 58% 
To comply with Chinese government policy 55 53% 
To access Chinese government incentives 46 45% 
Seeking low production costs 28 27% 
Setting up an export base in China 18 17% 
Comparisons indicate that joint ventures' comprehensive strategies were an outcome of 
compromise. In general, the underlying joint venture strategies match the 'third stage 
strategy pattern' of Shaw and Meier's (1993) study. This implies that the majority of 
Chinese and overseas partners in the joint ventures surveyed had completed their 
experimental stage and were moving towards long-term commitment. 
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5.3.2 Joint Venture Ownership Structure 
Table 5.3.2-1 shows that in 49 cases the majority stake in the venture was held by the 
overseas partner, and in 42 cases it was held by the Chinese partner. There were only 12 
cases with split equity ownership (50/50 equity). Thirty-four joint ventures had their 
ownership shares formally transferred between 1996 and 1998. Details of the 34 cases of 
ownership share transfer including changes in the ownership structure, venture age, 
percentage transferred, and country origin of overseas partners are given in Appendix 6. 
Table 5.3.2-1 Summary of Ownership Structure of Joint Ventures Surveyed 
Ownership distribution status Chinese partners Overseas partners 
More than 50% stakes 42 49 
Less than 50% stakes 49 42 
50150 equity ownership 12 12 
Total 103 103 
Table 5.3.2-2 shows the origins of overseas partners. There was a clear trend of the 
ownership moving from Chinese to overseas partners, with only 5 cases where Chinese 
partners increased their stakes. In the remaining 29 cases, either the overseas partners 
gained the dominant ownership position, or (in 15 cases) the overseas partners already 
wholly owned the joint venture. 
Most ofthe 34 ownership transfer cases involved Japanese, Korean and overseas Chinese 
partners. There was only one case, which involved a USA partner. This implies that 
joint ventures with Far East and offshore Chinese partners were more active in ownership 
share transfer than those of Western partners. 
118 
Questionnaire Survey Results Chapter 5 
Table 5.3.2-2 Overseas Partners with Officially Recorded Ownership Transfer 
Overseas partner Number of ventures Wholly owned Stake increased Stake decreased 
Japan 17 7 6 4 
Hong Kong 7 3 3 I 
Korea 6 4 2 -
Taiwan 2 - 2 -
Singapore I - I -
USA I I - -
Total 34 15 14 5 
Table 5.3.2-3 shows the times at which the 34 ownership share transfer cases took place. 
All ownership share transfers took place between 1996 and 1998, when state policy on 
foreign direct investment was further relaxed. 
Table 5.3.2-3 Time of Ownership Shares Transferred 
Number of Time of ownership transfer Venture age when Percentage 
ventures ownership transferred 
3 3 cases in 1997 9 years 8.6% 
2 1 case in 1996 and 1 case in 1997 8 years 5.7% 
2 1 case in 1996 and 1 case in 1997 7 years 8.6% 
1 1 case in 1997 6 years 2.9% 
5 2 cases in 1997 and 3 cases in 1998 5 years 14.2% 
6 3 cases in 1997 and 3 cases in 1998 4 years 17.1% 
8 4 cases in 1997 and 4 cases in 1998 3 years 22.6% 
5 2 cases in 1997 and 3 cases in 1998 2 years 14.2% 
1 1 case in 1998 1 years 2.9% 
1 1 case in 1998 3 months 2.9% 
34 - - 99.7% 
In these ownership share transfer cases, the majority of ventures (24 cases) transferred 
ownership shares after two to five years in operation. Eight ventures changed their 
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ownership shares after six to nine years. The speediest ownership share transfer took 
place only three months after the venture was set up. Among the 103 joint ventures 
surveyed, 12 ventures were established in the 1980s and seven of them transferred their 
ownership shares. Five of these seven ventures had been converted into wholly foreign-
owned enterprises, implying a strong trend on the part of the early entrants towards 
wholly owned ventures. 
According to local official information4, it was only in 1996 that the Dalian municipal 
government started to allow overseas partners to have a dominant ownership share. 
Hence, the ownership transfers were mainly a response to changes in China's foreign 
direct investment policy. It seems that joint ventures established in the 1980s had a 
relatively longer period before they conducted ownership transfer than that of joint 
ventures established in the 1990s. Reasons for the ownership transfers did not come up 
clearly in the questionnaire survey. They will be discussed in the next chapter. 
5.3.3 Joint Venture Operational Management 
(1) Joint Venture Performance 
Questionnaire surveys often encounter certain negative responses from local government 
departments and joint venture managers. Any question regarding joint venture 
performance in China is sensitive, and thus likely to generate less reliable data. Because 
of this, questions regarding joint venture perfom1ance were designed to be as general as 
possible. Table 5.3.3-1 shows that only 38 ventures (37%) reported that they are making 
profits, 6 ventures (5.8%) were just breaking even, and 59 ventures (57%) were 
unprofitable. 
It was not entirely surprising that 57% of the joint ventures surveyed were not profitable. 
This was in line with the literature, which indicates that in half of China-based joint 
ventures, neither the Chinese nor the overseas partners were satisfied with the operational 
performance ofthe venture. 
4 Secretary-General of the Dalian Association of Foreign Invested Enterprises, August 1998. 
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Table 5.3.3-1 Financial Performance 
Venture performance status No. of ventures Percentage 
Profitable 38 37% 
Break-even 6 5.8% 
Unprofitable 59 57% 
Total respondents: 103 
-
Table 5.3.3-2 reports that, apart from one venture, which had been operating for less than 
one year, the other 102 ventures had been operating for more than two years. Only 38 
ventures (36.8%) were profitable, six ventures (5.8%) were break-even, and 59 ventures 
(57.2%) were unprofitable. Among the 59 unprofitable ventures, 42 had been operating 
for between five and 14 years and the other 17 unprofitable ventures had been in 
operation for less than five years. 
Table 5.3.3-2 Financial Performance Status Versus the Age of Joint Ventures 
Setting up time No. of ventures Age of ventures Profitable Break-even Unprofitable 
1985 I 14 - - I 
1986 I 13 - - I 
1988 4 II 2 - 2 
1989 6 10 3 - 3 
1990 3 9 I I I 
1991 4 8 - - 4 
1992 12 7 7 - 5 
1993 25 6 8 2 15 
1994 16 5 9 - 7 
1995 18 4 4 2 12 
1996 9 3 2 I 6 
1997 3 2 2 - I 
1998 I 0.5 - - I 
Total 103 - 38 6 59 
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Table 5.3.3-3 presents a cross-tabular comparison of the 38 profitable ventures in terms 
of venture sector, age, ownership structure, ownership share changes and the origin of 
overseas partners as well as financial performance. 37 of the 38 ventures (97.3%) were 
manufacturing firms and one (2.6%) was a property development firm. Most of them had 
been in operation for between 4 and 7 years. 
In contrast to the previous studies, joint ventures with Chinese partners holding more than 
a 50% stake (16 cases) outperformed ventures with overseas partners holding more than a 
majority stake (9 cases). 12 of the 38 profitable ventures had their ownership share 
changed, of which nine ventures transferred their ownership shares from Chinese to 
overseas partners and only three ventures had ownership shares transferred to Chinese 
partners. This implies that overseas partners were more active than Chinese partners in 
gaining a greater ownership share. 
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Table 5.3.3-3 Profitable Joint Ventures 
Profitable Ventures 
Industry Sectors Number of Ventures Percentage 
Manufacturing 37 97.3% 
Property development l 2.6% 
Total 38 
Operation Age (years) Number of Ventures Percentage 
10 2 5.3% 
9 5 !3.1% 
8 l 2.6% 
7 I 2.6% 
6 6 15.8% 
5 7 18.4% 
4 9 23.7% 
3 4 10.5% 
2 I 2.6% 
I 2 5.3% 
Total 38 
Ownership Structure Number of Ventures Percentage 
Chinese partner holding more than 50% stakes 16 42.1% 
Overseas partner holding more than 50% stakes 9 23.7% 
Overseas partner wholly owned 7 18.4% 
50150 equity ownership 6 15.8% 
Total 38 
Changes in Ownership Structure Number of Ventures Percenta2e 
Overseas shares increased but still less than 50% I 2.6% 
Overseas shares increased to more than or = 50% I 2.6% 
Overseas shares increased to I 00% 7 18.4% 
Chinese shares increased to more than or= 50% 3 7.9% 
Ownership shares remain unchanged 26 68.4% 
Total 38 
Foreign Partner Profitable Ventures Ownership Shares Ownership Shares 
Changed Unchanged 
Japan 19 6 13 
Hong Kong 12 3 9 
USA 2 I I 
Korea I I 
Singapore I I 
Taiwan I I 
Germany I I 
Sweden I I 
Total 38 12 26 
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Table 5.3.3-4 displays a cross-tabular presentation of the 6 break-even ventures, of which 
five were manufacturing ventures and 1 was a service firm. The ages of these six ventures 
were between two and eight years, and two ventures had ownership share transferred 
from Chinese to overseas partners. 
Table 5.3.3-4 Break-even Joint Ventures 
Break-even Ventures 
Industry Sectors Number of Ventures Percentag_e 
Manufacturing 5 83.3% 
Property development 0 
Hotel/restaurant 0 
Services I 16.6% 
Total 6 
Operation Age (years) Number of Ventures Percentage 
8 I 16.6% 
5 2 33.3% 
3 2 33.3% 
2 I 16.6% 
Total 6 
Ownership Structure Number of Ventures Percentage 
Chinese partner holding more than 50% stakes 4 66.6% 
Overseas partner holding more than 50% stakes 2 33.3% 
Total 6 
Chan2es in Ownership Shares Number of Ventures Percenta2e 
Overseas shares increased but still less than 50% I 16.7% 
Overseas shares increased to more than 50% I 16.7% 
Ownership shares remain unchanged 4 66.6% 
Total 6 
Foreign Partner Profitable Ventures Ownership Shares Ownership Shares 
Chan2ed Unchanged 
Japan 3 I 2 
Hong Kong I I 
Taiwan I I 
Germany I I 
Total 6 2 4 
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Table 5.3.3-5 is a cross-tabular presentation of the 59 unprofitable ventures. Here too, 
manufacturing is the dominant sector. As far as the age of these unprofitable ventures is 
concerned, 31 ventures had been operating for between five and 13 years, while four 
ventures had been operating for more than 1 0 years. In comparison of ownership 
structure, there is almost no difference in terms of Chinese (22 cases) or overseas partners 
(23 cases) holding more than 50% stakes. 
It was surprising that eight wholly foreign ventures converted from joint ventures were 
losing money. Of the 59 unprofitable ventures, 20 changed their ownership shares. Of 
these, 8 were ventures in which overseas partners gained more than a 50% stakes and 
eight were wholly owned by the overseas partners. This reflects that there had been active 
reconfiguration within these unprofitable ventures. 
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Table 5.3.3-5 Unprofitable Joint Ventures 
Unprofitable Ventures 
Industry Sectors Number of Ventures l'ercentage 
Manufacturing 44 74.6% 
PrOj)_erty development 4 6.8% 
Hotel/restaurant 4 6.8% 
Services 7 11.8% 
Total 59 
OJ~eration Age (years) Number of Ventures Percentage 
13 I 1.7% 
12 I 1.7% 
10 2 3.3% 
9 I 1.7% 
8 I 1.7% 
7 3 5.0% 
6 6 10.1% 
5 16 27.1% 
4 7 11.8% 
3 12 20.3% 
2 6 10.1% 
I 2 3.3% 
Less than I year I 1.7% 
Total 59 
Ownership Structure Number of Ventures Percenta~~;e 
Chinese partner holding more than 50% stakes 22 37.2% 
Overseas partner holding more than 50% stakes 23 38.9% 
Overseas partner wholly owned 8 13.5% 
50/50 equity ownership 6 10.1% 
Total 59 
Chan~~;es in Ownership Shares Number of Ventures Percentage 
Chinese shares increased to more than or= 50% 3 5.0% 
Overseas shares increased to more than or= 50% 8 13.5% 
Overseas shares increased to I 00% 8 13.5% 
Overseas shares increased but still less than 50% I 1.7% 
Ownership shares remain unchanged 39 66.1% 
Total 59 
Foreign Partner Profitable Ventures Ownership Shares Ownership Shares 
Changed Unchanged 
Japan 21 10 II 
Korea 9 5 4 
Hong Kong 17 3 14 
Taiwan 5 2 3 
USA 6 6 
Singapore I I 
Total 59 20 39 
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Table 5.3.3-6 presents cross-tabular details of ventures with ownership shares transferred. 
There were 34 ventures with ownership shares transferred between partners, 32 of which 
were manufacturing firms and two were in the service sector. Among these 32 
manufacturing ventures, 12 were profitable, two were just break-even and 18 were 
unprofitable, which could explain the reason for ownership restructuring. 
After ownership restructuring, the number of ventures with Chinese partners holding 
majority stakes (more than 50%) fell from 11 to eight; the number of ventures with 
overseas partners holding majority stakes (more than 50%) increased from 13 to 24 
(including 15 wholly foreign-owned ventures) and the number of ventures with 50/50 
equity fell from 10 to two. This further confirmed that overseas partners had been 
actively gaining ownership shares with an view to gaining complete control over their 
joint ventures. 
The country origins of the leading overseas partners gaining majority stakes were Japan, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, USA and Singapore. 
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Table 5.3.3-6 Joint Ventures with Ownership Share Transferred 
Ventures with Ownership Shares Transferred 
Industry Sectors Profitable Ventures Breakeven Ventures Unprofitable Ventures Total 
Manufacturing 12 2 18 32 
Services 2 2 
Total 12 2 20 34 
Operation Age (years) Profitable Ventures Breakeven Ventures Unprofitable Ventures Total 
10 2 I 3 
9 3 3 
8 I I 
7 I I 
6 2 2 
5 I 4 5 
4 3 5 8 
3 2 5 7 
2 I I 2 4 
I 0 
Total 12 2 20 34 
Previous Ownership Structure Profitable Ventures Breakeven Ventures Unprofitable Ventures Total 
Chinese partner holding more than 50% stakes 3 2 6 II 
Overseas partner holding more than 50% stakes 3 10 13 
50150 equity ownership 6 4 10 
Total 12 2 20 34 
Existing Ownership Structure Profitable Ventures Breakeven Ventures Unprofitable Ventures Total 
Chinese partner holding more than 50% stakes 3 I 4 8 
Overseas partner holding more than 50% stakes 
(including wholly foreign-owned ventures) 7 I 16 24 
50150 equity ownership 2 2 
Total 12 2 20 34 
Foreign Partner Profitable Ventures Breakeven Ventures Unprofitable Ventures Total 
Japan 6 I 10 17 
Hong Kong 3 I 3 7 
Korea I 5 6 
USA I I 
Singapore I I 
Taiwan 2 
Total 12 2 20 34 
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Table 5.3.3-7 gives cross-tabular details of ventures without ownership share transfers, 
with a view to comparing them with ventures that had changed their ownership shares. 
There were 69 ventures surveyed experiencing no ownership share transfers between 
venture partners. Manufacturing was the dominant sector, with 54 ventures, and the other 
15 were from the property development, hotel/restaurant and service sectors. 
Of these 69 ventures, 26 were profitable, 4 were break-even and 39 were unprofitable. 
Looking at the age of these ventures, the 26 profitable ventures had been in operation for 
between one and nine years. It was surprising that the 39 unprofitable ventures had been 
operating for one to 13 years. The origin of the overseas partners of these 39 unprofitable 
ventures were Japanese (12 ventures), Hong Kong Chinese (14 ventures), South Korean 
(3 ventures), Americans (6 ventures), Singapore (1 venture) and Taiwan (3 ventures). 
This implies a situation in which overseas partners actively restructure their joint ventures 
to gain controlling stakes. As mentioned earlier, this situation is potentially unstable. 
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Table 5.3.3-7 Joint Ventures with Ownership Shares Unchanged 
Ventures with Ownership Shares Unchanged 
Industry Sectors Profitable Ventures Breakeven Ventures Unprofitable Ventures Total 
Manufacturing 25 3 26 54 
Property development I 4 5 
Hotel/restaurant 4 4 
Services I 5 6 
Total 26 4 39 69 
Operation Age (years) Profitable Ventures Breakeven Ventures Unprofitable Ventures Total 
13 I I 
12 I· I 
10 I I 
9 2 I 3 
8 I I 2 
7 I 2 3 
6 6 4 10 
5 6 2 12 20 
4 6 2 8 
3 2 2 7 II 
2 5 5 
I 2 I 3 
0.5 I I 
Total 26 4 39 69 
Ownership Structure Profitable Ventures Breakeven Ventures Unprofitable Ventures Total 
Chinese partner holding more than 50% shares 13 2 20 35 
Overseas partner holding more than 50% shares 9 2 13 24 
50150 egui~ownership 4 6 10 
Total 26 4 39 69 
Foreign Partner Profitable V cntures Breakeven Ventures Unprofitable Ventures Total 
Japan 13 2 12 27 
Hong Kong 9 14 23 
Korea 3 3 
USA I 6 7 
Singapore I I 
Taiwan I I 3 5 
Germany I I 2 
Sweden I I 
Total 26 4 39 69 
(2) General Managers 
Sixty-eight ventures had Chinese general managers (66%) and m the remammg 35 
ventures, the general managers were expatriates (34%). 
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l:l Senior Management Shifted from Expatriates to the Chinese 
Respondents were asked (1) who was the general manager in the early stage of the joint 
venture and (2) who was the general manager now. Table 5.3.3-8 reports the details of 
senior management arrangements both in the first and in the present stages. 
Table 5.33-8 General Managers 
Stage of Number of Number of 
Joint Ventures Chinese General Managers Expatriate General Managers Total 
In the early stage 57 46 103 
At present 68 35 103 
The table shows a general shift of general managers from being expatriates to the 
Chinese. Between 1996 and 1998, 11 expatriate general managers were replaced by local 
Chinese managers. The details of the 11 joint ventures where this happened are shown in 
Table 5.3.3-9. 
Table 5.3.3-9 Expatriate General Managers Replaced by Local Chinese Managers 
Country Origin s of Country Origins of Overseas Partner's Overseas Partner's 
No. Former General Existing General Original Present 
Manager Manager Ownership Shares Ownership Shares 
I Korea China 70% 100% 
2 Japan China 65% 85% 
3 Japan China 51% 80% 
4 Japan China 70% 70% 
5 USA China 70% 70% 
6 Korea China 60% 60% 
7 Taiwan China 50150 50150 
8 Korea China 25% 25% 
9 Japan China 65% 35% 
10 Japan China 50150 15% 
II HK Chinese China 35% 35% 
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Among these 11 cases, one Hong Kong and two Japanese partners lost their general 
manager positions owing to reduced ownership stakes. In another five cases, expatriate 
general managers were replaced by local Chinese managers without a change in the 
ownership structure. In the other three cases the· overseas investors gained a greater 
ownership stake. This indicates a trend for joint ventures to develop an indigenous senior 
management team in order to reduce the overall costs and handle any cross-cultural 
management problems. 
• Senior Management Shifted from the Chinese to Expatriates 
Of the 35 joint ventures that had expatriate general managers, four had brought m 
expatriates to replace Chinese general managers (Table 5.3.3-10). 
Table 5.3.3-10 Chinese General Managers Replaced by Expatriates 
Overseas Overseas 
Number Country origins Former general partner's Existing general partner's 
of JVs of overseas manager previous manager existing 
partner stake stake 
I Hong Kong Chinese 40% HK Chinese 80% 
I Japan Chinese 51% Japanese 93% 
I Japan Chinese 40% Japanese 100% 
I Hong Kong Chinese 50% HK Chinese 100% 
Obviously these four joint ventures all changed the ownership structure. Two had gained 
80% and 90% stakes from their Chinese partners and the other two were currently wholly 
owned. This clearly indicates that, although there was a trend for joint ventures to 
develop an indigenous senior management team, once gained complete control over a 
joint venture, the overseas partner tended to bring in an expatriate general manager. 
(2) Changes in Expatriate Staff 
Because of their high costs compared with local Chinese staff, the number of expatriate 
staff was a frequent source of friction between Chinese and overseas partners during both 
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the negotiation and operational stages. The respondents were therefore asked to say how 
many expatriate staff was working in their joint ventures in the early stage and currently. 
The number of expatriate staff was clearly declining, and many joint ventures did not 
have expatriate staff from the very beginning (Table 5.3.3-11): 
Table 5.3.3-11 Changes in the Number of Expatriate Staff 
Expatriate staff status Number of joint ventures Percentage 
Number of expatriate staff unchanged 26 25.2% 
Number of expatriate staff reduced 22 21.3% 
Number of expatriate staff reduced to nil 12 11.6% 
No expatriate staff from start 30 29.1% 
Number of expatriate staff increased 13 12.6% 
Total 103 -
There were 13 cases where the number of expatriate staff had increased. However, 
comparison of these 13 joint ventures where the ownership structure had changed further 
revealed that the overseas partners of all these 13 ventures had recently gained substantial 
stakes transferred from their Chinese partners. Eight overseas investors wholly owned the 
ventures - one Japanese, one American, and six Korean. This indicated that bringing 
back expatriate staff was a strategic action aimed at enforcing control over the wholly 
owned ventures. 
(3) Changes in Organisational Structure 
Table 5.3.3-12 reports the existing status ofthe domestic sales force ofthejoint ventures. 
In the preparatory stage of this research, it was found that major changes in the 
organisational structure of China-based joint ventures focused on domestic sales, as joint 
ventures sought to establish their own sales forces. In the early stage, most China-based 
joint ventures relied principally on the sales force of the Chinese partner's parent 
company to increase the market share. The survey results showed that the situation had 
significantly changed. Ninty-six per cent now had their own domestic sales forces and 
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this indicated a major change in organisational structure as compared to the 1980s and the 
early 1990s. 
Table 5.3.3-12 Status of Domestic Sales Force 
Operational stage In the early stage At present 
Joint venture with domestic sales force 4 (3.8%) 91 (88.4%) 
Joint venture without domestic sales force 99 (96.2%) 12 (11.6%) 
Total 103 103 
(4) Changes in Workforce Recruitment 
Previous studies (Brown 1986; Davidson 1987; Campbell 1989; Shenkar 1990) showed 
that workforces were mainly transferred from the Chinese partner's parent company. 
Only a small number of staff was recruited from local job centres in the 1980s and the 
early 1990s. The workforce recruited from Chinese parent companies brought with it 
problems such as overstaffing, poor production quality, and low productivity. 
The new trend was towards using local job centres rather than Chinese partner's parent 
company. The number of joint ventures that recruited both management staff and 
workers from the Chinese partner's parent company was declining. Forty-eight out of 
103 joint ventures recruited management staff directly from the local job centres from the 
outset. In another 39 cases, recruitment had been switched to the local job centres. Only 
one joint venture switched back from local job centre to the Chinese partner's parent 
company (Table 5.3.3-13). The personnel manager of this company was contacted via 
telephone after the survey and asked the reason for this. He claimed that it was because of 
the availability of skilled technical staff in the Chinese partner's parent company. 
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Table 5.3.3-13 Management Staff Recruitment 
Management Staff Recruitment Number of Ventures 
From local recruitment agencies only 48 
From Chinese parent company to local recruitment agencies entirely 21 
From Chinese parent company to local recruitment agencies partly 18 
From Chinese parent company only 15 
From local recruitment agency to Chinese partner's parent company 1 
Total 103 
Table 5.3.3-14 shows the recruitment structure. In contrast to the previous studies 
(Brown 1986; Davidson 1987; Campbell 1989; Shenkar 1990), 93 had completely or 
partly switched worker recruitment. Only eight had completely recruited their workers 
from the Chinese partner's parent company. There were also two cases where the shift 
had been reversed- from the local job centres to the Chinese partner's parent company. 
Table 5.3.3-14 Worker Recruitment 
Worker Recruitment Number of Ventures 
From local recruitment agencies only 61 
From Chinese parent company to local recruitment agencies entirely 14 
From Chinese parent company to local recruitment agencies partly 18 
From Chinese parent company only 8 
From local recruitment agencies to Chinese parent company 2 
Total 103 
(5) Changes in Employee Benefits 
In the 1980s, a major difference between Chinese and most overseas partners was the 
provision of fringe benefits such as housing, free working meals as well as uniforms for 
employees, which caused disputes between venture partners. As noted in Chapter Three, 
Chinese employees took it for granted that housing, corporate unifom1s and free meals 
would be provided by employers. However, this was not always accepted by overseas 
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partners. As a result, lacking of substantial commitment on the part of the overseas 
partner to provide benefits has led to less employee loyalty in joint ventures and wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises. In this survey, interesting changes were found to have 
happened and most overseas partners in Dalian now provided housing or a housing 
allowance (Table 5.3.3-15), corporate uniforms (Table 5.3.3-16) and free meals (Table 
5.3.3-17) for Chinese employees. This implies that joint venture managers, and overseas 
managers in particular, have been gradually adapting Chinese business culture in order to 
increase employee loyalty and workforce stability. 
Table 5.3.3-14 Worker Recruitment 
Worker Recruitment Number of Ventures 
From local recruitment agencies only 61 
From Chinese parent company to local recruitment agencies entirely 14 
From Chinese parent company to local recruitment agencies partly 18 
From Chinese parent company only 8 
From local recruitment agencies to Chinese parent company 2 
Total 103 
Table 5.3.3-15 Joint Venture Benefits (Employee Housing) 
No. of Ventures In the Early Stage At Present 
43 No housing/housing allowance Housing provided 
42 No housing/housing allowance Housing allowance provided 
18 No housing/housing allowance No housing/housing allowance 
103 - -
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Table 5.3.3-16 Joint Venture Benefits (Corporate Uniform) 
Overseas Partners No. of Companies Uniforms Provided Do not Provide Uniforms 
Japanese 43 38 5 
Hong Kong Chinese 30 24 6 
Korean 10 8 2 
USA 8 6 2 
Taiwanese 7 6 I 
Singaporean 2 2 -
German 2 2 -
Swedish I - I 
Total 103 86 17 
Table 5.3.3-17 Joint Venture Benefits (Employee meals) 
Operation stage Provide 3 meals Provide 2 meals Provide 1 meal Meal allowance No meal 
In the early stage 18 4 56 17 8 
At present 29 4 50 19 I 
(6) Driving Forces for Changes in Joint Ventures 
Simply asking what were the driving forces for the changes was too general to generate 
meaningful data, and would be difficult for respondents to give answers. Taking 
consideration of this fact, a list of potential external and internal driving forces for 
changes in joint ventures was provided for respondents to tick. Table 5.3.3-18 reports the 
feedbacks. With regard to the former, 'frequent changes in China's foreign direct 
investment policy' was ranked as the first driving force for changes in joint ventures (81 
responses - 78.6%) followed by 'bureaucratic systems' (77 responses - 74.7%) and 
'limitations of domestic market' (51 responses- 49.5%). 
External driving factors, such as 'political instability' and 'difficulty in repatriating 
profits to overseas partner's home country, used to concern overseas investors the most in 
the 1980s and the early 1990s, but attracted zero response in this survey. The factor 
'inefficient infrastructure' attracted only 4 responses out of 103 joint ventures. 
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Table 5.3.3-18 Driving Forces for Changes in Joint Ventures 
(Total respondents: 103) 
External Driving Forces Responses Ofo Internal Driving Forces Responses o;o 
Frequent changes in foreign 81 78.6% Different management styles 68 66% 
direct investment policy between Chinese and overseas 
partners 
Bureaucratic system 77 74.7% Changes in ownership 66 64% 
structure 
Limitations of domestic markets 51 49.5% Transfer pricing 59 57.2% 
Difficulties in obtaining high 39 37.8% Poor working relationship 52 50.4% 
quality raw materials or between Chinese and overseas 
components from domestic managers 
sources 
Interference by Chinese parent 12 11.6% Difficulty in recruitment of 48 46.6% 
company qualified Chinese management 
staff 
Inefficient infrastructure 4 3.8% Too much effort required to 31 30% 
deal with government 
departments 
Political instability 0 - Inefficiency of Chinese 23 22.3% 
workers 
Difficulty in repatriating profits 0 - Difficulty in communications 2 1.9% 
to overseas partners' home 
country 
Difficulty in controlling I 0.9% 
quality 
With regard to the internal driving forces for changes, the most frequently cited were 
'different management styles between Chinese and overseas partners' (68 responses -
66%), 'changes in ownership structure' (66 responses - 64%), 'transfer pricing' (59 
responses- 57.2%), 'poor working relationship between Chinese and overseas managers' 
(52 responses- 50.4%), difficulty in recruitment of qualified Chinese management staff 
(48 responses - 46.6%) and 'too much efforts required to deal with government 
departments' (31 responses - 30%). The ticking of 'inefficiency of Chinese workers', 
'difficulty in communications' and 'difficulty in controlling quality of products' which 
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were the major concerns for venture managers in the 1980s and the early 1990s was 23, 
two and one respectively. This indicated that overseas partners' concerns in the 1980s 
and the early 1990s were no longer problems. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The presentation of the survey findings and the cross-tabularisation have shown that there 
were significant changes in Dalian-based joint ventures in terms of corporate strategies, 
ownership structure and operational management. The survey findings indicated that to 
position themselves better, joint venture partners initiated internal changes in response to 
external 'changes' caused by China's economic transition. The most significant finding 
was that ownership transfers in Dalian-based joint ventures were mainly made from 
Chinese partners to overseas partners. This implied potential changes in bargaining 
powers between joint venture partners, a topic that is to be addressed further in Chapter 
Six. 
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Chapter 6 Personal Interview Results 
6.0 Introduction 
Chapter Four stressed the importance of usmg qualitative research methods to 
complement the information collected through the questionnaire survey. This chapter 
reports the results of 50 in-depth personal interviews, which were carried out with a view 
to gaining an understanding of (1) the impact of changes in China's business environment 
surrounding state control over foreign direct investment, (2) changes at national/regional 
levels and joint venture level, and (3) the outlook of foreign direct investment as viewed 
by Dalian government officials, Chinese and overseas venture partners. 
6.1 Sample of Personal Interviews 
From 6th June 1998 to 6th September 1998, 50 interviews were conducted with Dalian 
government officials, and Chinese and overseas joint venture managers. As noted in 
Chapter Four, I was introduced as a personal friend of the Mayor1 by a deputy director2 of 
the Dalian Municipal Foreign Affairs Office to the Dalian Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Committee. This was to emphasize the official affiliation of the joint 
questionnaire survey. By contrast for the interviews, less emphasis was placed on official 
affiliations, rather, I was introduced as an independent overseas PhD student with 
personal support from the Mayor. The implication is that any assistance from Chinese 
and expatriate managers with this research would be regarded as doing a favour for the 
local authorities and also as a chance to enhance the relationship between these joint 
venture managers and the local authorities. Hence, the atmosphere of all the interviews 
was informal, co-operative and very friendly. 
The interviews fell into three major groupings. The first group consisted of 13 officials at 
three levels of the Dalian government. Among the 13 officials, two were senior municipal 
1 I used to work for the Mayor between 1988 and 1995 in Dahan Foreign Affairs Office. 
2 Official2, who was the author's immediate superior between 1988 and 1995. 
140 
Personal Interview Results Chapter 6 
officials, five represented the five different district level authorities3, and six were from 
the Foreign-Invested Enterprise Division of the Dalian Economic and Technological 
Development Zone, which hosted most foreign-invested enterprises in the region. The 
second group consisted of seven expatriate managers who were available at that time. 
Chinese managers made up the third and biggest group, with 30 interviews. 
For reasons of confidentiality, the officials are referred to as Official 1 to Official 13. 
Joint venture managers are referred to as Overseas Managers one to seven and Chinese 
Managers one to 30, plus their titles (e.g., general manager, deputy general manager, or 
department manager) and the name of the company. 
6.1.1 Dalian Government Officials 
Interviews with local government officials responsible for foreign direct investment 
activities offer an insight into official perspectives on the impacts of changes in China on 
Dalian's foreign direct investment, and joint ventures in particular. 
Separate interviews were arranged by the Dalian Municipal Commission of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation. This enabled me to talk with 13 government officials 
(Table 6.1-1) from seven relevant departments of the Dalian municipal government, 
which oversee foreign direct investment activities. 
Interview questions for local officials were all open-ended focusing on the role of local 
govemment in foreign direct investment, changes in China's business environment, 
changes at nationaVregional levels in the transitional economy, and changes at the joint 
venture level. 
3 There are six districts in Dalian. One district was ruled out by the author because there are few foreign-
invested projects there. 
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Table 6.1-1 Summary of Dalian Officials Interviewed 
No Position Government Department 
Dati an Municipal Commission of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Official I Deputy director Cooperation 
Official 2 Deputy director Dalian Municipal Foreign Affairs Office 
Foreign-Invested Enterprise Division of Dati an Economic and 
Official 3 Division director Technology Development Zone 
Foreign-Invested Enterprise Division of Dati an Economic and 
Official 4 Deputy division director Technology Development Zone 
Foreign-Invested Enterprise Division of Dalian Economic and 
Official 5 Section chief Technology Development Zone 
Foreign-Invested Enterprise Division of Dati an Economic and 
Official 6 Section chief Technology Development Zone 
Foreign-Invested Enterprise Division of Dati an Economic and 
Official 7 Section chief Technology Development Zone 
Foreign-Invested Enterprise Division of Dalian Economic and 
Official 8 Section chief Technology Development Zone 
Dalian Zhongshan District Sub-Council of the China Council for 
Official 9 Secretary general Promotion of International Trade 
Dalian Ganjingzi District Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Official 10 Deputy director Cooperation 
Dalian Shahekou District Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Official II Deputy director Cooperation 
Dalian Zhongshan District Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Official 12 Deputy director Cooperation. 
Dahan Ganjingzi District Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Official 13 Section chief Cooperation 
6.1.2 Expatriate Managers 
All the interviews with expatriate managers were pre-arranged by officials from Foreign-
Invested Enterprises Administrative Departments at different levels of local government. 
Joint ventures with both Chinese and expatriate managers were the major targets for the 
in-depth personal interviews. As most Dalian-based joint ventures are run by Chinese 
managers, only seven expatriate managers were interviewed (Table 6.1-2). 
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Table 6.1-2 Summary of Expatriate Managers Interviewed 
No. & Title Time Company name Date Origin of 
with theJV of JV setting up overseas 
partner 
Manager I 
Asst. general 4 years Dalian North Pacific Can Co. Ltd 1992.01 USA 
manager 
Manager 2 Dalian Industrial Park Development 
Marketing director 3 year Co. Ltd. 1992.10 Japan 
Manager 3 Dahan Jianchang Foot Wear Co. 
General manager 4 years Ltd. 1994.08 Korea 
Manager 4 
General manager 3 years Dahan Polyclad Company Ltd. 1995.06 USA 
Manager 5 
General manager 3 years Dahan Southcorp Can Co. Ltd 1995.07 USA 
Manager 6 
General manager 2 years Le Cafe Igosso Co. Ltd 1996.03 Japan 
Manager 7 Dahan Supertech Electronic 
President 2 years Engineering Corporation 1996.08 USA 
Of the seven expatriate managers, four were American, two Japanese, and one Korean. 
The interviews were conducted in English. In comparison with most Chinese managers, 
expatriate managers are more familiar with qualitative academic research. Therefore the 
author was introduced as an independent overseas PhD student to reduce the emphasis on 
official affiliation. 
The interview questions for overseas joint venture managers were all open-ended. They 
were about the business environment, the working of joint venture, relative strategies, 
decision-making processes and the future. 
6.1.3 Chinese Managers 
All these interviews were also arranged by officials at different levels of local 
government. As most Dalian-based joint ventures are run by Chinese managers, it was 
less difficult to arrange such interviews. Here, I was introduced as an independent 
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overseas PhD student to reduce the emphasis on official affiliation, but with the 
additional hint that the author was also a personal friend of the Mayor's thereby implying 
that this research was of importance to the relationship between these Chinese managers 
and the local authorities. 
Altogether 30 Chinese managers were interviewed. With regard to their parent 
companies, 20 were state-owned companies and 10 were private companies. Table 6.1-3 
is a summary of the Chinese managers interviewed. 
Table 6.1-3 Summary of Chinese Managers Interviewed 
Name & Title Time Company name Date Origin of 
with the Co. of setting up overseas partner 
Manager I 
Deputy general manager 9 years Dalian North Pacific Can Co. Ltd. 1992.01 USA 
Manager 2 
General manager 8 years Dalian Deli Medical Materials Co. Ltd. 1990.12 Hong Kong 
Manager 3 Dalian Thermo King Transport Refrigeration 
HR manager 7 years Co. Ltd 1991.12 USA 
Manager4 
Plant manager 6 years Dalian Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 1992.03 USA 
Manager 5 
General manager 6 years Dalian Hualu Electronics Co. Ltd. 1992.09 Japan 
Manager 6 Dalian Industrial Land Development Co. Ltd. 
Deputy general manager 2 years 1992.10 Japan 
Manager? Dalian Taiyangcheng Entertainment Co. Ltd. 
Deputy office manager 5 years 1993.02 Korea 
Manager 8 
Asst. general manager 5 years Dalian Yuanda Building Co. Ltd. 1993.03 Hong Kong 
Manager 9 
General manager l year Dalian Baolu Colour Printing Co. Ltd. 1993.05 Japan 
Manager 10 
General manager 5 years Dalian Lanbao Fashion Dress Co. Ltd. 1993.05 Japan 
Manager II 
Deputy general manager 4 years Dalian Kun Chang Footwear Co. Ltd. 1994.08 Korea 
Manager 12 
Deputy general manager 4 years Dalian Shenjun Health Products Co. Ltd. 1994.04 USA 
Manager 13 
General manager 4 years Dalian Vander Orst Marine Engineering Co. 1994.05 Germany 
Ltd. 
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Name & Title Time Company name Date Origin of 
with the Co. of setting up overseas partner 
Manager 14 
Deputy general manager 4 years Dalian THK Co. Ltd. 1994.06 Japan 
Manager 15 
General manager 4 years Dalian Jianchang Shoe Co. Ltd. 1994.08 Korea 
Manager 16 
Office manager 4 years Dalian Falong Industrial Co. Ltd. 1994.08 Hong Kong 
Manager 17 
General manager 4 years Dalian Lingfa Food Products Co. Ltd. 1994.11 Japan 
Manager 18 
Chairman 4 years Dalian Far East Tools Co. Ltd. 1994.12 USA 
Manager 19 
Deputy general manager 4 years Dalian Okai Consultancy Co. Ltd. 1995.04 Japan 
Manager 20 
Deputy general manager 2 years Dalian Polyc1ad Company Ltd. 1995.06 USA 
Manager 21 
Managing director 3 years Dalian Southcorp Can Co. Ltd 1995.08 USA 
Manager 22 Dalian Zhongying Precise Casting Co. Ltd. 
General manager 3 years 1995.09 Japan 
Manager 23 
General manager 3 years Dalian Diesel Marine Ltd. 1995.10 Britain 
Manager 24 
Deputy general manager 3 years Dalian Pujin Steel Sheet Co. Ltd. 1995.11- Korea 
Manager 25 
Deputy general manager 2 years Dalian Yigousou Restaurant Co. Ltd. 1996.03 Japan 
Manager 26 
Deputy general manager 2 years Dalian Lushan Health Centre Co. Ltd. 1996.05 Japan 
Manager 27 Dalian Supertech Electronic Engineering 
PR manager 2 years Corporation 1996.08 USA 
Manager 28 
Deputy general manager 2 years Dalian Jinggong Electronics Co. Ltd. 1996.09 Japan 
Manager 29 
General manager 2 years Dalian Kaiyue Beauty/Health Co. Ltd. 1996.11 Taiwan 
Manager 30 
General manager I year Dalian Zhuyang Paper Products Co. Ltd. 1997.12 Japan 
The interview questions for Chinese managers were all open-ended with a similar focus 
to those before. 
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6.2 Changes in China's Business Environment in the 1990s 
The major evidents in the transitional economy and their impacts on state control over 
foreign direct investment were a common theme in talks with Dalian government 
officials at different levels. Many had admitted that the negative effects of China's 
economic reforn1s, together with the Asian financial crisis, had caused a decline in inflow 
of foreign investment since 1996. 
The Dalian government had been under pressure to relax controls on foreign direct 
investment, especially on the setting up of joint ventures, in order to reverse the situation. 
The impact of the transitional economy at the national/regional levels in the 1990s can be 
summarised as follows. 
6.2.1 Pressures for Government to Relax Controls over Joint Ventures 
(1) Pressures for the Creation of Employment 
A high-level Dalian official4 claimed that since 1984, China had implemented several 
reform measures to improve the productivity of state-owned enterprises, and the results 
had not been satisfactory. Since 1992, China has been in the process of building a 
'socialist market economy', and Dalian has been severely affected by this reform in terms 
of economic decline and increasing unemployment. 
Another semor government official5 revealed that most state-owned enterprises were 
losing money. With further reforms, they would close down more inefficient factories 
and lay off a growing number of workers. He said, "In 1996, about 420,000 workers 
were either dismissed or redeployed elsewhere in five cities in Liaoning Province. 
Therefore, local governments came under strong pressure to create jobs for those 
unemployed workers". 
4 Official!, Dalian Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
5 Official 2, Dalian Foreign Affairs Office. 
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A high-level Dalian official6 admitted that local governments had been pressurised by 
central government to make greater efforts to reverse the decline in foreign investment in 
their areas, with a view to creating jobs for laid-offworkers from state-owned enterprises. 
Relevant government departments had been made to relax the criteria for setting up joint 
ventures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises, so as to encourage the creation of jobs for 
unemployed workers. 
(2) CaU from the Government to Reverse tllne Dedine of Inward Investment 
According to a senior Dalian government official7: "China's economy as a whole has 
declined in 1996, 1997 and 1998 owing to China's internal adjustment of economic 
policy, especially the further reform of state-owned enterprises and the impact of Asian 
financial crisis. Therefore, there has been a substantial decline in foreign direct 
investment in Dalian between 1997 and 1998. We have been asked by central and 
provincial governments to do everything we can to tum this tide around. To be honest, 
the most effective action we can take with regard to job creation is to relax the control 
over foreign direct investment." In essence, this interviewee saw little alternative if 
central government objectives were to be met. 
Another official8 disclosed that, with the impact of the Asian financial crisis, existing 
joint venture export has been seriously affected. This official stated that, "By the end of 
1997, nearly 2000 joint ventures in Dalian had closed down due to a variety of reasons". 
This figure was alarming for a city of approximately 7000 foreign-invested enterprises in 
total. 
(3) Difficulty in Obtaining Bank Loans 
Another official from the Foreign-Invested Enterprise Division9 said, "In the 1980s, joint 
ventures could take out bank loans secured by their investment in real estates. This 
practice was ended by the central government in the middle of the 1990s, which dealt a 
6 Official!, Dalian Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
7 Official!, Dalian Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
8 Official 2, Dalian Foreign Affairs Office. 
9 Official 5, Foreign Invested Enterprises Division ofDalian Economic & Technical Development Zone. 
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huge blow to most Dalian-based joint ventures. In Dalian as well as in other major 
coastal cities, under pressure from the central government, banks have been extending 
loans only to rescue the failing state-owned enterprises. The shortage of bank loans has 
directly affected the operation of existing joint ventures and halted the start-up of new 
joint ventures." 
Another feature was the emphasis placed on finance. Several Dalian officials said that the 
greatest difficulty between 1996 and 1997 was that many joint ventures they had 
approved could not come into operation because the Chinese partners - state-owned firms 
in particular, - were unable enough funds, owing to difficulties in obtaining bank loans. 
As a result, local governments had to relax control and allow overseas investors to have 
majority stakes in setting up new joint ventures. 
Several overseas partners complained about their Chinese partners' delay in supplying the 
capital they had promised. This was largely to do with the tightening of the capital market 
by the Chinese government. One American general manager10 said in the interview, "In 
the 1980s, there were a lot of complaints from the Chinese government/Chinese partners 
about the delays by overseas investors in supplying their capital for setting up joint 
ventures. Nowadays, it is the Chinese partners who cannot pay up the capital for setting 
up joint ventures or to make further investment. That is why more and more Chinese 
partners have to let their overseas counterparts have majority stakes or even wholly own 
these ventures." 
In contrast, one senior local government official 11 pointed out that "It is true that bank 
loans are difficult to get at the moment, but this is not the only reason that most Chinese 
partners do not make further investment in their joint ventures. Most parent companies 
of Chinese partners have a tight budget at the moment, but some of them can still afford a 
bit of further investment. However, they don't just want to pour more money into the 
existing ventures as they think they are not worthwhile. The major reasons for this are 
10 Expatriate Manager 4, Dalian Polyclad Company Ltd. 
11 Official 4, Dalian Economic and Technology Development Zone. 
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the problems in joint operation and anticipated long-term losses. The trust between 
Chinese and overseas partners, which existed in the early stage of joint ventures is no 
longer there." This government official also mentioned that several large state-owned 
enterprises planned to invest abroad rather than in their Dalian-based joint ventures. 
(4) Impact of Regional Competition 
With the further opening up of the hinterland, most regional government departments 
have been competing to offer more attractive incentives to overseas investors. As one 
Dalian official 12 put it: "At the moment, in comparison with the hinterland, Dahan has no 
advantages at all in terms of incentives that can be offered to overseas investors and the 
flexibility given in interpreting central government policy towards foreign direct 
investment. There have been more and more reports about overseas investors moving 
away from coastal cities to areas in the hinterland to set up new and wholly owned 
enterprises. Several overseas joint venture partners in Dahan have already moved away 
or shifted into wholly owned ventures. We have no other option but to relax the controls 
over taxation, import of raw materials/components, domestic sales and in particular, the 
transfer of ownership from Chinese partners to overseas partners, in order to keep 
existing overseas investors to stay in our region." However, this also suggests that many 
joint ventures lacked a positive attachment to Dahan, and were likely to keep other 
possible locations in mind as well. 
6.2.2 Relaxed State Control over Joint Ventures 
(1) Delegation of Authority for Approving Joint Venture Projects 
Dahan municipal government has redirected the responsibility for halting the regional 
decline of foreign direct investment to lower levels of government, including the 
development zone and the urban district authorities, by giving them specific targets for 
foreign investment inflows every year. The only effective way for lower-level authorities 
to achieve these targets has been to further relax the controls over foreign direct 
investment activities. 
12 Official12, Dalian Zhongshan District Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
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According to an official 13 in a district-level authority, "In order to increase the number of 
foreign-invested projects and to create jobs, the Dalian municipal government delegated 
the authority for approving foreign inward investment projects to the Development Zone 
Authority in 1994 and then delegated the authority further, to the district level authorities, 
in 1996. When the authority for approval of inward investment projects was delegated to 
us, we were also given a set target for introducing a certain amount of foreign capital and 
setting up a certain number of joint ventures each year. These targets were very hard to 
achieve and we have had to relax controls even further so as to let in more overseas 
investment. Nobody pays attention to the state regulations anymore." An urban district 
official 14 said that, "The target for introducing foreign direct investment into our 
Zhongshan District is USD$30 million this year (1998). The corresponding figure for 
Dalian Economic and Technology Development Zone in 1998 is USD$80 million. In 
addition, we have been struggling to persuade existing overseas investors to stay in the 
region." By the time of the interview (August 1998), they had only achieved 45% of their 
overall target. This official was openly worried that she might be replaced if she failed to 
meet the target by the end of the year. 
To meet their targets, the lower-level government authorities often ignore many 
regulations, or agreed procedures, in order to make the setting up of joint venture projects 
within their administrative area much easier. As one official15 said, "As long as a project 
can create jobs, we, the district govemment authorities, will approve it and do not care 
who the overseas partners are, where their money comes from and how much they will 
invest." In other words there was a 'don't ask too many questions' approach because 
many officials found they had little choice. 
Another official 16 from the district-level authority said, "Consequently, lower level local 
authorities have made some significant changes with regard to the minimum capital 
requirement for overseas partners to set up joint ventures in Dalian. With the pressure 
13 Official 9, Dalian Zhongshan District Sub-Council of the China Council for Promotion oflnternational 
Trade. 
14 Official 9, Zhongshan District Sub-Council of the China Council for Promotion oflnternational Trade. 
15 Officialll, Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Department, Shahekou District. 
16 Official9, Zhongshan District Sub-Council of the China Council for Promotion oflnternational Trade. 
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from higher authorities, we make it easy and straightforward to register for a joint 
venture, especially when it is a venture involving a private Chinese partner. Any 
overseas investor can set up a joint venture in Dalian as long as he/she puts in 
USD$50,000." This official also said, "We know the potential problems that may be 
caused by this simplistic policy, but the local government takes no action against it and 
we have to meet the set targets." 
Because of such pressure, the local authorities had to relax the control for setting up 
foreign-funded enterprises, and this has probably led to the creation of many shell joint 
ventures in the past two years. As several officials put it, what mattered to the local 
authorities was the quantity, not the quality of foreign direct investment. Table 6.2-1 
presents the minimum capital requirement for overseas investors to set up a joint venture 
in Dalian from 1996 to 1998. 
Table 6.2-1 Official Requirement for Minimum Capital Contribution by Overseas Partners 
(USD$) 
Official requirement 1996 1997 1998 
Minimum contribution by overseas partners 5,000,000 100,000 50,000 
Source: Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ofDalian municipal government, 1998. 
It can been seen that Dalian government departments were so keen to attract overseas 
capital that they had considerably lowered the standard for inward foreign investment, 
indicating they might care more about quantity. One official17 declared, "We know we 
are making mistakes, as the relaxed controls for setting up joint ventures will bring in 
many shell joint ventures, but we have to meet the target set by the higher authorities." 
The subordinate nature of their power and authority was, thus, also an important feature 
of their responses. 
17 OfficiallO, Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Department, Ganjingzi District 
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(2) Limited Pressure to Set up Joint Ventures 
One Japanese manager18 from an industrial park development company stated that the 
most impressive external impact on his venture's strategies was the absence of local 
government pressure to set up joint ventures. More wholly foreign-owned enterprise had 
entered his industrial park, which had not been so open to wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises before, making it rather less exclusive. This Japanese manager thought that 
this policy would affect the joint operation of most existing joint ventures, as more 
overseas partners were starting to consider wholly owning their ventures rather than 
entering into a joint venture. 
(3) Relaxed Controls on Ownership Transfer 
In line with the campaign to encourage foreign direct investment, especially wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises, the control of ownership transfer within existing joint ventures 
was relaxed. Consequently, this has led to a series of shifts from joint ventures to wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises. Several government officials emphasized that many overseas 
investors established joint ventures in the 1980s simply to comply with Chinese 
government regulations and were not satisfied with joint operations so far. These officials 
claimed that many existing overseas investors, including several big multinationals, had 
already contacted them, demanding withdrawal of their equities from joint ventures, and 
seeking to move to the hinterland, unless the local authorities let them wholly own their 
ventures. These bargaining tactics were something new and different in their experience. 
As one official 19 pointed out, "We have to compromise with foreign investors who 
demand to wholly own the joint ventures. We could not afford to lose them. We prefer 
them to stay as wholly owned enterprises rather than see them moving away." This 
official also said, "We have to persuade many Chinese partners to give up their joint 
venture shares and allow their overseas partners to own those joint ventures. This has 
proved not to be a difficult job, as many Chinese partners are not happy with their joint 
ventures either." The implication was that local government would compromise and even 
18 Expatriate Manager 2, Dalian Industrial Park Development Co. Ltd. 
19 Official 3, Dahan Economic and Technological Development Zone. 
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assist this conversion process, playing the role of an intermediary trying to bring about 
the required change. 
( 4) Less Export Pressure 
Several Chinese and expatriate managers said, "Although there are still official calls for 
joint ventures to export their products, unofficially the pressure is not real". These 
officials claimed that, since 1997, there had been a substantial increase in joint venture 
domestic sales because of problems with exports due to the Asian financial crisis. 
Another officiae0 revealed, "It is true that the Asian financial crisis led directly to a 
dramatic drop in the overall level of exports to Asian countries by China-based joint 
ventures in 1997 and 1998, and the central government has had to open the domestic 
market wider to China-based joint ventures. Many Dalian-based joint ventures have 
consequently turned to the domestic market for survival. Nevertheless, there is another 
reason why many Chinese partners deliberately make great efforts to expand domestic 
sales, in spite of the local government's pressure to export - they want to maintain a 
certain degree of control over this end and make some profits from it." 
One Japanese manager21 said, "More and more joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises have failed to meet their official export targets without being punished by the 
local govenm1ent. The government departments seem to have a tacit understanding of 
this. I know that our Chinese partner has been encouraged by the relevant government 
departments to make domestic sales to make some profits from it themselves." In other 
words, there was more than one way to 'read' government intentions, and a sense that 
there was some 'game playing' regarding export targets. 
A Chinese deputy general manager22 pointed out that Chinese partners regarded the 
domestic sales as a sure way of making profits, compared with the uncertainty in transfer 
20 Official 4, Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone. 
21 Expatriate Manager 2, Dahan Industrial Park Development and Administration Co.Ltd. 
22 Chinese Manager 20, Dahan Polyclad Company Ltd. 
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pncmg. A deeper significance emerged: it would enable more Chinese to have control 
over business. 
One official23 claimed: "We understand that some Chinese partners have lost a lot of 
money over a long period of time because of their overseas partners' transfer pricing 
tactics. It is therefore vital for the joint venture to make a profit through domestic sales, 
where Chinese partners can play a hands-on role. However, once a Chinese partner has 
gained control over the domestic sales it will play the transfer pricing game itself. If 
things go this way, the joint venture project will never survive. Nevertheless, many local 
government officials have become interested in assisting the expansion of joint ventures' 
domestic sales in order to give Chinese partners a chance to make some profits for their 
parent companies." 
(5) Decreasing Differences between Joint Ventures and Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises 
In line with relaxing controls over foreign direct investment, the Dalian municipal 
government had also started a campaign to encourage wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
by offering further favourable incentives. This made for little real difference between 
joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in terms of setting up the business, 
corporate tax, expmtation and even domestic sales. 
One government official24 claimed, "The major difference between a joint venture and a 
wholly foreign-owned enterprise is that a joint venture would find it easier to conduct 
sales in China's domestic market. Apart from this, a wholly foreign-owned enterprise is 
actually much easier and more straightforward to set up, as it does not need a board of 
directors. Although there are still regulations under which wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises must export a certain proportion of their products, the central government has, 
23 Official 5,Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone. 
24 Official 12, Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Department, Shahekou District 
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smce 1996, gradually lifted the ban on domestic sales for wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises." 
Another government official25 said, "To be honest, local government would do nothing if 
a joint venture or a wholly foreign-owned enterprise failed to meet their export 
requirements. The government can't afford to lose any overseas investors. On the other 
hand, Chinese partners might benefit from the increase in domestic sales." 
A Japanese manager26 commented, "Most foreign investors are already aware of the lack 
of difference between a joint venture and a wholly foreign-owned enterprise in terms of 
domestic sales. That is why more and more overseas investors are very actively renewing 
their joint venture strategies and converting to wholly foreign-owned ventures. If the door 
of domestic sales opens wide to all, then a wholly foreign-owned enterprise would be 
much easier to operate than a joint venture." 
In commenting on the disappearance of previous differences between a joint venture and 
a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, an American general manager27 said, "This is the 
most important external impact on the joint venture strategies. I entered a joint venture 
with a Chinese partner mainly in order to penetrate China's domestic market, because I 
was only allowed to sell my products on the domestic market if I had a Chinese partner. 
At the moment, I am allowed to sell our products on the domestic market even without a 
Chinese partner. This is the main reason for me trying to convert the joint venture into a 
wholly owned enterprise." Hence, there was some equalisation between business formats 
so far as these respondents were concerned. 
25 Official 5, Dalian Economic and Technology Development Zone 
26 Expatriate manager 2, Dalian Industrial Park Development Co. Ltd. 
27 Expatriate Manager 5 Dalian Southcorp Can Co. Ltd. 
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(6) The Private Sector's Involvement in Joint Venture Projects 
A senior Dalian officiaf8 asserted "The private sector has clearly been allowed to get 
involved in joint venture projects since 1995, and the central government and local 
authorities are encouraging the private sector to create jobs by setting up joint ventures." 
Another officiaf9 explained that owing to the difficulty in obtaining bank loans for state-
owned enterprises as potential joint venture partners, the Dalian government had turned 
to the private sector for help. Local private enterprises had been encouraged to become 
more involved in joint venture projects since 1995 and had made significant contributions 
to job creation. According to this official, by 1998, joint ventures between private 
Chinese partners and overseas partners could account for almost one third of the total 
7000 foreign invested enterprises in Dalian. 
As local governments give job creation such priority, their requirements for setting up 
joint ventures increasingly focused on the amount of foreign capital and job creation 
rather than on advanced technologies or hi-tech products. Any auditing of potential 
Chinese and overseas partners tended to be relatively informal. Therefore, it became 
much easier for private companies to establish a joint venture. Nearly all the private 
Chinese partners interviewed confirmed that the government's relaxation of control over 
the private sector's involvement in joint ventures, as well as incentives, such as tax 
holidays and direct import and export licences, were particular attractive to them. 
As one government officiae0 put it, "We know that many joint ventures involving private 
Chinese partners are shell joint ventures. There are actually no overseas partners in these 
ventures, but we can do nothing about them. Otherwise, we would have more 
unemployment." For the setting up of a shell joint venture, one government officiae 1 
explained, "Many owners of private Chinese companies have sent their money to their 
'friends' abroad. Most of these 'friends' were actually their former business partners in 
28 Official!, Dalian Municipal Conmlission Foreign Trade and Econonlic Cooperation 
29 Official2, Dalian Municipal Foreign Affairs Office 
30 Official9, Dalian Zhongshan District Conmlission of Foreign Econonlic Relations and Trade. 
31 Official9, Dalian Zhongshan District Conmlission of Foreign Econonlic Relations and Trade. 
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Japan, Hong Kong or the USA. Their 'friends' are asked to bring the money back to 
China and help their Chinese friends register for a joint venture. Certainly, the overseas 
partner in this case is only a token partner, with no real investment. Those joint ventures 
are actually wholly owned and operated by the Chinese. Generally speaking, most shell 
joint ventures are stable and profitable." 
Several Chinese partners from the private sector said they were stimulated by the policy 
of encouraging the private sector to become involved in joint venture projects. One 
Chinese manager32 indicated that the purpose he had in setting up a joint venture was to 
obtain an import and export licence. This manager frankly admitted that he did not need 
an overseas partner, but it would have been impossible to obtain the import and export 
licence for a private enterprise without entering into a joint venture. 
6.3 Changes in Joint Ventures 
Nearly all Dahan officials and joint venture managers interviewed confirmed some 
changes in joint ventures. The following section presents relevant changes at venture 
level in terms of strategies, ownership structure and operational management. 
6.3.1 Joint Venture Strategies 
A deputy director33 of Dalian Municipal Commission of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation disclosed that by the end of May 1997, nearly 2000 joint ventures in the 
Dahan area had closed down or converted to wholly owned ventures. This happened for a 
variety of reasons, but was especially due to the changes in strategies between Chinese 
and overseas partners. This senior Dalian government official also said, "Joint ventures 
have been set up and are in operation. The potential for profit is obvious. However, 
because of strategic differences between partners, only the controlling partner can benefit. 
The crucial problem, at the moment, is the battle between the partners to control the 
operations and to influence the ventures' strategic direction. This directly affects the 
32 Chinese Manager 17, Dalian Ling fa Food Products Co. Ltd. 
33 Official1, Dalian Municipal Commission of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
157 
Personal Interview Results Chapter 6 
stability of joint ventures in the region. A joint venture would only be completely stable 
if either the Chinese or the overseas partner withdrew from it." As this official saw the 
situation, there were as number of different contexts over ownership and control of joint 
ventures. 
Another local government officiae4 said, "Conflicts between Chinese and overseas 
partners over the ventures' overall strategies have significantly increased in the past few 
years and caused further uncertainty. Local government departments have spent a good 
deal of time and effort in mediation and arbitration. Those conflicts are about differences 
in the ventures' strategies and controls, rather than the commonly perceived difficulties in 
cross-cultural management, product quality, or the inefficiency of Chinese workers". 
(1) Internal Factors Driving the Changes in Partners' Strategies 
11 Changes in Partners Power and Autonomy 
With looser government control over foreign direct investment, the bargaining powers of 
local governments and Chinese joint venture partners were greatly reduced and, 
moreover, overseas venture partners gained greater bargaining powers and autonomy. 
One government officiae5 admitted that local authorities' bargaining powers vis-a-vis 
overseas investors were reduced because the local government 'desperately' needed 
overseas investors' inputs and their contribution to job creation. As a result, so long as 
overseas investors stayed, invested and created jobs in Dalian, local government was 
obliged to sustain them. 
All overseas managers interviewed admitted that they were now in a better bargaining 
position to choose where they would like to move to, where to sell their products, where 
to purchase raw materials/components and where to recruit staff and workers. Most 
34 Official10, Dalian Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ganjingzi District. 
35 Official 10, Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Department, Ganjingzi District 
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importantly, it was much easier to acquire a majority on the board, or even to buy out 
their Chinese partners, at least compared to the situation before. 
One American general manager36 said that he already controlled the overall operation of 
his joint venture. He knew his Chinese partner had not been satisfied for some time and 
had the clear intention of pulling out of the business. He said, "I would like to be a 
wholly owned enterprise, but I am not going to buy out the Chinese partner's shares right 
now. The bargaining power is in my hands and I will wait until there is an even more 
favourable opportunity." 
The Chinese deputy general manager37 of this joint venture also stated that his parent 
company had already decided to pull out of the joint venture, but had no power at all to 
bargain with the overseas partner to obtain a reasonable selling price for the Chinese 
partner's stake. He said, "Two years ago, the local government didn't allow us to pull 
out. Now, they are putting pressure on us to pull out and let the overseas partner wholly 
own the venture." 
With controls over foreign direct investment relaxed, overseas partners could now 
exercise the right to obtain majority shares from Chinese partners or even buy out joint 
ventures. Many overseas partners were demanding further capital injection, aiming to 
obtain majority stakes or wholly own the ventures, as most Chinese patiners were simply 
not able to put money in because there were no loans available to them. 
Chinese managers from state-owned partners expressed their disappointment about their 
reduced bargaining powers in the joint ventures. One Chinese manager38 indicated that 
his parent company had no power at all to bargain with the overseas partner, and even 
local government did not give backing to his parent company. The overseas partner 
simply did not want the Chinese partner, but local government needed all the jobs created 
by the joint venture. The manager went on to say that his parent company did not have 
36 Expatriate Manager 4, Dalian Polyclad Co. Ltd. 
37 Chinese manager 20, Dalian Polyclad Co. Ltd. 
38 Chinese Manager 20, Dalian Polyclad Co. Ltd. 
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the money to buy out the overseas partner, nor would it be allowed to pull out of the 
venture. 
In contrast, overseas partners appeared satisfied with their existing position. One Korean 
manager39 said that he was allowed to sell the venture's products to the domestic market 
even without a Chinese partner. He had a hint that he was backed up by the local 
government to convert the joint venture into a wholly owned enterprise. This Korean 
manager said, "I know that the 750 jobs created by this joint venture are the most 
important aspect for bargaining with the local government." 
• Changes in Partners' Interdependency 
In the 1980s and the early 1990s, overseas joint venture partners viewed joint venture as 
crucial for gaining access to local markets, buyers and distribution channels. These were 
exactly the kinds of input overseas investors would find it difficult to obtain when 
operating alone and where the local knowledge and contacts of the Chinese partners were 
vital. The importance of these largely intangible inputs could significantly outweigh the 
importance of access to more tangible inputs such as labour, materials and capital. In the 
same way, what China needed from overseas investors was not only foreign capital and 
new products, but also foreign advanced technology and equipment as well as 
management skills. 
However, after 20 years of exposure to China, overseas investors had found that they 
needed less from their Chinese partners. One American general manager40 revealed that 
his company chose a Chinese partner because it had a very good relationship with the 
local governn1ent, and also because of its parent company's existing sales channels and 
its expertise in managing Chinese staff. But, to its surprise, the American partner did not 
benefit from the so-called good relationship between the Chinese partner and the local 
government, because the American company could not gain access to the existing sales 
channels of its Chinese partner's parent company. What they got from their Chinese 
39 Expatriate manager 3, Dahan Jianchang Footwear Co. Ltd. 
40 Expatriate Manager 4, Dahan Polyclad Company Ltd. 
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partner were disputes over joint management, operational problems and many more 
unqualified workers transferred from the Chinese partner's parent company. This 
American general manager said, "I have employed a Human Resources Manager from the 
local job centre, who works for me and has helped establish a really good management 
team that I can trust. She has also established a really good relationship with local 
government, which has enabled us to access many governmental incentives. We have 
also established our own sales team to do our domestic marketing. What do I need from 
our Chinese partner? Troubles? I can tell you honestly that what I want is a strategic 
partner rather than a venture partner. I think the local government is the best strategic 
partner. They are better than the Chinese partner." 
A Korean general manager said that he had not needed any input from the Chinese 
partner in the first place, but he was forced by the local authority to adopt a Chinese 
partner as a condition of entry. This expatriate manager said, "We have so many 
problems with joint operation at the moment. Things would be much simpler if we didn't 
have a Chinese partner. Now, the policy has changed, and I am negotiating with the local 
authority and trying to convert the venture into a wholly owned business. I am also glad 
that we are allowed to employ staff and workers ourselves from the local job centre. Staff 
and workers recruited directly by myself are far better than those transferred from the 
parent company of my state-owned Chinese partner." 
Most Chinese partners with majority stakes were pretty confident of their controlling 
position even without their overseas partners. One Chinese general manager41 said, 
"Through the joint venture, we have obtained new products, advanced technology and 
equipment. We have also learnt relatively advanced management skills. I don't think we 
need our overseas partner's hands-on work anymore. Expatriate managers are too 
expensive. They (the overseas partner) should trust their Chinese partner and leave 
everything to us. It would make things simpler for both of us". 
41 Chinese Manager 1, Dalian North Pacific Can Co. Ltd. 
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However, those Chinese partners with minority stakes experienced more uncertainty. 
They needed their overseas partners' input but had to make great efforts to maintain their 
existing stakes to maximise control. Because their overseas partners had been running the 
operation at a loss for several years, several Chinese partners were planning to pull out. 
One Chinese deputy general manager42 said that he knew his American partner no longer 
needed a Chinese partner, and he had already got a clear signal from his parent company 
and informed the local government he wanted to pull out of this joint venture. The role of 
local officials as 'the third party' in this process was therefore openly recognised. 
One Chinese deputy general manager43 had worked in a joint venture as the 
representative of the Chinese partner for three years. Now, it was clear that the Japanese 
partner was said to be 'tired' of the Chinese partner and wanted a 'buy out', while the 
Chinese partner was instructed by the local government to pull out. This joint venture 
was now wholly owned by the Japanese partner and the deputy general manager had been 
asked to stay until a replacement was found. 
It was surprising that the seven overseas general managers interviewed all felt that they 
did not really benefit from the so-called 'good relationship' between their Chinese 
partners and the local government. One American general manager44 commented, 
"Compared to my Chinese partner, staff members recruited from the local job centre have 
contributed much more to the joint venture in dealing with local government departments. 
The Chinese partner has done absolutely nothing but argue with me." 
A Japanese manager45 said that if everything was going well, the good relationships 
between his Chinese partner and the government departments did help the venture. 
However, if the Chinese and overseas partners were in conflict, the relationship would 
only seriously damage the overseas partner. For example, to reduce the high rate of 
employee turnover, this Japanese manager launched a more competitive pay package in 
42 Chinese Manager 20, Dalian Polyclad Company Ltd. 
43 Chinese Manager 19, Dalian Okai Consultancy Co. Ltd. 
44 Expatriate Manager 4, Dalian Polyclad Company Ltd. 
45 Expatriate Manager 2,Dalian Industrial Park Development and Administration Co. Ltd. 
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Dalian, based on his research into other Japanese joint ventures in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. However, this pay package was not accepted by the local government 
department, because the local authority feared that such a package might lead to a rise in 
the average wage rate in the entire region. At the same time, to his surprise, his Chinese 
partner, instead of using their good relationship with the government to lobby the local 
authority to approve the pay package, asked him to give up the idea. 
Another Chinese deputy manager46 said that his parent company had been trying very 
hard to work together with their American partner, but without success, and that this was 
not because of inadequate co-operation, but because of different strategies. He said it 
was 'hopeless' to rely on his foreign partner for overseas sales because of transfer 
pricing. The Chinese partner had to adjust its strategy and sell all their shares (30%) to 
their American partner. He said, "We have decided to set up an assembly factory in the 
US or Europe with components manufactured in China. We can sell our products to 
European countries and the US. I think the joint venture model may still be used abroad, 
but not in China anymore." 
From interviews with Chinese managers, it became clear that, with state control over 
foreign direct investment relaxed, the Chinese govemment and local authorities could 
offer more assistance to overseas investors in gaining access to China's domestic market, 
government incentives, and low cost labour, even without their having a Chinese partner. 
(2) Development of Partners' Independent Strategies 
With changes in market conditions, ownership structure and internal relationships, both 
Chinese and overseas partners had quietly developed new strategies that would allow 
them to reposition themselves in their ventures. 
One Japanese manager47 said that he had 'very unpleasant' three years of joint operation 
with his Chinese partner. He believed he had done his best to adapt to the Chinese 
46 Chinese Manager 1, Dalian Polyclad Co. Ltd. 
47 Expatriate Manager 2, Dalian Industrial Park Development and Administration Co. Ltd. 
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situation. He replaced Japanese staff by Chinese staff as far as he could, but still failed to 
gain the cooperation of his Chinese partner. He said, "I have a feeling that our Chinese 
partner only wants our capital, technology and products, but not really a Japanese partner. 
So why should we have a Chinese partner?" This Japanese manager revealed that the 
Japanese parent was considering buying out the joint venture. He admitted that the 
company was adjusting its strategy in China with the aim of establishing a wholly owned 
enterprise. 
An American general manager48 entered into a joint venture because it was the only way 
to sell a proportion of his products on the domestic market at that time. He revealed he 
had a 'difficult' experience with a group of uncooperative Chinese staff recruited from 
his Chinese partner's parent company. He had no 'control' because they knew they could 
go back to their jobs in the parent company at any time. This American manager then 
modified his recruitment policy and replaced his Chinese partner's staff by recruiting 
from the local job centre. The venture had had a joint long-term strategy for business 
development in China, however, this was gradually replaced by the strategy of the 
American partner. 
A Chinese general manager49 declared that he had to develop a completely new strategy. 
His Hong Kong partner withdrew because of the failure to sell anything produced by the 
joint venture abroad in the past two years. He said it had been very hard for him in the 
last few years, but he was now better placed because he could do things according to his 
own wishes. 
(3) Shifts in Market Focus 
As far as the target market was concerned, most joint venture partners reached a 
compromise over their differences at the early stage and targeted both overseas and 
domestic markets. However, this compromise market strategy did not always work at the 
48 Expatriate Manager 4, Dahan Polyclad Co. Ltd. 
49 Chinese Manager 2, Dalian Deli Medical Materials Co. Ltd. 
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operational stage. A Chinese general manager50 said, "We are targeting the overseas 
market, but our overseas partner's objective is to get access to the domestic market. We 
then have to make a compromise to target both markets in order to make the joint venture 
work. Targeting both domestic and overseas markets seemed to be a really good idea at 
the venture-preparing stage. However, at the operational stage, such differences in 
objectives become acute and each party makes great efforts to influence the operation in 
favour of its own strategic market objectives. We then start to have continual conflicts in 
the joint operation and both parties suffer setbacks. " 
However, in contrast to much of the literature and the questionnaire survey results of this 
study, it appeared that overseas partners were more interested in overseas markets, and 
Chinese partners were making extra efforts in domestic markets. 
As one Chinese partner51 put it: "Both Chinese and US partners preferred to make a quick 
entry deal at the negotiation stage and made compromises in their market strategies. But 
at the operational stage, the overseas partner managed 100% sales to the overseas market 
and made their own profits outside China. This left the joint venture unable to break even 
for several years. Hence, we cannot compromise any more and are starting to fight for 
domestic sales in order to make profits ourselves". 
Another Chinese deputy general manager52 said, "We are under strong pressure from both 
our parent company and the government departments concerned to expand overseas sales 
in order to earn hard currency. But the overseas sales are completely controlled by the 
Japanese partner, and it is clear that they are playing the 'transfer pricing' game and make 
their profits outside China. As we cannot do anything about overseas sales, the only 
thing we can do is to change our market strategy and make efforts to increase domestic 
sales." 
5
° Chinese Manager 9, Dalian Baolu Colour Printing Co. Ltd. 
51 Chinese Manager 3, Thermoking Dalian Transport Refrigeration Co. Ltd. 
52 Chinese Manager 27, Dalian Supertech Electronic Engineering Corporation 
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In another case, an American general manager53 from a Sino-USA joint venture said that 
in 1988, his parent company had planned to set up a wholly owned venture in Dalian as 
an export-oriented manufacturing base, but was forced to establish a joint venture with a 
government-recommended local partner, which held a 30% stake. The joint venture 
planned to export all its products, and this was encouraged by both the Chinese partner 
and the Dalian government. However, in 1997, his Chinese partner started to make 
greater efforts to sell on the domestic market and also sought more local sourcing, which 
greatly affected performance. The Chinese deputy general manager54 of the same 
company claimed that, despite many difficulties, the productivity of his joint venture was 
quite high, even by American standards. Nevertheless, the joint venture had never made 
any profit, after being in operation for five years. He said he was quite sure that his 
American partner had made profits outside China through practising transfer pricing, 
because the American partner had twice asked for further injections of capital to expand 
production. He said the Chinese partner had to change its overseas market-oriented 
strategy and put its efforts into domestic sales. In this way, the Chinese pminer could at 
least control something in the operation and make some profits. 
A Chinese general manager55 from a joint venture manufacturing medical products said, 
"The purpose for us in setting up a joint venture was to upgrade of our products using 
imported technology and equipment. With the advanced technology and equipment we 
would improve our productivity and the quality of our products, then increase our 
domestic market share and, in the long run, expand the business into the overseas market. 
We picked up the Hong Kong partner because they guaranteed to sell 60% of the joint 
venture's products abroad. They seemed to be a really ideal partner for us at the 
beginning. However, at the operational stage, we soon found that our Hong Kong partner 
only cared for short-term profits - making money by importing the equipment and 
machinery for the joint venture and charging us too much for them. They could not 
actually sell anything abroad. With the pressure from the local government to export 
60% of the joint venture products, which was clearly stated in the contract, our Hong 
53 Expatriate Manager 4, Dalian Polyclad Co. Ltd. 
54 Chinese Manager 20, Dalian Polyclad Company Ltd. 
55 Chinese Manager 2, Dalian Deli Medical Materials Co. Ltd. 
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Kong partner simply disappeared and never came back. We were left with a joint venture 
with improved production capacity and a lot of unsold products, but no overseas market. 
We have had to change our market strategies and tum to the domestic market for 
survival." 
6.3.2 Joint Venture Ownership 
Most Chinese managers interviewed expressed little doubt that majority stakeholders 
could exercise dominant control over joint operations. But for most state-owned Chinese 
firms it was getting harder to be a majority stakeholder, not only because of the financial 
situation in their parent companies, but also because of different respective bargaining 
powers. The Chinese partners had virtually no powers to bargain for a majority 
ownership. In contrast, most overseas investors indicated that they were aiming to acquire 
70 per cent stakes with a view to having complete control over the joint venture. 
As one American manager56 said, "For a successful joint venture in China, the overseas 
partner must control at least a 70 per cent stake of a joint venture. Otherwise, he should 
give it up completely." One Japanese manager57 said that "More and more Japanese 
partners prefer a wholly owned venture, or otherwise to hold less than a 15 per cent stake 
in the venture and to be a silent partner - mainly responsible for overseas sales and for 
purchasing raw materials/components for the joint venture." 
(1) Ownership Transfer between Partners 
In the interviews, once the topic of ownership was mentioned, particular attention would 
be focused on ownership transfer between joint venture partners and the conversion from 
joint ventures to wholly owned enterprises. 
One expatriate manager58 said that, "As China's business environment has become more 
favourable to overseas investors, most wholly owned ventures in Dahan are quite 
successful in terms of operation and earning profit. There will be more and more 
56 Expatriate Manager 7, Supertech Electronic Engineering Corp. 
57 Expatriate Manager 6, Le Cafe Igosso Co. Ltd. 
58 Expatriate Manager 1, Dalian North Pacific Can Co. Ltd. 
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ownership transfers from Chinese partners to overseas partners in coming years, as most 
overseas venture partners are aiming to end up with a wholly owned venture. The local 
authorities are actually happy with the conversion from joint ventures to wholly owned 
enterprises, as the latter are more stable and profitable." 
Several Chinese partners believed that it would be valuable to increase their stake in 
order to increase control, but they lacked the required funds. One Chinese manager59 
said, his parent company simply had no funds for further investment, so they had been 
looking for another potential domestic partner to join them. With a new partner, they 
might increase their stakes in the joint venture. However, most Chinese partners did not 
have the financial strength to increase their ownership shares, because of the tight budget 
applied by their parent companies. 
Increasing capital investment in joint ventures would be advantageous for further 
development, but it had been problematic for Dahan government officials and Chinese 
partners. In the interviews, these admitted that in most cases 'further capital investment' 
was made while the venture was running at a loss. How would production be expanded 
by further investment while the venture was losing money? This could only be explained 
by the overseas partners' transfer pricing policies. 
Another official60 said, "In most cases, the request for further capital investment by 
overseas partners was always a hint that the overseas partner wants to buy out the 
Chinese partner's share. It is a chance for the Chinese partner to pull out, as no Chinese 
partners will continue to make further investment in a joint venture running at a loss. It is 
better to let the overseas partner wholly own the joint venture than to make the Chinese 
partner continue to lose money." 
59 Chinese Manager 30, Dalian Zhuyang Paper Products Co. Ltd. 
60 Official 4, Invested Enterprises Administration Department of Dalian Development Zone 
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A Chinese deputy general manager61 said that his parent company entered into a joint 
venture with a Japanese partner in early 1996 and he used to represent the Chinese 
partner. Negotiations started in the middle of 1995 and all went well. The joint venture 
contract was signed after the Chinese party was secured a loan from the Dalian branch of 
the China Industrial and Commercial Bank. After the joint venture was established, 
however, the Chinese partner simply could not pay out any capital, because the loan was 
cancelled owing to changes in China's business environment. It took them about one 
year to apply for another loan from other sources, but all efforts failed. They had to let 
the Japanese partner wholly own the venture. 
A Chinese deputy general manager62 claimed that his joint venture was set up in 1994 
with a partner from the USA, who owned 60 per cent. All products were exported to the 
USA and South American countries. The operation was smooth and they had been quite 
busy. However, the joint venture never made any profits. As a result, the Chinese 
partner wanted to pull out, but the local authority forced them to stay. In April 1998, 
their American partner demanded further investment. The Chinese partner was definitely 
not willing to continue to invest money in this non-profitable operation. They therefore 
had to sell their 30 per cent stake to the American partner. The Chinese partner kept only 
a 10 per cent stake and maintained no operational influence at all. In fact, they would 
have sold the remaining 10 per cent stake if they had been able to gain approval from the 
local authority. 
There were also cases in which a profitable joint venture requested further investment, 
but the Chinese partner had no money to contribute. Eventually, the Chinese partner had 
to sell shares to its overseas partner. One official63 asserted that some Chinese partners 
could not tolerate holding a minority stake in a joint venture, so they were forced out of 
the joint business. 
61 Chinese Manager 25, Dalian Yigousou Restaurant Co. Ltd. 
62 Chinese Manager 12, Dalian Shenjun Health Products Co. Ltd. 
63 Official 5, Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone 
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Several Chinese managers also believed that ownership transfer from the overseas 
partners to Chinese partners offered few difficulties. In many cases, overseas partners 
quietly pulled out, and left only a name in the joint venture, in exchange for a dealership 
or overseas sales contract for the joint venture's products. 
In another case, a Chinese general manager64 said that she had 50 percent stakes in the 
early stage ofher joint venture with a Japanese partner. However, after one year of joint 
operation, her Japanese partner had proposed keeping only a 15 per cent stake and had 
remained as a silent partner, as they thought a joint operation was too complicated. 
(2) Converting Joint Ventures into Wholly Owned Enterprises 
Further encouragement to wholly foreign-owned enterprises on the part of the Chinese 
government brought in more foreign investment, as well as new hopes for those frustrated 
with existing overseas joint venture partners. Because of conflicts with their Chinese 
partners, overseas partners changed their strategies, wanting to convert joint ventures 
officially into wholly owned ones. Several senior local government officials conceded 
that there were many joint ventures officially converted into wholly owned ventures in 
1996. All the government officials interviewed basically confirmed that, according to 
their experience, the new wholly owned enterprises had not only bypassed certain joint 
operational problems, but also brought better profitability. 
An official65 told me that several multinationals in Dalian had demanded to wholly own 
their ventures, saying that otherwise they would withdraw from the ventures, and move to 
a hinterland area to set up wholly owned enterprises there. 
(3) Joint venture Ownership Transfer before 1996 
Starting in 1996, the Chinese government officially allowed overseas investors to wholly 
own joint ventures through official ownership transfer. Nevertheless, it became apparent 
in interviews that there had been unofficial ownership transfers before 1996. Several 
64 Chinese Manager 10 Dalan Lanbo Fashnable Dress Co. Ltd 
65 Official1, Dalian Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee. 
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lower-level government officials also confirmed a large number of unofficial ownership 
transfers in the region. One official66 said, "At that time (the first half of the 1990s), it 
was not permitted for an overseas joint venture partner to own a joint venture completely 
through internal ownership transfer. Therefore, in almost every single case of unofficial 
ownership transfer, a quiet deal was done between joint venture partners in a spirit of 
mutual compromise. One partner eventually pulled out of the venture or gave up the 
business after acquiring certain benefits." 
There were also some cases in which overseas partners just left for good without giving 
any advance notice. There was no doubt that the overseas partners who pulled out had 
already recovered their investment by importing equipment and raw materials for the 
joint ventures at artificially inflated prices. Most of them were Korean and Hong Kong 
partners with minority stakes." However, there were several cases in Dalian in which 
Chinese partners had pulled out through unofficial deals. Those ventures still kept the 
name of the joint business while the overseas partners were running the ventures in 
Dalian alone. According to unpublished local official records, the official ownership 
transfers usually involve European, USA, and Japanese partners, while the unofficial 
ownership transfers usually involve Hong Kong, Taiwanese, Korean partners. 
6.3.3 Joint Venture Operation 
Both Chinese and overseas joint venture managers interviewed stated that the most 
problematic area for a joint venture was probably its actual joint operation. 
(1) Joint Venture Performance 
The interviews revealed that there were several problems between Chinese and overseas 
partners. No partner seemed completely satisfied with the situation. The changes in their 
power relationship suggested limited common ground. Although some Chinese managers 
confirmed the existence of a good relationship with their overseas partners in the early 
stage, many admitted it was no longer the case. Both Chinese and overseas managers 
admitted serious worries about the future relationships with their business partners. 
66 Official 9, Dalian Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee, Zhongshan District 
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c Worsening Joint Venture Operation 
Expatriate managers complained strongly about their Chinese partners' efforts to gain 
control over the joint venture and about their lack of cooperation in the running of the 
business, while most Chinese managers complained of the expatriate managers' 
domineering attitudes. 
An American general manager67 said that he was runnmg his joint venture in a 
professional way, in particular, as far as the accounting system was concerned. 
According to the agreement made between the two parties in the early stages, the 
accounting department should keep the accounts books in English and produce a 
quarterly accounting report in Mandarin for the Chinese partner. However, soon after 
starting, the Chinese partner asked for a monthly accounting report in Mandarin. The 
request was refused by the general manager because of the shortage of accounting staff. 
From that point on, his Chinese partner allegedly adopted an uncooperative attitude in 
almost every aspect of the joint operation, especially the areas controlled by them. 
A Chinese deputy general manager68 commented, "Ours is a joint venture and we can't 
let our partner control everything. If we do exactly what the expatriate manager asks, it is 
'co-operation'. If we don't, it is not- that is ridiculous. We are operating the joint 
venture in China and we have to do things the Chinese way. The advanced Western 
management system must adapt to the Chinese environment and overseas partners should 
learn to adapt to Chinese partners." 
Another Chinese deputy general manager69 of a manufacturing joint venture admitted that 
there were instances of uncooperative behaviour in his venture. He said that the joint 
venture partners had made a deal to share management, and each party was in charge of 
some particular areas of operation. But because of some differences and conflicts in the 
overall strategy, there were frequent conflicts between the Chinese and overseas partners 
67 Expatriate Manager 5, Dalian Southcorp Can. Co. Ltd. 
68 Chinese Manager 26, Dalian Lushan Health Centre Co. Ltd. 
69 Chinese Manager 1, Dalian North Pacific Can Co. Ltd. 
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in joint operation. The initial harmony of the relationship had been affected. The quality 
of communication between joint venture partners had become increasingly difficult. 
An American assistant general manager70 said that he and his Chinese partner took charge 
of different operational areas of the venture. There was no communication at all between 
the two parties about the areas under their control. In this joint venture, the American 
partner provided two production lines and the technology for manufacture and was in 
charge of production, whilst the Chinese partner was in charge of accounting and sales 
departments. This manager said, "We operate like two completely different organisations 
and the overall working communications between us are based on paperwork. We have 
no joint meetings and not even any personal communications. We did try to improve the 
situation from my side at the very beginning, but all these efforts failed. We could not 
understand why. I personally don't think this joint venture will last long. We will have 
to develop our long-term strategy ourselves." 
• Conflicts over Decision-Making 
Both the Chinese and the overseas joint venture managers interviewed complained that 
decision-making was interrupted by th~ir partners or the local government. One Japanese 
general manager71 pointed out that when their joint venture was losing money, he planned 
to reduce all employees' pay, including his own, but his plan was not accepted by his 
Chinese partner, and this decision was backed by the local government. This Japanese 
general manager therefore had to operate at a loss. One American general manager72 said 
that his company used to have a very high turnover rate of sales staff because of low pay. 
He worked out a competitive salary and bonus package to keep the staff, but it was 
rejected by the Chinese partner, who was backed up by the local government. The reason 
given was that this package would have given sales staff a level of pay even higher than 
that of the Chinese deputy general manager. The company eventually solved this 
problem after the American partner managed to gain 100% ownership ofthe venture. 
70 Expatriate Manager 1, Dalian North Pacific Can Co. Ltd. 
71 Expatriate Manager 6, Le Cafe lgosso Co. Ltd. 
72 Expatriate Manager 5, Dalian Southcorp Can Co. Ltd. 
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o 'Tnms:lfer lPricnng' 
The greatest concern of the local authorities, as one official73 claimed, was the 'transfer 
pricing' problem. It was commonplace in Dalian that in export-oriented ventures, most 
overseas partners controlled the sales of products and the import of raw materials or 
components. Overseas partners, mainly Japanese, Korean, American, European and 
Hong Kong investors, were likely to make a profit by under-pricing exports and over-
pricing imports, and the profits were usually retained abroad. 
As has already been shown from the questionnaire survey data, 59 of the 103 joint 
ventures surveyed were unprofitable at the time of the survey. In this regard, most 
Chinese partners interviewed held their overseas partners responsible for the loss. The 
key complaint lodged by Chinese partners was the practice of 'transfer pricing.' 
It was significant that most Chinese managers from joint ventures in which overseas 
partners held majority stakes claimed that their overseas partners were playing the game 
of 'transfer pricing'. One Chinese deputy general manager74 said, "Our American partner 
has completely controlled the overseas procurement and sales. They purchase 
components and parts from their parent company or other sister branches at a higher price 
than they should be and they sell the joint venture's products to their overseas dealers at a 
lower price than they should be. They make money outside China and at the same time 
leave the joint venture losing money for five years. We cannot afford the continuous loss 
of money any more and we are doing things to fight against it." 
In contrast, overseas partners claimed that their Chinese partners were responsible for 
losing money because of domestic customers' failure to pay on time. A Korean general 
manager75 said that his Chinese partner took charge of the domestic sales through the 
sales workforce of its parent company. The customers paid the parent company, and this 
payment in tum should have been relayed to the joint venture. However, there were 
always arrears of payment to the joint venture. The longest delay was 18 months. As a 
73 Official13, Dalian Ganjingzi District Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
74 Chinese Manager 20 Dahan Polyclad Company Ltd. 
75 Expatriate Manager 3, Dahan Jianchang Footwear Co. Ltd. 
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result, this Korean manager said that he had had to look to increasing overseas sales, and 
this upset his Chinese partner very much. In a separate interview, the Chinese deputy 
general manager76 from the same venture said that it was true that there were substantial 
arrears, because their customers had no money to pay. He also said that his Korean 
partner always thought it was his parent company that deliberately obstructed the 
payment to the joint venture, but that this was not true. As far as the increase in overseas 
sales was concerned, this manager said, "We know that our partner has been engaged in 
'transfer pricing' through overseas sales. We will not tolerate under-priced exporting 
anymore. We must be in control of domestic sales." 
One official77 revealed that having known overseas joint venture partners were keeping 
profits abroad, thus leaving the Chinese partners losing money for a long time, Chinese 
partners were fighting against devious 'transfer pricing', even by some illegal means. 
This official told a story about a Dalian-based Chinese/Japanese joint venture whose 
Chinese partner was a Heilongjiang-based state-owned company. The venture had been 
unprofitable for four years and the Chinese partner could not stop the Japanese partner 
playing at 'transfer pricing'. On the Japanese side, enjoying the benefit of the 'transfer 
pricing', they asked for further injections of capital several times, and the requests was 
refused again and again by the Chinese partner. Eventually, the Japanese partner offered 
to buy out the joint venture from the Chinese counterpart. Taking advantage of the fact 
that the Japanese general manager was on holiday in Japan, the Chinese deputy general 
manager copied the Japanese manager's signature and obtained a bank loan against the 
fixed assets of the joint venture. The USD$8 million loan was then transferred to the 
Chinese partner's parent company, which it used to make investment in another business. 
Returning from his holiday, the Japanese general manager found the joint venture was 
now wholly owned by the Bank of China. On the other hand, this official said that in 
domestic market-oriented joint ventures, where Chinese partners controlled majority 
stakes, they would make their money using the same transfer-pricing practice in domestic 
76 Chinese Manager 11, Dalian Kun Chang Footwear Co. Ltd 
77 OfficiallO, Dalian Ganjingzi District Committee of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
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sales and raw materials procurement. The co-operation between the Chinese and 
overseas partners was disappointing. 
Several overseas managers expressed the view that they were not against indigenous 
sourcing of raw material, which they had actually practised for several years. The 
problem was that the quality of local materials was unpredictable. They also said the 
price their Chinese partners received was not competitive. 
11 Performance of Wholly Owned Ventures and 'Shell' Joint Ventures 
The findings of the in-depth interviews supported the questionnaire survey results that 
wholly owned enterprises converted from joint ventures outperformed existing joint 
ventures. According to the questionnaire survey, among Chinese-partner controlled 
ventures (51% stake or above) and overseas-partner controlled ventures (51% stake or 
above) the percentage of unprofitable ventures was the same (63%). However, 14 out of 
15 wholly foreign-owned ventures (converted from joint ventures) were making profits. 
This indicated that a complete control might deliver better performance. 
Interviews with officials from local authorities further confirmed the better performance 
of wholly foreign-owned and wholly Chinese owned enterprises, which had converted 
from joint ventures. Several lower-level officials78 disclosed that most shell joint ventures 
were considered profitable. 
An expatriate general manager claimed, "I had a very hard time with my Chinese partner. 
Everything seemed difficult and complicated at that time. I am really happy that the joint 
operation is over. I now wholly own this venture. I have already made profits. My own 
Chinese staffs are excellent and reliable." 
Another Chinese manager79 said, "This venture is now wholly owned by the foreign 
partner. I used to represent the Chinese partner but have been selected to continue 
78 Officials 5,6,7,8,13 from the local authorities. 
79 Chinese Manager 4, Dalian Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
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working in the venture. We have been making profits before, but the performance now is 
much better than that under joint operation. Things are a lot more simpler and 
straightforward now. There is no difference in terms of domestic sales, as we are still 
selling 90% of our products on the domestic market. Most important, our salary and 
wages are several times higher than before and we can purchase apartments with 
company loans, which was absolutely impossible with a joint venture. I personally think 
that wholly owned ventures are not only better off but better". 
A Chinese general manager80 claimed that since his Hong Kong partner left, he had 
achieved an organisational restructuring, which greatly improved the performance of the 
venture. Another four Chinese general managers81 frankly asserted that these shell joint 
ventures had no real overseas partners. But they all further confirmed that they had a 
very reliable and accountable overseas business partner as their sole sales representative 
abroad. Their ventures were very profitable and had few internal problems. They further 
claimed that they never thought about entering into a real joint venture, as they thought 
the shell joint venture was the best form for private Chinese businessmen. The only 
challenge for them was to obtain government loans to expand their production capacity. 
(2) Expatriate Staff 
Some Chinese partners complained about the undue number of expatriate staff in their 
joint ventures and considered them a major reason for losing money, simply because they 
were too 'expensive'. One Chinese manager82 said, "Expatriates are too expensive when 
compared with what they have done for us. We could make money right away if we sent 
them back home". Most overseas partners interviewed conceded that expatriate staff 
were expensive, but said they were necessary and important to overseas partners in 
exercising control over joint operations. 
Several expatriate managers confirmed in the interviews that, because of constant 
pressure from their Chinese partners, they had to reduce the number of expatriate staff to 
8° Chinese Manager 2, Dalian Deli Medical Materials Co. Ltd. 
81 Chinese Managers 17, 18, 30 from Lingfa Food, Far East Tools, and Zhuyang Paper. 
82 Chinese Manager 1, Dalian North Pacific Can Co. Ltd. 
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reduce cost, and still obtain further cooperation. But, most overseas partners had 
indomitably resisted the pressure to recruit replacements from their Chinese partner's 
own parent companies. 
There had been a tendency for Chinese and overseas partners to agree with each other on 
recruiting a third party Chinese general manager to run the joint venture, while still 
fulfilling the indigenous personnel strategy. Those overseas partners with controlling 
stakes seemed to prefer to recruit less expensive overseas Chinese personnel to replace 
expatriate general managers. An American general manager83 said that he had tried to 
replace all three of his expatriate department managers, with a Canadian Chinese 
manager and two Hong Kong Chinese manager. They were all Western-educated 
management staff and, most importantly, were Mandarin speakers. However, his Chinese 
partner strongly disagreed with the recruitment of overseas Chinese managers for the 
joint venture, saying that it would only make things worse to bring in overseas Chinese 
managers, who thought they understood China but actually did not. Nevertheless, the 
American general manager went ahead with the replacement, and the Canadian Chinese 
manager was dismissed only three months after his appointment. The Chinese acting 
general manager84, who recently replaced the above-mentioned Canadian Chinese as 
general manager, said that factory workers had staged a strike to protest against the 
rudeness and unreasonable operational decisions of the Canadian Chinese manager, and 
that the strike had been suppmied by an American teclmician and the Hong Kong 
Chinese Accounting Manager. 
On the other hand, several Chinese deputy general managers reported that there were also 
cases in which expatriate managers were brought back after overseas joint venture 
partners successfully converted their ventures into wholly owned ones. 
83 Expatriate Manager 5, Dalian Southcorp Can Co. Ltd. 
84 Chinese Manager 23, Dalian Diesel Marine Co. Ltd. 
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(3) Workforce Recruitment 
Recent years have witnessed a profound change in the recruitment of both office staff and 
workers. More and more overseas investors, especially those with majority stakes, have 
begun to recruit skilled and unskilled workers from the local job centres rather than from 
their Chinese partners' parent companies. An American general manager85 and a Korean 
general manager86 both confirmed that they had taken on middle-level managers and 
workers from their Chinese partners in the early stage of their joint ventures. Then, they 
recruited all their staff from the local job centres. Because of the shift in recruitment, the 
general trust between Chinese and overseas partner was lost. 
In contrast, some Chinese general managers of Chinese-controlled joint ventures (51% 
stake or more) said that they preferred to employ workers from their parent companies, as 
they were skilful and generally familiar with the products of the joint ventures. They said 
there was not difficult for them to select the best managers and skilled workers from their 
parent companies, although they could recruit some key technicians from the local job 
centres when necessary. 
It was rather surprising that neither Chinese nor expatriate managers complained of the 
problem of overstaffing, which was an important topic of the literature in the 1980s 
(Cohen 1982; Park 1983; Ruggles 1983; Horsley 1984; Moore and Scogin 1986; Shenkar 
1990). But both Chinese and overseas partners stressed that with the relaxed state policy, 
Chinese partners have less power to overstaff their joint ventures. 
(4) Culture Related Issues 
In the interviews, both Chinese and overseas managers admitted the existence of cultural 
barriers, these can be summarised as follows: 
85 Expatriate Manager 5,Dalian Southcorp Can Co. Ltd. 
86 Expatriate Manager 3,Dalian Jianchang Footwear Co. Ltd. 
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a Different Ways of Thinking 
According to one American general manager87 , Western managers had a thinking process 
that was completely different from that of Chinese managers. He said, "For example, if 
there is a problem in operation, Western managers focus on different options for a 
possible solution, while Chinese managers insist on finding out whose fault it is and like 
to see someone being punished. They ignore the need to seek a solution to the problem." 
In another case, this American general manager once found that the quality of some 
products did not reach the required standard and he therefore decided to destroy them. 
But his Chinese partner was against this decision and quietly sold them on the domestic 
market. The American manager admitted that each party had been making great efforts 
to change the attitude of the other party, but without success. 
When this issue was raised with the Chinese deputy general manager of the same 
company in a separate interview, the Chinese manager explained that, "In China's state-
owned companies, goods are all graded into categories: the best, the second best, and 
even the third best etc. The prices are accordingly different and there are always 
potential customers who opt for goods of a particular level of quality. So it is normal 
business practice to sell on such substandard goods and the company can make money 
out of it. I just can't understand why the American manager could not accept this". 
Another American general manager88 complained that his Chinese partner had been 
trying to purchase inferior components from its parent company. The only explanation 
given by his Chinese partner was that the parent company offered a very reasonable price. 
In another instance the Chinese partner transferred the joint venture's technology to its 
parent company without informing the overseas partner. 
An expatriate general manager89 said, "We are not here to change China and the Chinese 
people. We should learn about China, the Chinese culture, and the Chinese way of doing 
business. We have adjusted our policy and provided uniforms, apartments and three 
87 Expatriate Manager 5, Dahan Southcorp Can Co. Ltd. 
88 Expatriate Manager 7, Supertech Electronic Engineering Corp. 
89 Expatriate Manager 5, Dahan Southcorp Can Co. Ltd. 
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meals a day for the Chinese factory workers according to the Chinese welfare system. 
We are very patient people. But our Chinese partner would not adapt in any respect to 
suit our side. It seems to be taking too long to adapt to the Chinese way of doing 
business. We must find a way to do things in our own way. The joint strategy is not 
suitable for us anymore. Our new long-term strategy in China will be based on a wholly 
owned venture." 
o 'Guarnxn' (Connections) 
An American manager90 said, "Guanxi is a network of friendly relationships and business 
interests. We have understood the Chinese way of doing business - make friends first, 
then do business. It is possible for a foreigner to make friends, but not possible for a 
foreigner to enter the guanxi network. 
Another American general manager91 said, "Guanxi is necessary for doing business in 
China. But we don't need a Chinese partner just for entering this network. We do benefit 
from some business guanxi through the Chinese partner, but it also causes us a lot of 
trouble in the joint operation. Nowadays, we can employ good quality Chinese staff 
ourselves to develop the necessary business guanxi with government departments, 
customers, and suppliers. They are our own employees, who are very loyal and much 
better than a Chinese partner." 
6.4 Evolution of Joint Ventures 
Throughout the interviews with Chinese and expatriate managers, it was clear that there 
was frequently a strong intention on the part of the venture partners to end their joint 
operations. However, it was up to the overseas partners to make the initial move. The 
Chinese partners actually had no real power to terminate joint ventures, as they had to 
obtain permission from the local authority, which, according to one Chinese deputy 
90 Expatriate Manager 1, Dalian North Pacific Can Co. Ltd. 
91 Expatriate Manager 4, Dalian Polyclad Co. Ltd. 
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general manager, would not allow the Chinese parent company to initiate a move to 
terminate joint ventures. 
(1) From Joint venture to Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise 
According to a senior official from the Dahan Municipal Government, who was 
responsible for foreign direct investment in 199892 , "It seems that in the last five years, 
there has been a strong tendency for more overseas venture partners to fight for a 
majority ownership in a joint venture. Most of them have made efforts to officially 
convert their joint ventures into wholly foreign-owned ventures". 
Several Chinese deputy general managers from ventures in which the Chinese party holds 
a minority stake said that joint operations with overseas partners were full of problems 
and they made no profits for three to five years. Their parent companies were trying to 
pull out of the joint ventures, with backing from local government. 
One Chinese deputy general manager93 said that his parent company invested USD$1 0 
million, to acquire a 30% stake in the joint venture in 1995. The joint venture made no 
profits for three years. He bel~eved that his American partner had made their profits 
though transfer pricing. The Chinese partner had no power on the board of directors nor 
in the operation of the company. As the deputy general manager, he was only in charge 
of factory security, house-keeping and the cafeteria. There was little mutual trust. The 
Chinese parent company had planned to pull out a year before had not been able to obtain 
the approval from the local government at that time. Only recently had the local 
government approved their request to let the American partner wholly own the venture. 
Interviewed on a separate occasion, the American general manager94 from the same joint 
venture revealed that the joint venture did very well in the early stages. However, in a 
very short period of time, he had found that his senior Chinese deputy, responsible for 
production, proved to be a barrier. He had been expecting assistance and support from 
92 Official!, Dalian Municipal Conmrission of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
93 Chinese Manager 20, Dalian Polyclad Co. Ltd. 
94 Expatriate Manager 4, Dalian Polyclad Co. Ltd. 
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his local partner, not problems, but his Chinese partner had deliberately made everything 
very complicated. With threats to withdraw from the venture and with backing from the 
local government, the Chinese parent company had to replace its Chinese deputy general 
manager in the joint venture twice. With each replacement, the deputy general manager 
was given fewer responsibilities. The American manager said that he understood his 
Chinese partner was upset about their representative being sidelined in this way, but he 
had no other option. He also disclosed, "I am planning to purchase all the shares from the 
Chinese partner and to wholly own the venture. Things will be simpler then." 
A Chinese manager95 from a pharmaceutical joint venture said that there was a very good 
relationship between the Chinese and the American partners in his finn. The joint 
venture had started making money from the second year of operation. However, the 
Americans wanted to have a wholly owned venture, and had threatened to pull out and 
move to Shanghai. The Chinese manager said the negotiations should be between the 
local government and the overseas investor and that Chinese partner could do nothing 
about it. The Chinese party was told by the local government to reduce its stake from 49 
per cent to 30 per cent, then from 30 per cent to five percent. The Chinese partner had 
now been forced out of the business by the American partner and the local government, 
simply in order to keep this venture within the region. 
(2) From Joint Venture to Wholly Chinese-Owned Enterprise 
Several Chinese managers revealed that according to unpublished records, about 2000 
joint ventures were closed down in Dalian in the1990s, especially during the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997 - 1998, among them some 500 Korean companies. These Chinese 
managers said that in most cases, after the overseas investor pulled out, the Chinese 
partner had to take over the operation. The local government worked hard to prevent 
those ventures from closing down, although some of the ventures still 'disappeared'. 
According to one government official96, "Although some overseas investors have left, 
those joint ventures are still there and Chinese partners have taken them over and keep 
95 Chinese Manager 4, Dalian Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
96 Official 5, Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone. 
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them running. That is why the official number of foreign-invested projects goes up all 
the time. It never goes down." 
(3) From Joint Venture to '§heH' .Joint Venture 
From the questionnaire survey, it appeared that 30 joint ventures in Dalian had not had 
any expatriate staff, even from the very beginning. Some overseas partners completely 
withdrew their expatriate staff from the joint ventures. This was unusual since, according 
to the literature, overseas partners always tended to use their own personnel to control the 
business. 
s Joint Venture without Overseas Partner 
In interviews, some Chinese managers frankly admitted that there were some 'shell' joint 
ventures, especially those involving private Chinese partners. Because of the problems 
such as marketing, capital contributions, internal conflicts, distrust, and different 
objectives, as well as the impact of the Asian financial crisis, some overseas investors had 
pulled out and abandoned their Chinese partners. It was believed that some overseas 
partners had already recovered their initial investment by making money from importing 
equipment for the joint ventures, and so they simply withdrew from the joint business. 
One Chinese manager97 claimed that the Japanese partner and the Chinese partner in his 
joint venture were not cooperating well enough and the business was not successful. 
Eventually, the two sides converted the joint operation into a strategic partnership. The 
Japanese partner transferred half of its 60 per cent stake to the Chinese partner. The 
Chinese side was to pay for the stake with the products. The Japanese partner withdrew 
all five of its expatriate staff and left the venture for the Chinese partner to operate. In 
exchange, the Japanese partner obtained the sole dealership in the venture's products 
outside China and was also responsible for purchasing raw materials/components for the 
joint venture. This Chinese manager said, "Things are simpler now and I am confident in 
the future of this venture. My Japanese partner is happier, too. Actually, there are many 
cases in which partnership cooperation derives from former joint venture cooperation". 
97 Chinese Manager 22, Dalian Zhongying Precise Casting Co. Ltd. 
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A Chinese office manager98 of a former China/Korea joint venture said that his Korean 
partner went back to Korea on holiday in 1997 and they had not been in contact ever 
since. The Korean partner did not give any explanation for 'pulling out'. This Chinese 
manager believed it was closely linked to the impact of the Asian financial crisis in 
Korea. The venture is now wholly owned by the Chinese partner, but is still classified as 
a joint venture and receiving all the incentives appropriate to that status from the local 
government. 
Four Chinese general managers, whose identities are concealed, admitted to me that their 
ventures were 'shell' joint ventures. They claimed that what they wanted was not really a 
joint venture but the government incentives, which were only granted to joint ventures. 
They were all quite profitable private businesses and would like to export their products 
to earn hard currency for importing advanced teclmology and equipment, as it would be 
too expensive to rely on state-owned import/export companies to do this. On top of that, 
one incentive granted to joint ventures by the government was a two-year tax holiday and 
another a 50 per cent tax deduction for another three years. To a profitable private 
company, a five-year tax holiday and deduction really meant a lot. Hence, they were all 
very keen to set up shell joint ventures. 
I asked the four Chinese, separately, the same question: why they did not set up a real 
joint venture? They responded that they could not afford the complications of a real joint 
venture, and none wanted a foreign boss, so a 'shell' joint venture was best for them. 
• Joint Venture without Chinese Partner 
According to central government regulations on foreign direct investment, since 1998, 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises have been restricted to the service sector, for example 
entertainment, real estate/property, and vehicle-repairing businesses. Consequently, 
many joint ventures had been set up in the service sector in the Dalian area. 
98 Chinese Manager 7, Dalian Taiyangcheng Entertainment Co. Ltd. 
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One Chinese deputy general manager99 of a joint venture which runs a recreation centre, 
said in the interview, "As you already know, the Korean partner has preferred a wholly 
owned enterprise to a joint venture. However, it was not permitted to set up a wholly 
owned company in the entertainment business. To get around this regulation, the Korean 
partner easily found a token Chinese partner and established a 'joint venture'. This 
means they just use the name of the Chinese partner, but actually wholly own the venture. 
They had to pay the Chinese partner for the use of the name but this proved worthwhile. 
The business is quite profitable and has no internal problems at all." 
I had separate interviews with two Chinese managers, one100 from a joint venture with a 
Hong Kong partner and the other101 from a beauty salon jointly owned with a Taiwanese 
investor. Because wholly foreign-owned enterprises were not allowed in the sector, both 
joint ventures had a Chinese partner, but again only in name. 
The Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors did not favour joint operations, and would have 
preferred to run the businesses by themselves. To encourage the inflow of overseas 
investment, the local government recommended two state-owned enterprises to them as 
Chinese partners. A deal was made in which the Chinese partners offered only their 
names to help in the formation of joint ventures, but would not become involved in the 
operations. In return, the two overseas investors had to pay the two Chinese partners 
between two and five percent of their annual profits. 
There were several similar cases involving Japanese investors in the retail business 
(department stores). When the above projects were mentioned, a government official 102 
commented, "We have to create jobs for local people. Sometimes, we have to keep one 
eye open and the other closed". She admitted that the local government had been 
unofficially encouraging shell joint venture practices in order to create jobs. 
99 Chinese Manager 7, Dalian Taiyangcheng Entertainment Co. Ltd. 
10
° Chinese Manager 16, Dalian Falong Industrial Co. Ltd. 
101 Chinese Manager 29, Dalian Kaiyue Beauty/Health Co. Ltd. 
102 Official9, Zhongshan District Sub-Council of the China Council for Promotion oflntemational Trade. 
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1!1 Joint Venture with Private Chinese Partner 
There were several joint ventures in the survey whose Chinese partners came from the 
private sector. In the interviews, their general managers quietly told me that I had picked 
the wrong person for research on joint ventures. They said that theirs were not real joint 
ventures. In many similar cases, the relevant government department knew they were not 
real joint ventures but took no action against them because they did create jobs. 
One female general manager103 of a garment manufacturing joint venture said that she 
had been a senior manager of the textile section of a state import and export company for 
about 15 years, and had many customers in Japan and Hong Kong. Three years ago, with 
the help of her guanxi (connections) in the local government, she managed to obtain a 
loan, and sent money to one of her Japanese friends/customers. This Japanese friend 
brought the money back to Dalian and set up this joint venture with her, which was 
actually her own business. The Japanese friend/customer had no actual investment in the 
joint venture but looked after the sales of her products in Japan. The business was quite 
profitable and both she and her Japanese friend/customer had benefited from the business. 
6.5 Future Outlook 
(1) Unstable Joint Ventures 
Most Chinese managers of existing equity joint ventures expressed their frustration with 
joint operations. They had no confidence in the future ofjoint ventures and some found it 
hard to predict how the future of their joint ventures would develop. They believed that, 
sooner or later, equity joint ventures would be replaced by wholly owned enterprises, 
either run by a solo Chinese or an overseas partner. At the moment, overseas partners 
have already wholly owned a growing number of joint ventures. Several Chinese 
managers said that a joint venture could only work if it was run by a Chinese partner. In 
contrast, some expatriate managers said that it would be a potential disaster if they let 
their Chinese partners run their ventures. 
103 Chinese Manager 10, Dalian Lanbao Fashion Dress Co. Ltd. 
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(2) Stable Joint Ventures 
One overseas manager104 said, "We had a minority equity in the joint venture at first and 
no expatriate manager was involved in the operation. But we had a terrible experience 
with our Chinese partner in the joint operation. We had to modify our strategy- either to 
pull out of the venture or to gain a majority stake to run the venture with expatriate 
managers. We are really lucky because, with the assistance of the local government, we 
were eventually able to buy out all the shares and operate as a wholly owned enterprise. 
The long period of uncertainty is over." 
Managers from these wholly owned ventures and shell joint ventures converted from 
joint ventures were quite confident about their future operations in China. 
(3) Significant Increase in the Number of Wholly Owned Enterprises 
About the prospects of foreign direct investment, one top official from the Dalian 
municipal government105 said, "Joint ventures have lost their appeal to both Chinese and 
overseas investors. There are too many problems with joint ventures and overseas 
investors are no longer interested in the Chinese partners' old factory buildings and out-
of-date equipment. There is no doubt that in the coming years, wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises will be the dominant form of foreign direct investment in Dalian, as it is 
simpler in practice. Personally, I wouldn't recommend the joint venture form to 
anybody. But, as a government official, I have to persuade both Chinese and overseas 
investors to set up joint ventures in Dalian because firstly, this is our central 
government's policy, and secondly, the local government will receive 10% corporate 
income tax from joint ventures but will get nothing from wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises." 
Most local govemment officials expressed the same view that a joint venture was only a 
temporary business strategy for entering into the Chinese market. With the changes in 
China's business environment in recent years, the number of wholly foreign-owned 
104 Expatriate Manager 6, Le Cafe Igosso Co. Ltd. 
105 Official 1, Dalian Municipal Commission of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
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enterprises is increasing while the number of joint ventures declins. As one official 106 
said, "Apart from some restricted sectors, we expect to see a significant increase in the 
number of wholly foreign-owned enterprises in this region. The wholly owned enterprise 
form will certainly dominate the foreign direct investment in this region in the coming 
years. We will also see more wholly owned enterprises converted from joint ventures" 
As the general manager107 of Dalian Hualu Electronics Co. Ltd. said in an interview in 
the UK, "I am not interested in any kind of joint venture in China any more. My strategic 
objective is to be an international player. We are having difficulties in selling our 
products directly to Europe at the moment, because of the tariff policy there. We are 
planning to set up one or two operations in Europe in the next few years for sub-assembly 
of our products with components made in China. This model has proved to be successful 
with Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese businesses. It is the only way to get around the 
tariff policy and to fully utilise our own production capacity at home." 
At a reception108 for a Chinese inward investment mission m London, the vice-
president109 of the China Haier Group said that he believed that the joint venture model 
was still useful to his group, but it would only be applied in a Western country, such as 
the USA, the UK or other European countries. 
Only the director of the Dalian Association of Foreign-Invested Enterprises110 claimed, in 
an informal discussion of the result of this joint questionnaire survey between the Dalian 
municipal government and myself, that: "I think joint ventures still have a chance in 
China if you have the right project, the right partner, the right strategy, and the right 
location, plus the right government policy." 
106 Official 3, Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone. 
107 Managing director of China Hualu Electronics Co. Ltd. (Special interview when he was on a business 
visit to the Northeast of England in Nov. 1999). 
108 Reception for Chinese inward investment mission hosted by Invest Britain Bureau, 22/08/2000 
109 Talk by a vice-president of China Haier Group at a reception for a Chinese inward investment mission 
hosted by Invest Britain Bureau, 22/08/2000 
110 Deputy Secretary-General of the Dalian Association ofF oreign-Invested Enterprises 
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6.6 ConcBusion 
The negative aspects of China's transitional economy, such as the decline of foreign 
direct investment, difficulty in obtaining bank loans and an increase in unemployment, 
have had a strong impact on foreign direct investment in Dalian. Local government 
therefore has to relax its controls over foreign direct investment in order to achieve a 
greater inflow of foreign capital and create more jobs. 
Both Chinese and expatriate managers indicated that the strategic objectives held by 
Chinese and overseas investors differed considerably, but since both parties wanted to 
make a quick deal at the beginning, the strategic differences were ignored in order to 
make a compromise at the negotiation stage. However, at the operational stage, all the 
strategic differences emerged and grew larger. Each party then started to do everything 
possible to influence the overall strategy for its own interests. These strategic differences 
have caused endless conflicts between Chinese and overseas partners. 
With more relaxed state control over foreign direct investment, overseas partners have 
secured a better bargaining position. As a result, overseas partners have actively 
reformulated their strategies to obtain complete control over the businesses. The major 
part of this reformulation has been converting the joint ventures to wholly foreign-owned 
ventures. The Chinese partners, however, could only passively react to these strategic 
changes. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion of Survey and Interview Results 
7.0 Introduction 
In this chapter the empirical findings presented in Chapter Five (questionnaire survey 
results) and Chapter Six (in-depth interviews) are discussed. Analysis of the survey 
findings will be guided by the research framework developed in this chapter (Figure 7.0-
1 ). This will enables us to identify to what extent the findings of this study confirm 
earlier finding of other authors. It will also shed further light on the evolving pattern of 
China-based joint ventures. 
7.1 Drift of Joint Venture Entry Strategies 
It was established in Chapter Three that allowing China-based joint ventures to exist was 
a political compromise among the top Chinese leadership in the late 1970s. Ti was 
intended to promote rapid growth and economic efficiency by means of the absorption of 
foreign capital, technology and management skills while at the same time guarding 
against loss of control to foreign capitalists. China's early joint venture policy was 
formulated in this light, which had a significant impact on foreign investors' market entry 
strategies. Chinese and foreign partners alike had to put aside their strategic differences to 
go for a joint market entry strategy. 
As a result, joint venture partners solicited capital from both Chinese and overseas banks, 
targeted both domestic and overseas markets, and entered into a joint operation with 
shared power along functional lines. 
Previous studies (Daniels 1986; Davidson 1987, Tai 1988; Beamish 1989; Pearson 1989; 
Shenkar 1990, Aiello 1991; Bleeke and Ernst 1991; Newman 1992; Glaister and Wang 
1993, Kim 1996) argued that the Chinese and overseas partners had pursued their own 
individual strategies during the operation stage, producing conflicts and differences over 
technology transfer, exporting, equity sharing, management styles, etc. 
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Figure 7.0-1 The Research Framework Developed 
Joint Venture Entry Strategies 
Joint entity in terms of capital, technological know-how, equipment and land or premises. 
Joint operation with shared powers along functional lines. 
Targeting both domestic and overseas markets through marketing/sales channels of both parent companies. 
The appointment of board directors, general manager and deputy general manager according to ownership 
shares. 
Recruiting a top management team from both sides. Staff and workers are transferred from Chinese partner's 
parent company. 
Driving Forces for 
Instability: 
(Compromises reached between partners where strategic differences emerged) 
Restraining Forces for 
Stability: 
Drift of joint entry 
strategies 
Initial inter-partner fit is affected and 
internal changes emerged 
Local authority controls 
over state-owned Chinese 
Changes in business 
environment. 
Changes in bargaining 
power. 
Changes in joint venture partners' strategies. 
Changes in joint venture ownership structure. 
Changes in joint venture management and 
operation. 
venture partners. 
Inter-partner pre-venture 
relationship. 
Inter-partner competitive 
learning. 
Changes in Chinese Partners 
Efforts to maintain majority ownership. 
Market focus shifted from abroad to home. 
Tight controls over transfer pricing by reducing 
export. 
Efforts to withdraw from unproiitable joint 
ventures. 
Alternative outward investing abroad and to be 
some international market players. 
Changes in Foreign Partners 
Acquiring complete ownership in order to 
reduce managerial and operational uncertainty. 
Efforts to abandon Chinese partners by taking 
the advantage of increased bargaining power. 
Top management localisation with Chinese 
managers recruited by overseas partners. 
Workforce recruitment switched over from 
Chinese partner's parent companies to from 
local job centres. 
Adaptation to Chinese business culture to 
motivate employees' loyalty. 
Resulting emergence of a rapid evolution of joint ventures 
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In this study, the survey and interview results showed that there were strategic differences 
at both the early stage of joint ventures and at the time of the survey. Respondents 
admitted that they had to make compromises over their strategic differences at the early 
stage of setting up a joint venture. This finding supported the argument in the literature 
that joint ventures were facilitated by an entry strategy compromise, which satisfied both 
parties at the very beginning. Table 7.1-1 presents a summary of the result of the 
questionnaire survey, which revealed that venture partners had made some compromises 
over nearly all the strategic differences at the early stage of joint ventures. 
Table 7.1-1 Summary of JV Partners' Strategic Differences and Compromises 
Objectives Overseas partners Chinese partners Compromises 
Motivation for setting Capital profit Political, economic and social Both 
up joint venture benefits 
Market orientation and China's domestic market Overseas market and Targeting both domestic and 
marketing/sales and marketing channels marketing/sales channels of overseas markets using the 
channels of Chinese partner's overseas partner's parent marketing/sales channels of 
parent company company both parent companies 
Capital Expecting bank loans Expecting foreign capital or Foreign capital together with 
from China's domestic bank loans from overseas loans from Chinese banks 
banks banks 
Equipment Intent on providing some Expecting latest and brand Some out-of-date equipment 
old or second-hand new equipment. together with relatively new 
equipment. equipment. 
New technologies Prefer single, not Prefer latest, series, dynamic, Relatively advanced, more 
transfer advanced, high valuation. low valuation. items, reasonable valuation. 
Top management and Maximum control by Learning, joint management, Appointment of board of 
operation expatriate managers. maximum control of operation directors, general manager 
along functional lines. and deputy general manager 
according to ownership 
shares. 
Recruitment Recruiting joint venture's Transferring top management Recruiting top management 
top management team team, office staff and workers team from both sides. Office 
from overseas, and office from the Chinese partner's staff and workers are 
staff and workers from parent company to the joint transferred from Chinese 
local job centres. venture. partner's parent company. 
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However, in the personal interviews, most venture managers claimed that former 
strategic differences surfaced, simply because each venture partner was attempting to 
influence the operation in favour of their own strategic interests or to gain strategic 
advantage over the other, rather than work together for mutual benefits. As a result, these 
compromises in the early stage were removed during the operation stage and venture 
partners pursued their own individual strategies. 
Seven expatriate managers interviewed were concerned about their Chinese partner's 
failure to secure loans from Chinese banks, and frustrated by the marketing and sales 
chmmels of the Chinese partner's parent company. They also complained about their 
Chinese partner's uncooperative attitude towards joint operations. On the other hand, 
most officials and Chinese managers interviewed expressed their disappointment with the 
overseas partners, in particular with their transfer pricing and failure to transfer 
technology. Of the Chinese managers interviewed, 26 complained of their expatriate 
counterpart's domineering attitude. Any trust, which had been developed at the entry 
stage, was put in question and affected overall joint operation. These strategic differences 
started to cause poor financial performance and failure of shared control. 
(1) Poor Financial Performance 
Strategic differences affected the financial performance of the ventures. The 
questionnaire survey indicated that out of 103 joint ventures, only 38 (37%) were making 
a profit. The other 65 joint ventures (63%) were not profitable. Nevertheless, the 
questionnaire survey and eight personal interviews revealed that some of the 38 profitable 
joint ventures were actually 'joint ventures' which had already been converted into 
wholly owned ventures or 'shell' joint ventures, so the actual percentage of unprofitable 
joint ventures could exceed 63%. 
All the seven expatriate managers interviewed accused their Chinese partners of making 
inadequate contributions towards the joint operation, and of deliberately making the joint 
operations difficult and complicated. Four of them clearly stated that they could not 
tolerate their Chinese partners' lack of cooperation any longer. As a result, overseas 
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partners shifted their strategies from joint operation to complete individual control of the 
venture by requesting majority stakes or by buying out their Chinese partners. In 
personal interviews, Chinese and expatriate managers revealed that in many cases, 
overseas investors had had to withdraw their interests from the joint businesses before 
1995, because China's institutional environment at that time did not allow them to buy 
out Chinese partners or even to be majority shareholders. Therefore, many unofficial 
ownership transfers quietly took place between venture partners at that time. In contrast, 
three expatriate managers (who have already wholly owned these ventures) said that with 
state control over joint ventures being relaxed, this was no longer a problem for overseas 
partners after 1995. 
On the other hand, 24 out of 30 Chinese partners interviewed criticised their overseas 
partners for unprofitable joint operations, and complained about the cost of expatriate 
managers and staff, who were not only too expensive but were also believed to be 
responsible for false 'transfer pricing' and repatriating profits outside China (the other 6 
Chinese managers attributed operation losses to the Asian financial crisis). In several 
cases of chronic operational losses, the overseas partners requested further injections of 
capital into joint ventures, which were repeatedly refused by the Chinese partner. 
When asked 'What are you going to do with the operation losses?' two expatriate 
managers answered that the losses would be the price paid for market entry, but that they 
would enforce individual control. In contrast, Chinese partners claimed to shift their 
focus from export to domestic sales in order to increase control. In six cases, the Chinese 
partners expressed their intention of transferring a greater ownership share to their 
overseas partner, or even of pulling out of the ventures altogether. 
(2) Underperformance of Shared Control 
It was established in previous studies (Shenkar 1990; Teagarden 1990; Beamish 1993; 
Osland and Cavusgil 1996; Child and Yan 1999) that partners had split control along 
functional lines based on ownership share when ventures began. However, both Chinese 
and expatriate managers from 65 unprofitable and break-even joint ventures claimed that 
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they became frustrated with shared control. There were another 22 Chinese managers 
from profitable ventures who also complained about shared control along functional lines 
(the other 16 venture managers interviewed responded that they were all right at that 
moment, although they did have problems). All seven expatriate managers interviewed 
admitted that it was impossible for overseas partners to increase their control over joint 
operation if they were minority shareholders before 1995. 
In contrast, with the impact of the relaxation of state control over foreign direct 
investment after 1995, each partner started to exercise independent control. In the battle, 
most overseas joint venture partners were in a better bargaining position and sought to 
gain independent control over the venture operations by obtaining a majority stake. 
Similarly, the Chinese partners preferred to have complete control of joint ventures, 
without expatriate managers. Chinese partners had been making efforts to squeeze them 
out of the joint operations. Although it was often hard for them to control their expatriate 
managers, 17 Chinese partners admitted that they had been making efforts to dominate 
the operation, as they thought they could do much better without the overseas partner's 
involvement. Nine Chinese partners clearly indicated that it might be ideal for them to 
wholly own their businesses, but because they did not have sufficient finance, they had to 
maintain their partnership until they accumulated more. In six cases, Chinese venture 
partners had been seeking to make deals with other domestic partners in order to buy out 
their overseas partners and to become a domestic joint venture. As a result most joint 
ventures were actually controlled by one partner. 
In summary, the findings of this study indicated that a drift of joint venture entry 
strategies had emerged from the ventures' internal strategic uncertainties and joint 
operational difficulties. However, although this strategic drift had great potential for 
driving ventures to instability, it was not strong enough to drive a fundamental change in 
joint ventures before 1995, where the institutional environment in China was a major 
restraining force against any fundamental changes within joint ventures (for example, 
transfer of venture ownership shares from Chinese to foreign partners was restricted by 
the central government). The evidence was, as discovered in this study, that many venture 
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partners had to make ownership share transfers quietly and unofficially. Nevertheless, 
those unofficial ownership transfers implied that joint venture internal difficulties were 
accumulating and would work as a major driving force towards instability of ventures 
once they joined with external driving forces. In the next section, the two sets of driving 
forces, which influence the stability of joint ventures, will be discussed. 
7.2 Driving lForces for Joint Venture Instability 
It was established in Chapter Two that previous studies based on the dynamic nature of 
international joint ventures (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Lecraw 1984; Harrigan 1986; 
Yan and Gray 1994; Vachani 1995; Yan and Luo 2001) identified four major 
explanations for structural changes and instability in joint ventures: apart from poor 
financial performance, which was mentioned in the last section, the rest are unexpected 
contingencies, changes in venture partners' bargaining power, and inter-partner 
competitive learning. 
This research has identified several driving forces of joint venture instability, which 
supports the argument in previous studies and the emerging trends of China's business 
environment. The findings clearly indicated that joint venture partners had been 
positively or passively altering their strategies in order to fit the new business 
environment, and this had brought about changes in joint ventures. The driving forces for 
joint venture instability will be discussed in what follows. 
7.2.1 Changes in China's Business Environment 
(1) Adverse Impacts of Economic Reforms 
Existing studies (Luo 2000; Peng 2000; Child and Tes 2001) have indicated many 
positive implications of China's economic transition. In the transition from plan to 
market, China's attractiveness to overseas investors has increased. There 1s more 
flexibility in choosing market entry and operating modes. However, there exists a 
negative impact on international businesses, particularly China-based joint ventures. The 
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Chinese economy, as a whole, slowed down in the mid-1990s, partly because of 
inadequate reforms of the economic structure and state-owned enterprises, which led to 
increased unemployment for domestic workers and financial difficulties for foreign-
funded enterprises. Moreover, foreign direct investment decreased, owing to the impact 
of the Asian financial crisis. 
• Increasing Unemployment 
Although China's economic reforms have achieved some positive results, one direct 
result has been the increasing number of company bankruptcy. All 13 Dalian govemrrient 
officials interviewed confirmed that, as one of China's major industrial bases with many 
large state-owned enterprises, Dalian had been severely affected by the reforms. A 
growing number of inefficient state-owned factories has been closed down with a huge 
number of workers laid off. The local authority came under strong pressure to tum the 
declining regional economy around and create jobs. 
The findings from interviews with govemment officials suggested that the Dalian 
authorities tumed mainly to foreign direct investment for a solution. Relevant 
govemment departments made great efforts to relax the criteria for setting up joint 
ventures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises, with a view to encouraging the creation of 
jobs for unemployed workers. Moreover, the relaxation of control of foreign direct 
investment also provided fresh opportunities for existing joint venture partners to 
reformulate their strategies, including changes within joint ventures. 
• Financial Difficulties for Joint Venture Projects 
At early steps of joint venture operation, Chinese and foreign partners made compromises 
to obtain loans from both Chinese and overseas banks. In many cases, loans from Chinese 
banks used to play an important role (Killing 1983; Dutta and Merva 1990). But local 
govemment officials and joint venture managers interviewed claimed that joint ventures 
have not been able to obtain loans secured on their investment in real estate since the 
mid-1990s, as banks have only extended loans to rescue failing state-owned enterprises. 
This presented a major problem for most joint ventures. The shortage of bank loans has 
198 
Discussion of Survey and Interview Results Chapter 7 
directly affected operations of joint ventures and halted the start-up of new joint ventures. 
Several Dahan officials stressed that, in the 1980s, there had been many complaints about 
the delays by overseas investors in paying in their capital to set up joint ventures. But in 
the middle and late 1990s, Chinese partners had that problem, too. The local authorities 
then had to encourage transfer of venture ownership shares from the Chinese to overseas 
partners in order for them to survive the financial difficulties. Obviously, such difficulties 
put many Chinese partners from state-owned enterprises in a less favourable bargaining 
position. 
a Decline of Foreign Direct Investment 
Dalian has been one of the 14 major coastal cities opening to the outside world since 
1984. Approximately 7054 foreign investment projects, including 1395 overseas 
representative offices, had been approved by the Dahan municipal government by the end 
of May 1997. This made Dahan one of the five cities in China with the highest 
concentration of foreign firms and representative offices. Foreign direct investment 
projects have created about 300,000 jobs in the region. As a result, since the late 1980s 
Dahan has relied heavily on the inflow of foreign direct investment and exports for job 
creation. According to 13 Dahan officials interviewed, most overseas investors in Dalian 
are from South-East Asian countries. The Asian financial crisis seriously affected not 
only foreign direct investment from these South-East Asian countries, but also exports 
from Dalian-based foreign-funded enterprises to these countries. 
One senior official revealed that about 2000 joint ventures were terminated by the end of 
1997. Other officials and joint venture managers interviewed confirmed that the Asian 
financial crisis was the major reason for most of the terminations. To reverse the decline, 
the Dahan authorities have had to relax the control over foreign direct investment by 
reducing the minimum capital requirement for overseas partners to set up joint ventures. 
The authorities have also further opened up the domestic market to existing joint 
ventures. 
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(2) Relaxed Control over Foreign Direct Investment 
Profound changes took place in China's business environment m the 1990s. These 
included the decline of the national/regional economy, the reduction in inflows of foreign 
direct investment, and the mounting pressure for job creation. These changes, in tum, 
have induced changes in joint ventures. 
• Reduced Differences between Joint Ventures and Wholly Foreign-owned 
Enterprises 
In the 1980s and the early 1990s, a certain proportion of joint venture products could be 
sold to the domestic market. But a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, despite its other 
advantages, was not allowed to do so, or was only allowed to do so under very strict 
conditions (China Joint Venture Law 1979; China Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise 
Law 1986; Peng 1989; Vanhonacker 1997). In 1995, with controls being further relaxed, 
the Dahan government lifted restrictions to allowed wholly foreign-owned enterprises to 
sell their products to the domestic market. Except for restrictions on publishing, 
broadcasting, domestic commerce and insurance, as well as telecommunications sectors, 
the differences between a joint venture and a wholly foreign-owned enterprise were 
reduced in terms of venture duration, taxation and domestic sales. The reduced number of 
differences between joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises was confirmed 
by Dalian government officials (Refer to Table3 .3-1, Chapter 3, p.83). 
Market orientation and taxation are the two areas where major changes have happened. 
Before 1995, wholly foreign invested enterprises could only sell their products to the 
overseas market, but since 1995 they have been able to target both overseas and domestic 
markets. As far as corporate tax was concerned, before 1st July 1991, the overall 
corporate tax for wholly foreign invested enterprises was 50 per cent. ( 40% to the central 
government and 10% to local authorities). Since 151 July 1991, it has been the same (33%) 
as that for joint ventures (See Tale 3.3-1 at page 83). Thus, when compared with wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises in terms of venture setting up, operation and management, 
joint ventures lost their appeal. 
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• Reduced Government Pressure for Setting up Joint Ventures 
In the face of these changes, the Dalian government further relaxed controls over setting 
up joint ventures. Officials interviewed claimed that it was a long-standing policy of the 
local government to encourage the setting up of joint ventures. There were three major 
reasons for this policy: (1) Local government can keep 10 per cent of a joint venture's 
corporate tax, but this does not apply to a wholly foreign-owned enterprise; (2) With a 
joint venture, a state-owned or private Chinese partner can improve their productivity 
with foreign capital, new products, advanced technology and management skills; (3) A 
state-owned Chinese partner could directly transfer its surplus workers to the joint 
venture. 
However, the problem was that many state-owned enterprises could not contribute any 
capital at all even if they wanted to form a joint venture with overseas investors. Their 
old factory buildings, out-of-date manufacturing equipment, and over-staffed workforce 
did not interest potential overseas investors. As a result, the Dalian government was 
forced to place less emphasis on joint ventures and to accept other forms of foreign direct 
investment. 
• Relaxed Ownership Transfer from Chinese to Overseas Partners 
In line with its acceptance of wholly foreign-owned enterprises, in 1996 the Dalian 
government also relaxed the controls over ownership transfer between joint venture 
partners, especially the transfer from Chinese to overseas partners. According to previous 
studies (Pearson 1989; Beamish and Wang 1989; Engholm 1990; Boisot and Child 1990; 
Li and Xu 1994), China's Joint Venture Law did not specify a maximum limit on 
overseas joint venture partners' ownership and placed few restrictions on the transfer of 
ownership shares between joint venture partners. However, as China's policies on foreign 
direct investment were complex and difficult to interpret, there was often confusion 
between what was allowed legally and what could be done unofficially. The state-level 
policy and the interpretation of that policy by regional and municipal level governments 
were often different. Therefore, most overseas partners from joint ventures established in 
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the 1980s and the early 1990s had a minority stake because of the different interpretations 
of the law by different local authorities. 
Although at the state level there was no formal restriction on transferring ownership 
between joint venture partners, before 1997 it was almost impossible to have ownership 
shares transferred from a Chinese to an overseas partner if that overseas partner would 
then hold a majority stake (51% or above). Hence, in order to get around this restriction, 
many overseas venture partners demanded a further injection of capital into joint ventures 
by both parties. They aimed to gain a majority stake, or even buy out their Chinese 
partners, as they knew it was difficult for their Chinese partners to obtain capital. 
Naturally, the demands for further injections of capital met with strong opposition from 
Chinese partners as they could neither afford to, nor wished to, inject further capital into 
the ventures because of poor joint performance. Thus, many overseas partners suggested 
purchasing more shares, or even buying out their Chinese partners by exerting pressure 
on local government, such as threatening to pull out or to move to the hinterland area to 
set up new wholly owned enterprises. Many Chinese partners could not afford 
unprofitable operations and took the opportunity to make unofficial deals with their 
overseas partners to pull out of the joint business. 
In the face of this difficult situation, especially the increased unofficial ownership 
transfers between Chinese and overseas partners, the central government lifted the 
restriction and from 1996 allowed two-way ownership transfers between joint venture 
partners. This policy directly triggered a large number of official ownership transfers that 
converted joint ventures into wholly owned ventures. More overseas joint venture 
partners acquired shares from their Chinese partners in order to become majority 
shareholders or wholly own the ventures. This research indicated that most official 
ownership transfer cases involved Western European and American partners. 
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o Private Sector Involvement in Joint Venture Projects 
Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has encouraged the development of the 
private sector to create job opportunities. This study found that 19 out of 103 Chinese 
partners were from that sector. 
Chinese authorities have much less control over private investors than the state economy. 
As a result, most unofficial ownership transfer deals, known as shell joint ventures, 
involved private Chinese partners. In these shell joint ventures, either the Chinese or the 
overseas partner quietly withdrew their interests but still kept the joint venture name. In 
some cases, one of the partners never had any true investment in the venture. The 
venture was actually run by one partner and obtained governmental incentives given to 
joint ventures. Interestingly, most shell joint ventures were reported as being profitable 
and stable. 
• Regional Competition in Attracting Inward Foreign Investment 
In the process ofbuilding a socialist market economy, the central government has opened 
up more hinterland areas to the outside world. Many regional authorities have been 
competing with each other to offer more attractive incentives to overseas investors. In 
this competition, coastal cities lost their advantages in terms of incentives they could 
offer, causing many overseas investors to move from coastal cities to the hinterland. The 
Dalian government was then under pressure to relax its control over inward foreign 
investment to attract new foreign capital or to keep existing joint ventures within the 
region. 
7.2.2 New Power Relationships between Joint Venture Partners 
Previous studies (Killing 1983; Pearson 1989; Yan 1993; Yan and Gray 1994) suggested 
that the extent to which a host government could assert control in relation to foreign firms 
depended upon its bargaining power and the possibility of increasing it. According to 
Pearson (1989), China was initially in a relatively good bargaining position in attracting 
foreign direct investment, because of the prospect that China would open what overseas 
investors believed to be a huge domestic market. This made China a highly desirable 
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location for new investment, although potential weaknesses were also evident in China at 
the time. These weaknesses often paralleled the strengths of foreign firms in terms of 
foreign capital, advanced teclmology, access to international markets and management 
skills. That was why most state-owned enterprises turned to the joint venture solution for 
survival (Glaister and Wang 1993; Shawn and Meier 1993; Tenbridge Survey 1999). As 
was established in Chapter Three, the close links with the government meant the Chinese 
partners usually had strong bargaining powers. As a result, in the 1980s and the early 
1990s most Chinese venture partners had a majority equity position (Beamish and Wang 
1989; Engholm 1989; Boisot and Child 1990). 
A significant change in power relationships between joint venture partners has occurred. 
As China urgently needs a substantial increase in foreign inward investment and the 
creation of more employment, the new situation has put overseas joint venture partners in 
a more favourable bargaining position. In the case of Dalian, as long as jobs can be 
created, there are few entry restrictions on potential overseas investors. Increased 
bargaining powers have been gained by the existing overseas joint venture partners as 
well. They are also in an advantageous position in re-negotiating their ownership shares, 
choosing where they like to move to, or sell products to, and the way raw materials and 
components are purchased. It has also become easier for them to recmit office staff and 
workers directly from local job centres. 
The state-owned Chinese partners, on the other hand, were put in a weaker position. They 
seemed to have lost their bargaining power considerably. The findings indicate that 
because of further relaxation of state controls over foreign direct investment, the 
bargaining powers of the Dalian government/Chinese partners were gradually reduced. 
The Dalian government had to yield to requests for increased ownership shares from 
overseas partners to keep them in the region. Because of the administrative links between 
the local government and state-owned Chinese partners, the actual controlling power of 
most state-owned Chinese partners in joint ventures was reduced accordingly. They had 
to compromise with aggressive overseas partners by giving up majority ownership and 
the control over joint ventures. They were often not allowed by the local authorities, or 
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could not afford, to initiate any strategic action. In most cases in which ownership 
transferred from Chinese to overseas partners, Dalian officials would ask the Chinese 
partner to meet the overseas partners' requests. Even with majority stakes, the Chinese 
partners' control over joint ventures was continuously undermined by the pressure from 
the local government to transfer ownership shares to the overseas partners. Meanwhile, 
not satisfied with only a majority stake, many overseas partners moved towards having 
whole ownership of the enterprises. Fifteen out of 103 joint ventures surveyed are already 
wholly owned by overseas partners. 
On the other hand, private Chinese partners were subject to less control by the local 
authorities in comparison to their state counterparts. But what do they care more about is 
to obtain an import and export licence, as a fallout of entering into a joint venture with a 
foreign partner. Without a joint venture, it was nearly impossible for a private Chinese 
company to obtain an import and export licence. Therefore, in general, private Chinese 
venture partners do not mind who they have as overseas partners, what the ownership 
arrangements are, or who controls operations, as long as a joint venture could be 
established. That is why most 'shell' joint ventures involved private Chinese partners. 
7.2.3 Inter-Partner Competitive Learning 
According to previous studies (Harrigan 1985; Dutta 1988; Shenkar 1990; Beamish 1993; 
Killing 1993; Glaister and Wang 1993), in the 1980s and the early 1990s, overseas joint 
venture partners viewed the joint venture as a crucial vehicle to facilitate entry into the 
Chinese market. Firstly, this was the Chinese government's condition for market entry. 
Secondly, it was perceived to offer a short cut to gain access to the knowledge of the 
local market, local culture and links with major buyers and distribution channels. These 
were the inputs that overseas investors found difficult to obtain when operating alone. 
Thus, the Chinese partners' local knowledge and contacts were of great interest to them. 
The advantages of these largely intangible inputs significantly outweighed the importance 
of more tangible factors, such as low cost labour, raw materials and existing factory 
buildings. Hence, a local Chinese partner's contribution in this regard to an overseas 
investor was crucial at the early entry stage. Some studies on China-based joint ventures 
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(Pearson1989; Shawn and Meier 1993) have attributed joint venture failures to the 
inexperience of most expatriate managers and to cultural barriers. This also reflects the 
importance of those intangible inputs gained from local Chinese partners. Wong (1999) 
suggested that the Chinese partners would continue to be a problem because they were 
still attempting to dominate their foreign partners, knowing that the latter were heavily 
dependent on them. 
In contrast to previous studies, the findings of this study indicate that the interdependency 
between joint venture partners was greatly reduced over time, particularly after 1996. Of 
all the 37 Chinese and overseas managers interviewed, no one satisfied with their joint 
partnerships. Having a joint venture partner became a less significant issue to both sides, 
and to overseas partners in particular. All seven expatriate managers interviewed 
complained that the value added by Chinese partners was quite low to begin with and 
declined steadily over time. Taking over office staff and workers from the Chinese 
partner's parent company could easily bring in less qualified personnel, who would 
otherwise be laid off by their parent company. In addition, expatriate managers found it 
difficult to access their Chinese partners' existing sales channels, which, in many cases, 
was impossible. 
With deepening knowledge of the Chinese market and the relaxation of state controls 
over foreign direct investment, overseas investors in Dalian better understood that their 
individual commitment could make it easier for them to achieve their strategic goals in 
China. They further indicated that they no longer needed Chinese partners any more. 
Most overseas venture partners became more aggressive in their attempts to acquire 
greater ownership stakes and thereby to increase control over the joint ventures. To many 
overseas venture partners, majority ownership was not their final strategic objective. 
Rather, they were making efforts to eventually abandon their Chinese partners and to 
wholly own these ventures, because the local dependency of these overseas partners had 
already shifted from their Chinese partners to those Chinese employees they had recruited 
themselves. 
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Under the new regulations, China-based joint ventures became able to recruit office staff 
and workers from local job centres, and, as a result, overseas partners shifted their 
recruitment away from their Chinese partners' parent companies. They found the 
personnel they recruited were not only appropriately qualified but were also more loyal, 
and could efficiently provide all the perceived intangible inputs required. They could, for 
example, establish direct links and maintain good relationships with the local 
government, secure government incentives, and gain access to the domestic market and 
raw materials, which the Chinese partners had failed to deliver. Through them, overseas 
partners could save an extraordinary amount of management time, which had previously 
been spent in dealing with their Chinese partners. The whole operation became simpler 
and easier. Hence, to overseas venture partners, the perceived tangible and intangible 
inputs from a Chinese partner were no longer significant, or even necessary. 
On the other hand, previous studies (Davidson 1987; Li and Xu 1994; Li 1995; Yang 
1997) argued that, in the 1980s, Chinese partners were in great need of foreign capital, 
quality products and advanced technology, as well as modem management skills 
including production and human resource management, quality assurance, credit control, 
sales and service promotion. For China, the quickest way to meet these needs was to 
open the domestic market in exchange for the inflow of foreign investment. Thus, the 
input of overseas partners was absolutely vital in the entry stage. The findings of this 
study also indicated changes in this issue. Chinese partners and government officials 
interviewed believed that Chinese enterprises have greatly improved in terms of financial 
strength, production efficiency and the quality of products by using foreign capital, as 
well as transferred technology, equipment and management skills. The requirements of 
their overseas partners have also reduced. When the problems brought from working 
jointly with overseas partners in terms of strategic differences, cross-cultural barriers and 
communication problems were considered, overseas partners were seen as having placed 
too many restrictions on Chinese partners' potential self-development. 
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7.3 :Restraining Forces for Joint Venture Stability 
It was established in Chapter Two that there are forces in organisations that counter 
changes and help retain a certain organisational stability. Previous studies (Kimberly 
1980; Mintzberg and Water 1982; Boeker 1989; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; 
Scott 1992) have suggested that organisational factors such as the characteristics of the 
founding executives or top management team, as well as the venture's initial business 
strategy, can create structural stability. Yan and Luo (2001) have further summarised the 
restraining forces for joint ventures' structural stability as the local political and legal 
environment, partner initial resources contributions, the original match of inter-partner 
bargaining power, and pre-venture relationships between partners. 
The findings of this research have identified that China's political and legal environment, 
partner initial resources contributions and the original inter-partner bargaining power 
tended to be driving forces for joint venture instability rather than restraining forces for 
stability. Several restraining forces, which might contribute to joint venture stability, 
were identified, but in comparison with those driving forces for instability, they were too 
weak to have much effect. 
7.3.1 Authorities' Control over State-owned Chinese Partners 
As was mentioned earlier, Chinese partners were in a less competitive bargaining 
position; however, most Chinese partners and local government officials interviewed 
thought that to simply import advanced technologies or even to manufacture under 
licence would be preferable to cooperation with a foreign venture partner. Chinese 
partners too, therefore, sought chances to abandon their overseas partners for an 
independent operation of their joint venture. However, because all state-owned Chinese 
joint venture partners have strong official administrative links with relevant government 
departments, they have to do what the local authorities tell them to do as the local 
authorities have ultimate control over the strategic decision-making of these state-owned 
Chinese venture partners. 
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As the instability of any Dalian-based joint ventures would likely lead to dissolution or 
termination, and thereby increase existing local unemployment, the Dahan government 
had strictly controlled all strategic moves on the part of state-owned Chinese partners, in 
terms of ownership transfer, dissolution or termination of joint ventures. On the surface, 
the special relationship between local authorities and state-owned Chinese venture 
partners contributed temporary stability but it put those state-owned Chinese ventures 
partners in an even worse position when it came to reacting to the ventures' internal and 
external changes. Eventually, the special relationship (arguably) triggered those 
unofficial ownership share transfer deals between state-owned Chinese partners and 
overseas partners- shell joint ventures. Moreover, seven Chinese managers revealed that 
they had shifted their international market focus from joint ventures towards attempts to 
establish their own operations in foreign countries in order to access world markets. 
7.3.2 Venture Partners' Pre-Joint Venture Relationships 
The findings from personal interviews indicated that inter-partner pre-joint venture 
relationships also contributed to joint venture stability, at least on the surface. Four 
Chinese joint venture managers said that their overseas partners were their previous 
business partners and they had very good business relationships. They were more like 
personal friends than business partners. They entered into joint ventures for closer 
cooperation. However, joint operations were not as successful as expected because of 
different strategies between the partners. On the one hand, both parties had to terminate 
joint cooperation, but on the other, they had to make sure their actions did not damage 
each other and the local authorities. Thus, unofficial venture deals were made by partners 
to keep joint ventures in name only (shell joint ventures) rather than to close them down. 
More cases of this kind, in which venture partners went back to their original trade 
partner-relationships, were reported after 1996 when the Chinese government removed 
restrictions on venture ownership transfer. 
To summarise, the findings of this research support the argument from previous studies 
(Killing 1982; Harrigan 1984; Harrigan 1985; Davidson 1987; Kogut 1988; Pearson 1989; 
Beamish 1993; Mamill and Pambos 1997; Vanhonacker 1997; Bulcke et al.1999; Weldon 
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and Vanhonacker 1999; Selmer 1999; Wong et al. 1999) that joint ventures in China are 
likely to be less stable in the future. The longer a joint venture has been in operation, the 
greater would be the number of reorganisations/liquidations, as performance problems 
arise. As both sets of forces influence a joint venture, actual changes in venture structure 
depend upon the relative strength of the two sets of forces. The implication of the 
findings of this research is that joint venture structural reconfiguration would occur in 
one way or another because the overall destabilising forces were stronger than the overall 
stabilising forces. 
In summary, the findings of this study support the hypothesis that drift of joint venture 
entry strategies and the relaxation of state control over foreign direct investment affected 
joint venture partners' initial power relationships, which further affected the balance 
between restraining forces for a venture's stability and driving forces for a venture's 
instability. In the next section, internal changes in joint ventures will be discussed. 
7.4 Changes At Joint Venture Level 
This section provides conclusive evidence that with relaxed state controls over foreign 
direct investment, and the new power relationships between joint venture partners, there 
have been significant changes in joint venture partners' strategies, ownership structure, 
and operational management within joint ventures. 
7.4.1 Changes in Partners' Strategies 
This research found major changes in joint venture partners' strategies. The constant 
disputes over strategic differences and operational issues, the complexity of mutual 
adaptation and the frustrations of joint performance were all factors that caused a drift of 
joint operation strategies. 
(1) Significant Shift in Market Focus 
Previous studies (Daniels et al. 1985; Grub and Lin 1991; Li and Xu 1995; Hamill and 
Pambos 1997) argued that a major strategic difference between the Chinese and overseas 
partners was that overseas partners focused on China's domestic market whilst the 
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Chinese partners focused on the international market. Pearson (1989) revealed that the 
Chinese government set up a number of controls to discourage domestic sales by joint 
ventures. Formerly, the government was able to use the state plan to press for exports. 
By including joint ventures in these state marketing plans, the government was able to 
direct how and where joint ventures made sales. It could also use its pricing authority to 
impose far higher prices for joint venture products than for the comparable local 
products, making domestic sales difficult. And, in theory, the Chinese government could 
also use its Chinese managers within joint ventures to direct sales. 
According to the questionnaire survey results of this study, 67 (65%) out of 103 Chinese 
partners said that to export products and earn hard currency for parent companies was one 
of the most important motives for setting up joint ventures. On the other hand, 60 (58%) 
out of 1 03 foreign partners saw entering into China's domestic market as the most 
important motive for setting up joint ventures, which seemed to support the argument 
from previous studies. However, the questionnaire survey results were contradicted by 
the results from personal interviews, which indicated that the above market focus was 
true only at the early stage of joint ventures but it was changed over time by venture 
partners. 
As mentioned earlier, most Dalian-based joint ventures had reached a compromise over 
the differences in market focus by targeting both domestic and overseas markets, where 
Chinese partners influenced overseas sales while overseas partners were keen to expand 
sales in the domestic market. According to previous studies (Daniels et al. 1985; Tai 
1988; Pearson 1989; Kungchia Yeh 1993; Li and Xu 1995; Hamill and Pambos 1997), 
the Chinese government originally restricted domestic sales with the aim of encouraging 
the export of joint venture products. In contrast, seven expatriate managers interviewed in 
this research clearly indicated that it was now overseas partners, rather than Chinese 
partners, who were making efforts to limit domestic sales. 
All seven expatriate managers interviewed were satisfied with their controlled overseas 
sales, which indicated that they were able to repatriate their own profits outside China. 
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Three expatriate managers from manufacturing ventures expressed no interest at all in 
China's domestic market, due to the complexity of its practice and the possible control of 
domestic sales by their Chinese partners. When these expatriate managers were asked 
about the contradiction between the remarks on market focus in the questionnaire survey 
and in the personal interviews, they explained that their interest in China's domestic 
market remained unchanged. The evidence was that they had established or were working 
on setting up their own domestic sales teams. Two expatriate managers, who already 
wholly owned their ventures, claimed that they had been working hard to expand 
domestic sales. But in many cases, China's domestic sales system was too complicated 
and the Chinese partners' existing sales channels were insufficient. Another five 
expatriate managers complained that it was very difficult to receive payments for 
domestic sales. Therefore, they had to rely on overseas sales to generate profits. 
In contrast, most officials and Chinese managers interviewed claimed that the shift of 
overseas partners' market interest was more likely because of 'transfer pricing'. Most 
Chinese managers claimed that they had been making great efforts to influence overseas 
sales activities, but without any success. As a result, Chinese partners had to also make a 
U-turn, in order to shift their market focus from export to the expansion of domestic sales 
in order to control one aspect of the operation and make profits. From interviews with 
local government officials, it was found that Chinese venture partners were encouraged 
by the local government to make extra efforts for domestic sales and to limit overseas 
sales. Most officials and Chinese managers interviewed claimed that Chinese partners 
might use domestic sales to exercise control of the joint operation. In other words, 
Chinese partners were making independent efforts to achieve their own profits through 
domestic sales. Six Chinese managers said that their parent companies were planning to 
set up their own sales offices abroad in order to make their own overseas sales of joint 
venture products. 
(2) Shift from Mutual Adaptation to Independent Control 
Previous studies on China-based joint ventures (Shenkar 1990; Glaister and Wang 1993; 
Shaw and Meier 1993; Wilpert and Scharpf 1995; Fan 1996) shared one common theme: 
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mutual adaptation between Chinese and overseas partners. The focus of several studies 
even in the late 1990s (Sergeant & Frenkel 1998; Biorkman and Yu 1999; Selmer 1999; 
Wang and Law 1999; Weldon 1999) was still on how to improve expatriate managers' 
ability to work together with Chinese partners as well as adapt to China's business 
environment. However, the findings in this study indicated that efforts made by joint 
venture partners for mutual adaptation were switched to independent control. Overseas 
partners, in particular, had been making great efforts to sideline Chinese partners, rather 
than work together with them. In fact, overseas partners, in a better bargaining position, 
were taking strategic steps to reduce uncertainties and operational difficulties by 
dispensing with Chinese partners. Interviews with seven expatriate managers indicated 
that overseas partners realised it was far easier to abandon Chinese partners than to make 
efforts to adapt to their way of doing business. As a result, overseas partners' local 
dependency had rapidly switched from Chinese partners to Chinese employees recruited 
by the overseas partners themselves. 
Most Chinese officials and partners interviewed claimed that they had been making 
efforts to adapt to their overseas partners. However, with a continuously unprofitable 
joint operation and their ongoing reduced bargaining power, the Chinese partners were 
put in a defensive position. Their dependency on overseas partners, and overseas sales in 
particular, was greatly reduced because of transfer pricing. Similarly, the efforts for 
adaptation to overseas partners had had to switch to emphasizing their own interests in 
joint ventures. However, because of local authority control, most state-owned Chinese 
partners could not initiate any strategic changes (e.g. termination of joint ventures) 
without approval from those authorities, and so Chinese partners could only passively 
maintain their ownership shares and enforce their control along functional lines (e.g. 
domestic sales). However, as the findings of this study indicate, there was a strong 
willingness from many Chinese venture partners to withdraw from these unprofitable 
joint ventures. 
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(3) Move to Abandon Joint Partnerships 
The endless conflicts and poor joint operational performance disappointed both Chinese 
and overseas partners. The findings of this study further indicate that in most cases, the 
former partners could become a strategic barrier. Hence, internal difficulties, together 
with the impacts of the changes in China's business environment, frequently motivated 
joint venture partners to move to abandon the joint partnership. 
The findings from personal interviews indicated that among most Chinese and overseas 
partners, there was a common intention to end their joint partnership. As has been 
discussed earlier, the overall external and internal situations had broken the initial 
balance of power relationship between partners, and thus there was a strong tendency on 
the part of both overseas and Chinese partners to obtain/maintain a maximum/complete 
control of joint ventures, or otherwise to pull out. Overseas partners were in a more 
favourable position to initiate a strategic take-over of their joint ventures and to operate 
independently, whereas Chinese partners would only take over joint ventures once the 
overseas partners completely pulled out. 
In summary, the findings of this study confirm changes in venture partners' strategies in 
terms of shifted market focus, efforts switched from mutual adaptation to independent 
control, and willingness to abandon joint venture partners. The findings thus support the 
hypothesis that the impacts of changes in China's business environment and joint venture 
internal difficulties affected venture partners' power relationships, and drove the changes 
in partners' strategies. 
7.4.2 Changes in Ownership Structure 
It was established in Chapter Two that the ownership of equity stakes was the major lever 
for the exercise of control over strategic matters, such as the use of profits, re-investment 
policy, setting strategic priorities and allocating top management appointments in joint 
ventures. (Pearson 1989; Beamish and Wang 1989; Engholm 1989; Boisot and Child 
1990; Beamish 1993; Hamill and Pambos 1997; Pan 1997; Child and Yan 1999). Pearson 
(1989) noted that during the 1980s, Chinese officials were clear in their preference for 
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Chinese majority or fifty- fifty ownership, for the 'comfort of control' over management. 
Reflecting this preference, Chinese majority or equal ownership was far more common 
than foreign majority ownership for joint ventures formed in the 1980s. Most overseas 
investors had to accept only a minority stake or at most 50 per cent ownership. 
This study reveals that there has been a rapid increase in the joint ventures with overseas 
partners owning majority stakes. Among 103 joint venture surveyed in this study, there 
were 49 in which the overseas partners held majority stakes, 42 in which the Chinese 
partners held majority stakes, and 12 joint ventures where there was 50/50 equity. It was 
significant that of the 49 ventures with overseas partners holding the majority of 
ownership shares, 31 had recently managed to obtain greater ownership shares from their 
Chinese partners, and 16 ventures were actually wholly owned by overseas partners. One 
might guess that the actual number of joint ventures controlled by overseas partners could 
well be larger, because many cases of unofficial, and therefore unrecorded, ownership 
transfer from Chinese to overseas partners were found during the personal interviews. 
The difficulties the Chinese partners had in maintaining majority ownership stakes were 
largely due to problems with finance, as well as to pressure from local authorities. In 
most cases, when an overseas partner requested a further injection .of capital into joint 
ventures, it would be very difficult for the Chinese partner to secure a bank loan. 
Therefore, most Chinese partners had to transfer more shares to their overseas 
counterparts. Most Chinese and overseas managers confirmed that after 1996, it became 
easier for overseas partners to obtain greater ownership shares from their Chinese 
partners. Four Chinese managers interviewed admitted that the transfers of greater 
ownership shares to overseas partners were made under pressure from the local 
authorities, as the government would do anything it could to keep overseas investors 
within the region and to prevent further job losses. Hence, the local authority instituted 
strong controls over the buying or selling of ownership shares by state-owned Chinese 
partners. Without the local authority's approval, Chinese partners could not purchase or 
sell their stakes, as they would wish. 
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There were five cases in which Chinese partners wanted to pull out from unprofitable 
ventures, but could not get approval from the local authority. The five Chinese managers 
interviewed indicated that most Chinese partners with a minority ownership stake would 
be more than happy to pull out from unprofitable ventures. They told the author that they 
were negotiating with the local authorities in order to get their approval to pull out from 
these joint ventures. 
Another two Chinese managers admitted that some Chinese partners strategically aimed 
to withdraw step by step from unprofitable joint ventures, in order to recover their 
investment. In most cases, joint venture partners had to manipulate the ownership transfer 
quietly and unofficially, as the local authority did not in general allow them to give up 
their ownership, either partially or completely. 
Unofficial ownership transfers meant the ownership transfer deals happened without the 
formal approval of the local authority, which should, in theory, have been obtained first. 
The findings of this study show that many Chinese and overseas partners had a good pre-
joint venture relationship, especially where such a relationship was between private 
Chinese partners and overseas partners. Most of them were former trade partners. Thus, 
the formation of the joint ventures had been based on their inter-dependency. Although 
conflicts emerged during the joint operation stage, both Chinese and overseas partners 
were unwilling to break up their business relationship completely. Nevertheless, to keep 
the joint venture going would further hurt each partner and, on the other hand, probably 
neither party would benefit from the dissolution or termination of these ventures. This 
special situation thus drove these venture partners to enter into unofficial ownership 
transfer deals, leading to 'shell' joint ventures. As a result, both Chinese and overseas 
partners could benefit, to a greater or lesser degree, from simply retaining the name of 
their joint ventures. 
Eight local officials and three Chinese managers admitted that most private Chinese 
partners would unofficially arrange for ownership transfers with the aim of obtaining 
import/export licences and government incentives, such as a two-year corporate tax 
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holiday and another three years of corporate tax reduction (50%), for both of which joint 
ventures are eligible. 
This research also discovered 'shell' joint ventures, which had been formed as such from 
the outset in order to gain for import/export licences, government incentives or market 
entry into sectors, which were restricted to wholly foreign-owned firms. In these 
unofficial deals, one partner pulled out but left its name with the venture, which made a 
significant difference to these ventures' operation and management. This finding 
challenges the existing literature on joint venture ownership/control theory, which holds 
that controlling power, derived from majority equity, was no longer important. Firstly, 
joint venture ownership could be unofficially transferred from one partner to another 
even if the law or government regulations did not actually allow this kind of ownership 
transfer. Secondly, joint venture ownership could be unofficially manipulated by partners 
from the outset for strategic purposes, in terms of complete control, entry into a restricted 
sector, obtaining import/export licences and government incentives for genuine joint 
ventures. 
In summary, the findings of this research not only support the hypothesis that the impacts 
of changes in China's business environment and the new power relationships between 
venture partners has affected joint venture ownership structure, but have also uncovered 
many instances of unofficial joint venture ownership transfer, thus challenging 
international joint venture ownership/control theory. It is also significant that many 
unofficial ownership transfers happened before the arrival of the dramatic changes in 
China's business environment in 1995. This implies that joint venture internal difficulties 
were a major determinant for changes in joint venture ownership structure. 
7.4.3 Changes in Operational Management 
Together with the changes in joint venture partners' strategies and in ownership structure, 
the findings of this study further indicate changes in joint venture operational 
management. 
217 
Discussion of Survey and Interview Results Chapter 7 
(1) Localisation of Management 'feam 
The findings of this study confirm a trend towards the localisation of joint venture 
management teams. Among the 103 joint venture surveyed, only 35 ventures (34%) were 
run by expatriate general managers representing overseas partners. In contrast, 68 
ventures (66%) were run by Chinese general managers, representing either Chinese or 
overseas partners. It was significant that of the 68 Chinese general managers, 11 had 
simply replaced expatriate managers, even where overseas partners had obtained majority 
ownership shares. Nevertheless, there were also four cases in which expatriate general 
managers were brought back to replace Chinese general managers, where overseas 
partners obtained majority ownership shares or wholly owned the ventures. 
This study indicates that as part of the strategy of localisation of management teams, the 
number of expatriate staff had greatly reduced when compared with the early stages of 
these joint ventures. Out of 103 joint ventures surveyed, 34 ventures (32.9%) had their 
expatriate staff reduced. However, 13 ventures (12.6%) had increased the number oftheir 
expatriate staff, as a strategic move aimed at enforcing complete control over these 
ventures after the overseas partners had obtained majority ownership shares. 
Nevertheless, it is significant that a further 30 ventures (29.1 %) had employed no 
expatriate staff, even from the very beginning. 
All seven expatriate managers interviewed admitted that the localisation of management 
teams was partly due to the pressure from their Chinese partners, and partly due to the 
fact that hiring expatriate managers cost too much. Another change in this regard was that 
most Chinese general managers representing overseas partners were from third parties 
rather than from the Chinese partner's parent company. This further underlined the 
ongoing tension of the relationships between some Chinese and overseas partners. 
(2) Establishing a Joint Venture's Own Sales Force 
It was established in Chapter Two that at the entry stage, most overseas partners expected 
to rely entirely on their Chinese partner's parent company's existing sales force and 
distribution network in order to gain easy access to China's domestic market (Beamish 
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1989; Pearson 1989; Daniels 1986; Aiello 1991; Newman 1992; Glaister and Wang 1993; 
Li and Xu 1995). That was why most joint ventures did not establish their own sales 
forces to start with. The findings showed that, of the 1 03 ventures surveyed, in 99 cases 
(96.1 %) the venture had no sales force in its early stage. This was in line with the joint 
venture entry strategy identified by the previous studies 
However, this study shows that 91 (88.3%) of the 103 joint ventures surveyed had their 
own domestic sales forces at present. Only 12 joint ventures (11.6%) did not have their 
own sales forces because 100 per cent of their products were for export. However, this 
change in the organisational structure implied a major shift in joint venture strategies. 
Seven of the expatriate managers claimed that this change was due to the failure to use 
the sales forces of their Chinese partners' parent companies. But at the same time, 
another 16 Chinese managers interviewed admitted that the Chinese partners' market 
priority had shifted from the overseas market to the domestic market, which further 
reflected different strategies between the venture partners. 
(3) Changes in Management Staff and Worker Recruitment 
Another important change was found in management staff and worker recruitment in 
joint ventures. At the time of this survey, 87 (84.5%) out of 103 ventures had their 
management staff recruited entirely or partly from local job centres rather than from their 
Chinese partner's parent company. 
It was established in Chapter Three that there were continuous arguments between joint 
venture partners about the quality of the workforce, which emanated from the Chinese 
partner's parent company. In contrast with the existing literature, the findings of this 
study indicate that an increasing number of overseas partners, in particular those who had 
obtained controlling ownership shares, had rapidly switched from taking over the 
employees of the Chinese partner's parent company to recruiting employees from the 
local job centres. 
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The seven expatriate managers interviewed all clearly confirmed that the successful shift 
of management staff and worker recruitment from their Chinese partners' parent 
companies to local job centres had solved the perceived problem of overstaffing and also 
reduced some operational difficulties, such as difficulties in communication and 
uncooperative attitudes. Most importantly, as the seven expatriate managers all stressed, 
loyalty to the employers was greatly improved in comparison with that of office 
staff/workers from the Chinese partners' parent companies. This implied that with the 
shift of personnel recruitment, cross-cultural management in joint ventures would be 
simpler. 
(4) Adaptation to the Chinese Business Culture 
Development of a local management team was the leading factor for the success in the 
Chinese market place. Most Chinese employees have worked for government 
departments or state-owned enterprises all their lives. Their motivation and work ethic 
might well be very different from that of employees from Hong Kong or Taiwan 
(Lindsay and Dempsey 1985). The hiring of local Chinese management staff and workers 
by overseas investors had been problematic, because employment of local Chinese 
personnel by overseas investors had almost always included provision of housing and 
medical benefits, whereas in most cases wholly foreign-owned enterprises and overseas-
partners controlled joint ventures did not offer such provision (Cohen 1982; Horsley 
1984; Moore and Scogin 1986; Shenkar 1990). Hence, for joint ventures as well as 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises, it was often difficult to attract promising staff and 
workers because the state-owned enterprises provided Chinese employees with a full 
range of benefits: welfare, medical insurance, housing, kindergarten, recreation and 
sports. If they worked for a foreign enterprise or a joint venture, they would receive none 
of these, unless they were sent to work in a joint venture as the employees of the Chinese 
partner rather than of the joint venture. 
In the early stages, most employees in Dalian-based joint ventures were redeployed from 
the Chinese partner's parent company to reduce the overall cost of providing these 
benefits in the joint venture. Hence, although these Chinese employees were physically 
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working within a joint venture, their benefits, including housing, pension schemes, and 
medical insurance, still came from their previous employer - the state-owned enterprise. 
For Chinese employees, it was a privilege to work in a joint venture because they could 
earn more while at the same time continuing to enjoy the whole range of benefits 
supplied by their parent companies. However, this demanded loyalty to the Chinese 
partner, not the overseas partner, as these Chinese staff and workers could be easily 
withdrawn from the joint venture by their parent companies at any time. As long as 
overseas investors did not provide a benefit package in terms of housing, medical 
insurance and so on, they were likely to encounter problems with regard to employee 
loyalty. 
This study indicates that, as the overseas partners' control over joint ventures increased, 
so the shift of employee recruitment away from the Chinese partners' parent companies 
and towards the local job centres also increased. Most wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
now started to provide housing (or a housing allowance), free lunches and medical 
insurance in an incentive package to attract talented management staff/workers in the 
hope of creating and retaining the loyalty of their Chinese employees. All seven of the 
expatriate managers interviewed claimed that hiring local employees proved to be far 
more effective for several reasons: it could reduce the costs associated with keeping 
expatriate managers, develop loyalty to the overseas investors and prove to be a 
dependable force in helping achieve corporate strategic objectives, thereby ensuring long-
term growth in the Chinese market. 
In summary, the findings of this study support the hypotheses that the relaxation of state 
control over foreign direct investment and the new power relationships between joint 
venture partners drove significant changes in venture partners' strategies, ownership 
structure and operational management. All these changes were to have a strong impact 
on joint venture evolution. 
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7.5 Evolution of Joint Ventures 
7.5.1 Patterns of Evolution 
The first four sections of this chapter have demonstrated that changes in China's business 
environment had a significant impact on joint venture projects and led to changes at joint 
venture level too. Johnson and Scholes (1993) argued that changes in strategies always 
transform an organisation, thus it is logical to assume that with the impact of the changes 
in the external environment and in joint venture partners' strategies, ownership structure 
and operational management, these joint ventures would have been transformed in 
different patterns. 
In the current literature (Kogut 1988; Kogut 1989; Parke 1993; Ring and Van de Ven 
1994; Gulati 1995; Gray and Yan 1997; Yan and Luo 2001) the major focuses of joint 
venture evolution are on instability as a cause of termination and also on changes in 
ownership structure as well as reorganisation and contractual renegotiation. 
Consequently, previous studies went into great depth in identifying factors contributing to 
joint venture instability, but none has so far attempted to identify patterns of evolution of 
China-based joint ventures. Given ongoing economic transition in China, it is logical to 
consider that the impact of economic transition on the pattern of evolution for China-
based joint ventures. Based on the findings of this study, a four-way pattern of evolution 
of joint ventures can be established, as shown in Figure 7.5-1. 
(1) Wholly Owned Enterprises 
This study has identified a trend for joint venture partners to make strategic efforts to buy 
out their venture partners in order to exercise complete control. In the process of buying 
out partners, overseas partners were in a better bargaining position, while the Chinese 
partners were put in a defensive position and could only react passively to the overseas 
partners' initiatives. 
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Figure 7.5-1 Evolution Patterns of Dalian-based Joint Ventures 
Strategic 
partnerships 
Wholly Owned 
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Dalian-Based Joint 
Ventures 
Dissolution 
or 
Termination 
'Shell' Joint 
Ventures 
Chapter 7 
For overseas partners, it was simpler to buy out their Chinese partners than to work with 
them. Overseas partners have learned to shift their local dependency from Chinese 
partners to staff recruited by themselves. For Chinese partners, lengthy unprofitable joint 
operations were not satisfactory. Now it seemed that they could easily put an end to the 
uncertainty by pulling out of the ventures, as the only barrier - the need for local 
authority approval, had been removed. Hence, in the future, there would be a dramatic 
increase of wholly foreign-owned enterprises converted from joint ventures. There might 
also be cases where Chinese partners had to take over some joint ventures, when the 
overseas partners withdrew from them. 
(2) Converting Joint Ventures into Strategic Partnerships 
During the personal interviews, four Chinese managers admitted that they had made deals 
with their overseas partners to convert the joint venture partnership into a strategic 
business partnership. In these deals, the joint ventures were jointed in name only. One 
partner withdrew its interest from the joint operation with a dramatic reduction of its 
ownership share and left the other party to run the venture alone. In exchange, the 
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withdrawn partner would act as a strategic partner - a sole sales dealer, sole raw 
materials/components supplier, or product designer. 
(3) Converting Joint Ventures into 'Shell' Joint Ventures 
There are several types of 'shell' joint ventures. The characteristics of such ventures vary 
from time to time, depending on the changes in the external environment. They have 
mainly been expedient arrangements for seeking governmental incentives available to 
joint ventures, gaining access to restricted industrial sectors, or achieving internal 
ownership transfers between partners when such transfers are restricted by the 
government. Table 7.5-1 presents three types of 'shell' joint ventures: 
Table 7.5-1 Types of 'Shell' Joint Ventures 
Objectives for Forming Chinese Partner Overseas Partner 
'Shell' Joint Ventures 
I Seeking government incentives, such as tax Real commitment with Token commitment in 
holidays, cheaper land/factory buildings and complete control name only. 
import/export licences. 
2 Seeking market entry into sectors restricted to Token commitment, in Real commitment with 
joint ventures only. name only. complete control 
3 Seeking illegal ownership share transfer from Token majority stakeholder Actual majority 
Chinese to overseas partner when the Chinese stakeholder 
government restricted such transfers before 
1996. 
• 'Shell' Joint Ventures' for Extracting Government Incentives 
Three Chinese managers from the private sector admitted in interviews that they had set 
up joint ventures mainly in order to gain government incentives, such as tax holidays, 
relatively cheap land/factory buildings and import/export licences. Six of the government 
officials interviewed confirmed the above Chinese managers' comments and explained 
further that this kind of 'shell' joint venture mainly involved private Chinese partners and 
overseas partners from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and Japan. In most cases, overseas 
partners were token investors, without any physical commitment. They only invested 
their names in exchange for individual benefits in terms of product dealership, a certain 
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percentage of the joint venture's annual profit or a position of sole supplier to purchase 
raw materials/components from abroad for the joint venture. 
• 'Shell' Joint Ventures for Obtaining Market Entry 
Under the government foreign direct investment policy, a number of sectors could only 
be entered by a joint venture. As a result, overseas investors in theory have to find a 
Chinese partner to comply with this government regulation on market entry. However, 
three Chinese managers who represent overseas partners told in the interviews that in 
many cases, overseas investors in Dalian did not necessarily need a Chinese partner. 
Some of them had managed to find a token Chinese partner, who had no physical 
commitment. One of the managers hinted that his company had official assistance in 
searching for such a token Chinese partner. After market entry was achieved, the 
overseas venture partners always made unofficial deals to buy out the Chinese partners, 
and run these 'joint ventures' themselves. 
• 'Shell' Joint Ventures for Undertaking Internal Ownership Transfer 
During the fieldwork, several cases were found in which ownership shares were 
transferred from Chinese to overseas partners even before the government officially lifted 
the restriction in 1996. Two Chinese managers interviewed said that they were majority 
stakeholders when their ventures were set up in 1990, but their joint operations were not 
profitable for about four years. But at that time, they were not allowed to pull out from 
the unprofitable ventures, so they quietly transferred majority ownership shares to their 
overseas partners without attracting the attention of the local authority, and remained the 
majority stakeholder only in name. This implied that in China, a majority ownership 
stake does not necessarily mean complete control, since ownership distribution could be 
manipulated unofficially and illegally. 
(4) Dissolution or Termination of Joint Ventures 
Previous studies (Kogut 1988; Yan and Luo 2001) have listed five major reasons for exit 
from an international joint venture: inter-partner strategic differences, changes in 
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partners' strategies, inability to meet partner expectations, unrealised partner 
commitment, and mission fulfilled. 
During the interviews with local government officials, whenever the topic of dissolution 
or termination of joint ventures was raised, they showed clear concern about any negative 
image that Dahan's foreign direct investment might acquire. Using the Chinese words 
'the joint venture disappeared' (hezi qiye huang le), rather than 'the joint venture closed 
down' (hezi qiye guan le), they argued that there were cases where joint venture contracts 
were tern1inated, but those ventures were not closed down, because even if overseas 
partners left the ventures for good, the joint ventures were still there, run by the Chinese 
partners, or were taken over by other state-owned enterprises. Only one senior official 
disclosed that about 2000 joint ventures in the region had been terminated since 1984. 
Another 11 Chinese and three expatriate managers confirmed the above official 
explanation that many unsuccessful Dalian-based joint ventures were not really closed 
down after the joint venture project failed, as the local authorities always managed to 
keep those joint ventures running. In contrast, the other 19 Chinese and 4 expatriate 
managers interviewed admitted that a large number of joint ventures in Dalian area had 
closed down. 
Regarding the reasons for exit, both local government officials and Chinese managers 
interviewed claimed that strategic differences between joint venture partners were the 
major one. They further suggested that although the Asian financial crisis caused many 
terminations, the dominating strategies and illegal operations of overseas partners, such 
as 'transfer pricing', were the major reasons that led directly to many ventures' long-term 
unprofitable operations and eventual termination. 
On the other hand, seven overseas managers claimed that most termination cases in the 
region were due to the dominating attitudes of the Chinese partners, and their failure of 
delivering local knowledge to the ventures. Although this was not the direct experience of 
these overseas partners themselves (no managers of failed joint ventures could be found 
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for interview) it shed some light on the situation where internal competition between 
partners was the main reason for joint venture failure. 
In addition, one senior staff member from the Dalian Association for Foreign-funded 
Enterprises claimed that venture partners' accumulation of knowledge about the local 
market could be another reason for a joint venture's termination. With enhanced practical 
experience of the marketplace, joint venture partners in general, and overseas partners in 
particular, have learned a good deal about the way of doing business in China. Hence, 
their need for a local partner has gradually reduced. As a result, one of the partners might 
pull out or be forced to pull out. This implied that the venture partners' learning curve 
was another determining factor for the termination of Dalian-based joint ventures. 
7.5.2 Operational Performance of Converted Ventures 
Empirical evidence provided by previous studies (Teargarden and Von Glinow 1991; 
Beamish 1993; Yan and Gray 1994; Osland and Cavusgil 1996; Hamill and Pambos 
1997) suggested that international joint ventures in general performed poorly and 
estimated failure rates ranged from 30 to 60 per cent. One can expect the failure rate of 
joint ventures in China to be even higher, given the complex economic, political, market, 
legal and cultural difficulties involved in doing business in China. 
The findings of this study indicate that operational performance of joint ventures was 
poor which supports previous studies. Indeed, among the 103 joint ventures surveyed, 
only 38 ventures were profitable (37%), of which 37 were manufacturing ventures and 
one was in the property business. The age of these profitable ventures ranged from one to 
four years (16 ventures) and five tolO years (22 ventures). It was hard to determine 
whether ventures controlled by Chinese or overseas partners had a better operational 
performance, as 16 ventures were controlled by Chinese partners (holding more than a 
50% stake) and 16 ventures by overseas partners (holding more than a 50% stake). The 
remaining six ventures were held in 50/50 equity ownership. However, an analysis of 
changes in ownership structure of the 38 profitable ventures gives a clear conclusion. Of 
the 38 profitable ventures, 12 ventures changed their ownership structure. Apart from 
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three cases in which the Chinese partner obtained at least a 50 per cent stake, overseas 
partners in another nine ventures managed to transfer ownership share from their Chinese 
counterparts. It was significant that seven of the nine ventures were foreign wholly 
owned. Overall, this indicated that in the profitable sample group, ventures controlled by 
overseas partners performed better. 
One the other hand, there were 59 unprofitable ventures in the survey sample. Of these, 
22 (37.2%) had Chinese partners holding more than 50 per cent stakes, 31 (52.4%) had 
majority holdings by overseas partners. The remaining had 50/50 equity ownership. On 
the surface, it looks like that more foreign controlled ventures were poor performers. 
However, of the 31 unprofitable ventures in which the overseas partner hold a majority 
stake (52.4%), 17 (28.7%) had ownership shares transferred from the Chinese to them 
between March and August 1998, just a few months before the survey. In fact, 6 Chinese 
managers interviewed admitted that in most cases, after overseas partners gained a 
majority stake, they would score a better performance. Another two Chinese managers 
believed that Chinese partners delivered a better performance after obtaining total control 
over the ventures. This implied that total control of a venture would deliver a better 
operational performance. 
Overall, performance of joint ventures was not satisfactory, as only 38 ventures (37%) 
reported to be profitable, 6 (5.8%) broke even, and 59 (57%) unprofitable. Of seven 
ventures, converted to wholly foreign-owned ventures in 1996, they became profitable in 
less than two years. The other eight ventures had been converted less than a year and 
were still unprofitable at the time of the survey. However, their managers were very 
confident that they would soon do better. 
Among the 38 profitable joint ventures, seven ventures were already converted into 
wholly foreign-owned ones and four were actually 'shell' joint ventures, which should 
not be counted as profitable 'joint ventures'. There may be more 'shell' joint ventures in 
these 38 profitable ventures, but hard evidence is difficult to find. The implication is that 
the actual financial performance of joint ventures was even worse than the survey data 
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showed and those converted joint ventures (including 'shell' joint ventures), where 
control is wholly in the hands of one partner do deliver a better performance. 
7.5.3 Future Perspectives 
Now that in China, overseas joint venture partners are able to increase control and 
convert into wholly foreign-owned enterprises, the long-term uncertainty and operational 
difficulties in joint ventures tend to decline. Having a strong foothold in the Chinese 
market, overseas investors are making full use of their advantages and are actively taking 
strategic steps to improve operational performance. Overseas investors now see a true 
opportunity to evolve the joint ventures towards stable and profit-oriented foreign 
enterprises in China. 
In contrast, most Chinese joint venture partners are in a weaker position. They have few 
strategic options but to gradually give up their ownership stakes to their overseas 
partners. However, although under pressure from the local government, they will not 
give up easily. Most Chinese managers interviewed claimed that because of the bitter 
experience with overseas partners, many Chinese state-owned enterprises have lost 
interest in forming a joint venture. Five Chinese partners revealed that with quality 
products, advanced technology and extra production capacity, they hope to become 
international market players. The ideal model, they believe, is to set up a wholly owned 
or a joint venture abroad to assemble products using components supplied by their China-
based parent companies. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed changes in China's business environment and the impacts of 
the relaxation of control over foreign direct investment. Next, changes at the joint venture 
level in terms of partners' strategies, ownership structure and operational management 
were discussed. 
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Evidence suggests that, with the relaxation of state control over foreign direct investment, 
there have been dramatic changes in the nature of joint ventures' internal difficulties, 
venture partners' initial power relationships and their interdependency. This has 
accelerated evolution of Dalian-based joint ventures. In the process, overseas partners 
have obtained a better position to aggressively pursue complete control over joint 
ventures. In contrast, Chinese partners are largely defensive and have to reformulate 
their joint venture strategies to accommodate the changes. Also in this process, an 
evolutionary pattern has emerged in Dalian-based joint ventures. 
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Chapter 8 Conclm~ion 
8.0 Introduction 
The mam motivation of this research is to examme transitional changes in China's 
business environment and their impacts on foreign direct investment in China. This study 
also reviews subsequent changes at the joint venture level, and then identifies an overall 
pattern of evolution of these joint ventures. 
This chapter concludes the research by providing a comprehensive summary of the 
research findings and a critique of the literature on the evolution of international joint 
ventures. It also points out the theoretical implications of this study by examining the 
similarities and differences between this research and the existing body of knowledge on 
China-based joint ventures. A clear understanding of the findings of this study may 
provide an indication that the traditional joint venture model is no longer suitable for both 
Chinese and overseas partners in the context of China's ongoing economic transition. As 
a result of both external and internal changes, joint venture partners are facing new 
challenges to manage a rapid evolution of their ventures. This chapter also suggests areas 
for further research. 
8.1 Main Findings of The Thesis 
Previous studies (Brown 1986; Davidson 1987; Campbell 1988; Pomfret 1989; Beamish 
and Wang 1989; Pan et al. 1993) indicated that in the past two decades, joint ventures 
involving an overseas investor and a Chinese partner became an extremely useful vehicle 
for penetrating the Chinese market, because a joint venture was seen as the most realistic 
and effective way to generate Chinese government interest and support, gain a possible 
presence, smooth the way into a strange market, establish the joint operation necessary 
for success, and provide a combined instrument to deal effectively with China's unique 
culture and general business practices. 
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Some recent studies (Vanhonacker 1997; Weir 1997; Walsh et al. 1999; Cui 1999; 
Bulcke et al. 1999; Weldon et al. 1999; Wong et al. 1999) argue that the joint venture 
model has lost its appeal in China because of major institutional changes' and its own 
internal difficulties. However, there is no indication so far in the literature as to the 
impacts of external and internal changes on the process and pattern of evolution of joint 
ventures. 
The primary findings of this study contribute to the literature by identifying a distinctive 
process and pattern of evolution found in Dalian-based joint ventures in the face of 
China's economic transition. A summary of the main research findings is as follows: 
(1) External Changes Accelerated Internal Changes in Joint Ventures 
By examining the relationship between external changes and joil)t venture internal 
difficulties, this study has revealed that in the process of China's economic transition, the 
state government and local authorities were under pressure to relax the control over 
foreign direct investment to boost the inflow of foreign investment and help create jobs. 
The relaxation included reducing the differences between a joint venture and a wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise, free ownership transfers between joint venture partners, and 
less government pressure on setting up joint ventures. The relaxation state has had 
impacts on the general business environment as well as working of joint ventures at the 
firm level. 
However, this study finds that apart from the impacts resulting from changes in the 
external environment, the changing nature of internal difficulties have also undermined 
the ventures' stability and are a critical factor in joint venture's evolution. Quiet 
unofficial ownership transfer from Chinese to overseas partners happened before 1996, 
which was not exactly allowed by the government. As a result, frustrated by unprofitable 
joint operations and constant disputes over the ventures' strategic and operational issues, 
1 In particular, relaxation of restrictions on certain sectors, and of domestic market restriction for wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises. 
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many Chinese state-owned partners quietly pulled out of joint ventures without the local 
authority's approval. 
(2) The New Power Relationships Resulted in Changes in Partners' Strategies, 
Ownership and Organisational Structures 
With further development of economic reforms and the impact of the Asian financial 
crisis, the Chinese government and local authorities were more concerned with what 
overseas investors could bring to China than how deals were actually structured. The 
Chinese government relaxed controls over foreign direct investment, lessened its 
insistence on joint venture being the preferred form of foreign direct investment, and 
encouraged wholly foreign-owned enterprises. The institutional changes had finally 
removed the technical differences between a joint venture and a wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise in terms of sector restriction, domestic market entry, and taxation. 
At the same time, having gained extensive business experience in China, overseas joint 
venture partners no longer see their Chinese counterparts as vital to the joint businesses. 
Worse still, negative contributions from each partner are often found to outweigh the 
positive ones. Overseas partners therefore shift their local dependency from the Chinese 
partner to Chinese staff recruited locally by themselves, while Chinese partners trying to 
set up their own marketing and sales operations abroad. Moreover, the lifting of the ban 
on ownership share transfer from the Chinese to overseas partners has allowed overseas 
partners to actively buy out their Chinese partners. 
As a result, power relationships have tipped in favour of the overseas partners, giving 
them a better position in initiating strategies to acquire a majority or even a complete 
ownership stake and operate the ventures independently. As the Chinese partners' 
position is weakened they have to seek compromise when transferring ownership shares 
to overseas partners. Their bargaining power is further undermined by the central 
government and local authorities who want to keep existing overseas investors and attract 
more foreign direct investment projects in the region. 
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The active involvement by private Chinese firms in joint venture projects has made the 
power relationships more complicated. The true motive for most private Chinese firms to 
enter into a joint venture with an overseas partner is to obtain import/export licences and 
government incentives such as taxation holidays, cheaper land and premises. As long as 
they can achieve such goals, they are able to compromise on other issues, such as the 
ownership structure and operational management. In many cases, private Chinese firms 
have formed a joint venture with an overseas partner only in name, leading to a 'shell' 
joint venture. This is possible because private Chinese firms are subject to much less 
control by the government. 
(3) Internal Changes Resulted in Joint Ventures' Evolution 
The new power relationships have resulted in a dramatic shift in venture partners' efforts 
from mutual adaptation to the development of independent strategies. With increased 
bargaining power and the shift of their local dependency from Chinese partners to 
Chinese staff recruited locally, overseas partners found it much easier to get rid of their 
Chinese partners rather than to adapt to their way of doing business. As a result, most 
overseas partners have made great efforts to obtain complete control over joint ventures 
by acquiring a majority or a total ownership stake from their Chinese partners. As the 
findings of this study show, this proves not to be a problem. With transferred products, 
technology and equipment, as well as modem management system, many state-owned 
Chinese partners are willing to pull out of unprofitable joint ventures and develop their 
own businesses. These pave the way for joint ventures to evolve. 
Some unofficial ownership transfers from Chinese partners to overseas partners quietly 
took place before 1996. This marked some early signs of joint ventures' evolution. 
Dramatic changes in China's business environment in the middle of the 1990s, 
particularly after 1996, plus subsequent changes in joint venture partners' strategies, 
ownership structure, and operational management accelerated the process of their 
evolution. 
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Evolution of joint ventures can be defined as a major change in relationship status, such 
as shifts in the ownership structure or the ventures' termination. With the identification of 
the pattern of evolution of Dalian-based joint ventures, this study indicates that in some 
Dalian cases shifts in the ownership structure may go beyond changes in ownership 
distributions. It is a trend that some joint ventures are converted into wholly owned 
enterprises, nevertheless, an additional form of joint venture exits. Other forms of joint 
venture's evolution include the emerging of an increasing number of 'shell' joint ventures 
and strategic partnerships between Chinese and overseas partners. 
(4) Better Performance of Converted Ventures 
The findings from the questionnaire survey and the in-depth interviews reveal that joint 
ventures generally performed poorly. Joint ventures are also unstable, which is reflected 
in the shifts in partners' strategies, reconfiguration of the joint venture's ownership 
structure, reduction in the degree of local dependence and conflicts about operational 
management. This implies that, in China, the joint venture model restricts the extent of 
partners' resource commitment. In contrast to the poor performance of joint ventures, 
this study finds that those converted ventures, in particular 'shell' joint ventures, perform 
better. The major reason for this is that one party's total control can greatly reduce 
operational and management difficulties. In addition, converted ventures have reinforced 
the controlling party's determination of resource commitment, which are evidenced in 
further injections of capital into the ventures and acceleration of technology transfer from 
parent companies. 
8.2 Implications of This Research 
The findings of this study have the following implications. They are relevant for the 
theoretical and investment in China, as well as in many other transition economies. 
(1) Dramatic Shifts in Partners' Commitment to Mutual Adaptation 
Previous studies on the development of China-based joint ventures are locked into mutual 
adaptations between joint venture partners and the means of making joint venture deals 
work. The current study shows that joint venture partners are starting to abandon 
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commitment to mutual adaptation for complete independent controls. With the relaxation 
of government control over joint ventures, venture partners find it is much easier to get 
rid of their counterparts rather than adapt to them. 
(2) In China, Ownership Shares No Longer a Good Indication of ControB 
According to previous studies on the control of international joint ventures, equity shares 
are the only significant predictor of strategic control over joint ventures, as the percentage 
of equity shares is directly linked to board memberships and appointment of key 
executives. Child and Yan (1999) further argued that equity share is the major lever for 
the exercise of control over strategic matters, such as use of profits, re-investment policy, 
setting strategic priorities and allocating top management appointments. This study 
demonstrates that the controlling power acquired by holding a majority stake no longer 
matters to joint ventures in the context of China's current business environment. Firstly, 
joint venture ownership shares can be quietly transferred from one partner to another, 
ignoring the existence of regulations against such transfers. In these joint ventures, 
ownership shares can be manipulated such that one of the partners is only a 'token' one. 
Hence, no matter how the 'ownership shares' are distributed, there is no real problem 
about who is in control and to what extent the control be exercised. 
(3) 'Shell' Joint Ventures- An Additional Exit Mechanism 
The Chinese government restricted ownership transfer from Chinese partners to overseas 
partners before 1996. This forced Chinese partners to maintain their majority stakes and 
control over joint ventures at that time. However, this policy had also triggered many 
quiet, unofficial ownership transfer deals between joint venture partners. Frustrated by 
difficulties with joint operations, many overseas partners would have liked to end their 
joint ventures, but the potential of the Chinese market is too huge for them to give up. 
Hence, some unofficial deals were made between joint venture partners. With more 
involvements in foreign direct investment activities by private Chinese firms, there has 
emerged more expedient joint venture activities. Instead of dissolution or termination, 
'shell' joint ventures have emerged as a unique exit mechanism for Dalian-based joint 
ventures. 
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Within a 'shell' joint venture, one of the partners has pulled out but it is still officially 
recorded as a joint venture because it was not officially terminated. These 'shell' 
ventures still enjoy government incentives granted to normal joint ventures. There is 
growing evidence that Dahan government officials have unofficially recognised these 
shell joint ventures as one of the accepted official exit mechanisms for run-down joint 
ventures. 
Before 1997, most 'shell' joint ventures did not have a Chinese partner. But after 1997, as 
the restrictions have been relaxed to allow overseas investors to be majority stake holders 
or to wholly own their ventures through official ownership transfer, the number of 
foreign-owned shell companies has declined. On the other hand, shell joint ventures 
owned by private Chinese firms are rapidly increasing in number, because many fresh 
private Chinese entrepreneurs tend to establish shell joint ventures as a first step in 
developing their businesses. 
(4) Joint Venture Model Has Lost Its Appeal 
The joint venture is only a temporary vehicle, which was useful for setting up operations 
in the Chinese market in the 1980s and the early 1990s. It will not last long in the 
transitional Chinese economy. With changes in China's business environment, in the 
power relationships between Chinese and overseas partners, and in the partners' 
interdependency, joint ventures will eventually evolve into wholly owned ventures, 
'shell' joint ventures, or strategic partnerships. 
In conclusion, most Dalian-based joint ventures are not purely commercial agreements 
between Chinese and overseas partners. Rather, they are a product of strategic 
compromise between partners designed for entry into a complex market as defined by 
China's specific political, economic, and social and technological situations. The joint 
venture model will lose it appeal when it evolves in response to the internal and external 
changes. The process of evolution of Dalian-based joint ventures should, therefore, be 
viewed as a means to bring an end to joint ventures. If the joint venture model is a 
marriage with 'same bed, different dreams', the wholly foreign-owned enterprise model, 
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with its flexibility and managerial control, fits in excellently with China's transitional 
business environment. Hence, there is new hope for existing China-based joint ventures 
to find more effective ways to operate and grow in a country with great potential, and this 
might be followed by relatively long-term stability in converted joint ventures. 
8.3 Limitations of This Study and Areas for Future Research 
The validity of conclusions drawn is contingent upon the recognition of several factors. 
These factors are related to both the survey sample and the methodology adopted. First, 
this research was essentially exploratory. The purpose of the research was to identify 
variables impacting on the changes in joint ventures and their evolution, and not to 
provide a complete management solution analysis. However, the richness of the 
information derived from this research provides a good foundation for follow-up 
fieldwork. Secondly, whilst it has been possible in the research to validate a number of 
determinants of joint venture patterns of evolution, it has not been possible to determine 
precisely the interrelationship between the variables by multivariate analysis. 
With respect to data limitation, a number of points can be raised. First, the survey sample 
was limited to Dahan, although it was certainly representative of China-based joint 
ventures in at least the North East of China. Secondly, the survey sample and 
interviewees were selected by the relevant government departments and the Dahan 
Association of Foreign-Funded Enterprises. The sample was therefore limited to joint 
ventures which were members of the Association and doing relatively well. Thirdly, the 
survey included joint ventures in both the manufacturing and service sectors, and in view 
of this, the statistical relevance of the findings had to be interpreted with caution. 
Fourthly, some published data on foreign direct investment from local government 
departments was included in this research. However, these official data may not be 
accurate enough because of the way in which the data was collected by the Dahan 
municipal government, i.e. negative information referring to foreign direct investment 
was usually not fully published. 
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In the coming years, m line with the central government's policy of continuing to 
encourage foreign direct investment, there is likely to be a great increase in wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises, together with more wholly owned ventures converted from 
existing joint ventures. Moreover, with one partner having complete control within a 
venture, there should be relatively long-term stability for most converted ventures and a 
great reduction in the failure rate of China-based foreign-invested enterprises. China's 
political climate, business environment, and business culture will continue to pose great 
challenges to overseas investors. Hence, this study offers the following areas for future 
research: 
(1) Further Adaptability to the Chinese Business Environment 
Since external and internal triggers often create a set of new environmental contingencies 
that affect a firm's performance and growth prospects, further adaptation to China's 
business environment, which can be prone to change, should be a constant focus for both 
Chinese and overseas investors, as well as for business researchers. 
(2) Human Resources Localisation 
Local recruitment of management staff has surfaced as a real priority in the operations of 
existing joint ventures and converted ventures. Hence, business studies on the human 
resources of China-based joint ventures should focus on Chinese staff, employed by 
overseas investors, and on how, as well as to what extent, these Chinese staff can 
therefore establish and maintain complex networks of communications and relationships 
in the marketplace. 
(3) Potential Competitors 
In addition to the challenges from other wholly foreign-owned enterprises as in the case 
of the 'cola war' between Coca Cola and Pepsi, the real future challenge for overseas 
investors in China would come from those former Chinese joint venture partners, who are 
equipped with transferred products, technologies and management skills. 
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( 4) Chinese Partners from the Private Sector 
The possibility of creating new, privately owned business entities has been given an 
unexpected and astonishing boost by the central govemment with its announcement that 
"all but 1000 of China's 300,000 state-owned enterprises would soon be made available 
for privatisation" (Jiang Zemin 1997)2 . Many of them would be actively engaged in joint 
venture projects. To deal with private Chinese partners would be a new challenge for 
overseas investors as well as a new topic for business researchers, since private Chinese 
partners might be completely different from those coming from state-owned sectors. 
(5) Potential Outward Investment by Chinese Enterprises 
At present, there are few studies in the literature on outward investment by either state-
owned or privately owned Chinese companies. Being frustrated with joint operations and 
the willingness of overseas partners to give up China-based joint ventures, several state-
owned Chinese partners interviewed claimed that they would expand their businesses into 
the intemational market by direct investment. Future business research should also pay 
special attention to the development of China's outward investment strategies. With a 
developed capability to produce quality products, as well as the advanced technology 
they have acquired, Chinese enterprises are emerging to tap overseas markets with 
ambitious strategies, e.g. to use China-made components for assembling and marketing 
their products abroad. 
This outward investment strategy is fully encouraged by the central govemment. 
According to the statistics from One NorthEast - the Regional Development Agency for 
the North-east of England - between May 2000 and the end of 2002, 42 mainland 
Chinese enterprises established their wholly owned subsidiaries in the region to market 
their products, or are carrying out marketing research with a view to establishing 
manufacturing factories. The motivation behind this action on the part of Chinese 
enterprises is the desire to have direct access to international markets previously 
controlled by their overseas joint venture partners. These Chinese companies are also 
2 Speech at the 151h Party Congress in Beijing 1997. Jiang Zernin was then the President of China. 
240 
Conclusions Chapter 8 
amung to create jobs domestically, as this will make fuller use of their production 
capacity to manufacture components for their assembly lines abroad. 
Furthermore, the evolving strategies of China-based joint ventures could also be a new 
focus of international business studies. Finally, but no less importantly, the emergence of 
'shell' joint ventures also invites future research and reconceptualisation. This could yield 
interesting and significant information, which may prove to be of profound importance to 
the theory of international joint ventures in transition economies. 
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Appendix I - Format of Questionnaire 
The following is a general format of the questions used in the questionnaire. 
Company profile Name and address of the company, position of the respondent, 
nationality, and involvement with the company. 
Section 1 -Formation of the joint venture 
Questions 1 - 10 Names of Chinese and overseas parent companies; Setting up 
date of the joint venture; sector; number of employees; changes 
in joint venture's ownership since establishment; joint venture 
terms. 
Section 2 - Strategies of the joint venture 
Questions 11 - 14 Joint venture's development strategies: motivations in setting 
up the joint venture, initial and present strategies of the Chinese 
and overseas partners. 
Section 3- Structures of the joint venture 
Questions 15- 18 Joint venture's organisational structure: changes in the position 
of general manager, nationality, terms, changes in joint 
venture's organisational structure over time, and the ratio of 
management staff to workers. 
Section 4- Operations of the joint venture 
Questions 19- 23 Joint venture's operation: decision-making; changes in the 
percentage of overseas and domestic sales; changes in the sales 
force; product quality; and the percentage of locally supplied 
raw materials. 
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Section 5 -Management of the joint venture 
Questions 24-41 Joint venture's management-related issues such as teamwork; 
relationships between management team and workers; cross-
cultural management issues. 
Section 6 - Industrial relationships 
Questions 42- 55 Joint venture's working relationships between management and 
workforce, teamwork, disagreement and cross-cultural 
management related issues. 
Section 7 -Policies of employees of the joint venture 
Questions 56-74 Joint venture's personnel policy: changes in staff and worker 
recruitment; employee training program; working position 
rotation; promotion; salary/wages; housing; company meals; 
employees' turnover rate and reasons. 
Section 8 - Driving forces for joint venture instability 
Questions 75-77 Major factors affecting joint venture's management and 
operation: changes in external and internal environments; major 
conflicts between Chinese and overseas partners as well as 
possible shift in joint venture partners' strategies. 
Section 9 - Future outlook 
Questions 78- 80 Future outlooks from both Chinese and overseas partners; 
perspective further increase in capital investment. 
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Appendix II Questionnaire (Chinese Version) 
5 .g. '6'£ 0 fi] R'>J '6'£ * ¥.J JJX; : 
a. 0fil ~j'[;f)];!tJI: 
lf!Jj}N{)h':l: ____ % 
:>'r 1J n5i:ffi" r1:i": % 
b. fJI!,Ilfrfi: 
lf!Jj}Nffi- ,~,: ____ % 
:>'r 1J fRill" r~l: ____ % 
6 -€; '6'£ 0 fi'j ~ ·~ I¥J nt ]t[ : 
]1[~-!f: 
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Appendix ][][[ - English Version of Questionnaire 
Date: _____ _ 
Questionnaire 
Joint Venture Company In PR China 
Name of the Company: _________ _ 
Address of the Company: ________ _ 
Job Title of the Respondent: _______ _ 
Length of Service in the Company: _____ _ 
Nationality of the Respondent: _______ _ 
(Please mark •..j ' in related blanket, or answer the 
questions according to the question's specific 
requirement) 
Section 1. Joint Venture's Formation 
I Name of the Chinese parent company: 
2 Name of the foreign parent company: 
3 Date of the joint venture first established: 
4 Total number of employees at present: 
5 Joint venture's capital formation: 
a. In the early stage: 
-Chinese party's total shares: ______ % 
- Foreign party's total shares: % 
b. At present: 
-Chinese party's total shares: ______ % 
-Foreign party's total shares: % 
6 The board of directors of the joint venture: 
-Chairman: 
The Chairman is from Chinese partner 
The Chairman is from Foreign partner 
- Directors: 
No. of directors from Chinese partner: ____ _ 
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No. of directors from Foreign partner: ____ _ 
7 Joint venture's business: 
a. In the early stage: 
) Full manufacturing 
) Assembly with supplied parts 
) Product parts processing 
) Products design 
) Others, (please specify) _____ _ 
b. At present: 
( ) Full manufacturing 
(' ) Assembly with supplied parts 
( ) Product parts processing 
( ) Products design 
( ) Others, (please specify), _____ _ 
8 Joint venture's products: 
9 Joint venture's contract term 
( ) 1-10 years )I 1-20 years 
( ) 21-30 years ( ) over 30 years 
I 0 Is the joint venture put into operation? 
( ) yes, the date of operation was: ___ _ 
( ) no, not yet 
- According to the last year's financial report, is 
there any profit? 
( ) yes 
( ) just keep the balance 
( ) deficit 
Section 2. Joint Venture's Strategies 
II Joint venture's main strategic objectives 
- Chinese partner's main objectives 
( ) Import foreign capital 
( ) Advanced new products 
( ) Import advanced foreign technology and 
management skills 
Creation of more employment opportunities 
Others: ___,.,......,.----,----:----,---,-------,--,----,-,---
- How well these objectives being achieved? 
( ) very well 
( ) partially 
( ) poorly 
-Foreign partner's main objectives 
Fast entry to the huge Chinese market 
Attractive tax regime/financial incentives 
offered by Chinese government 
Production transferred to lowest cost 
location 
Create an export base for foreign market 
To reduce international competition 
Others:--,------------,-----------
- How well these objectives being achieved? 
( ) very well 
( ) partially 
( ) poorly 
12 Joint venture's present strategic objectives 
( ) Develop highly localised management 
capability 
( Localisation of majority of product parts 
( Target to dominant share of China's 
domestic 
market within industry sector 
To be viewed as truly local player by 
consumers 
Build broader multi-regional or national 
(presence (through sales or facilities) 
( To be significant earnings engine for 
parent company 
Others: _______________ _ 
- How well these objectives being achieved? 
( ) very well 
( ) partially 
( ) poorly 
13 Expected advantages from foreign partner 
( ) Trust between top management 
( ) Good international image and strong 
financial strength 
Famous international recognised product 
or advanced technology 
Export potential for joint venture's product 
Others: ______________ _ 
- How well these advantages being achieved? 
( ) very well 
( ) partially 
( ) poorly 
14 Expected advantages from Chinese partner 
( ) Local market knowledge 
( ) Good relationships with host government 
( ) Related products 
( ) Existing distribution channels 
( ) Availability of raw materials 
( ) Experience in technology applications 
( ) Existing factory buildings/land 
( ) International co-operation experience 
Others: _______________ _ 
- How well these advantages being achieved? 
( ) very well 
( ) partially 
( ) poorly 
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Section 3. Joint Venture's Structure 
15 Joint venture's general manager: 
a. In the early stage: 
) General manager is from Chinese party 
Term: years 
General manager is from foreign party 
Term: ____ years 
General manager is from a third party 
Term: ____ years 
b. At present: 
( ) General manager is from Chinese party 
Term: ____ years 
General manager is from foreign party 
Term: years 
General manager is from a third party 
Tenn: ____ years 
16 Joint venture's organisation 
a. At the early stage: 
( ) Human resources department 
( ) Production department 
( ) Accounting department 
( ) Engineering department 
( ) Marketing department 
( ) Quality assurance department 
Others: _____________ _ 
b. At present: 
( ) Human resources department 
( ) Production department 
( ) Accounting department 
( ) Engineering department 
( ) Marketing department 
( ) Quality assurance department 
Others: _____________ _ 
17 Is there a large proportion of supervisory 
personneal? 
) yes, % 
) no, % 
18 Hierarchy structure of the company is clear and 
respected 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
Section 4. Joint Venture's Operation 
19 Which party is more powerful in decision-
Making 
a. Joint venture's long-term plan (5-1 0 years) 
) Joint venture's general manager 
) Chinese parent company 
) Foreign parent company 
) Board of directors 
Others: _______________ _ 
b. Joint venture's annual budget: 
( ) Joint venture's general manager 
( ) Chinese parent company 
( ) Foreign parent company 
( ) Board of directors 
Others: _______________ _ 
c. To decide output and profit objectives 
( ) Joint venture's general manager 
( ) Chinese parent company 
( ) Foreign parent company 
( ) Board of directors 
Others: ______________ _ 
d. To decide production plan 
( ) Joint venture's general manager 
( ) Chinese parent company 
( ) Foreign parent company 
( ) Board of directors 
Others: 
-------------------------
e. To decide product's sales price 
) Joint venture's general manager 
) Chinese parent company 
) Foreign parent company 
) Board of directors 
Others: _______________ _ 
f. To increase/dismiss management staff and 
shop-floor workers 
( ) Joint venture's general manager 
( ) Chinese parent company 
( ) Foreign parent company 
( ) Board of directors 
Others: 
-----------------------
20 Sales of joint venture's products 
a. In the early stage: 
Proportion of export: % 
Proportion of domestic sales: % 
( ) Domestic sales mainly rely on Chinese 
parent company's existing sales channels 
Domestic sales mainly rely on joint 
venture's own sales force 
b. At present : 
Proportion of export: % 
Proportion of domestic sales: % 
( ) Domestic sales mainly rely on Chinese 
parent company's existing sales channels 
Domestic sales mainly rely on joint 
venture's own sales force 
21 Joint venture's product quality (based on 
the customers' feedback reports). 
a. In the early stage: 
( ) very good 
( ) good 
( ) OK 
( ) not good 
( ) very poor 
b. At present 
( ) very good 
( ) good 
( ) OK 
( ) notgood 
( ) very poor 
22 Localisation of raw materials/product parts 
In the early stage of production: % 
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At present: _____ % 
23 Localisation of the management team 
In the early stage: 
No. of expatriate management staff ____ _ 
No. of expatriate engineers/technicians: 
At present: ----
No. of expat1iate management staff 
No. of expatriate engineers/technici--a-ns_: ___ _ 
Section 5. Joint Venture's Management 
24 Managers are entitled to have privileges. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
25 Managers have involved in details. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
26 Clear work requirements and instructions 
a. Managers prefer clear work requirements and 
instructions: 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
b. Workers prefer clear work requirements and 
instructions: 
yes 
no 
27 Managers make less individual and risky 
decisions. 
( yes 
( no 
28 Managers always fear of failure. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
29 Group decisions are considered better than 
individual decisions. 
yes 
no 
30 Managers thought conflict and competition 
can unleash aggression and should therefore 
be avoided. 
yes 
no 
31 Managers thought that deviant employees and 
ideas are dangerous and intolerance. 
) yes 
) no 
32lnitiative of subordinates should be kept under 
control. 
yes 
no 
33 Lower readiness to compromise with 
opponents. 
yes 
no 
34 More emotional resistance to the changes. 
( yes 
( ) no 
35 Younger staff are suspect. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
36 Need for written rules and regulations. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
3 7 The company provides uniform to 
employees. 
) yes 
) no 
38 More power be used to control of uncertainty. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
39 Managers aspire to conformity and 
orderliness. 
yes 
) no 
40 Policies and practices vary according to 
relations. 
yes 
) no 
41 Company interests are a legitimate reason for 
interfering with people's private lives. 
) yes 
) no 
Section 6. Industrial Relationships 
42 Superiors consider subordinates as being of a 
different kind. 
yes 
) no 
43 Subordinates consider superiors as being of a 
different kind. 
yes 
) no 
44 Managers should try to look as powerful as 
possible. 
) yes 
) no 
45 Co-operation among employees is difficult to 
bring about because oflow faith with each other. 
) yes 
) no 
44 Co-operation/team work 
a. In the early stage: 
- Among managers/departments 
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) very good 
) acceptable 
) poor 
b. At present: 
- Among managers/departments 
( ) very good 
( ) acceptable 
( ) poor 
-Among shop-floor workers 
a. In the early stage: 
( ) very good 
( ) acceptable 
( ) poor 
b. At present: 
( ) very good 
( ) acceptable 
( ) poor 
4 7 To express disagreement with direct superior 
a. In the early stage: 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
b. At present: 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
48 Employees reluctant to trust each other. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
49 Tendency to switch to a better company. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
50 Employees have emotional dependence on 
the company. 
) yes 
) no 
51 Employees expect the company to look after 
them like a family - and Can become very 
alienated if the company dissatisfies them. 
) yes 
) no 
52 The Company has great influence on 
employees' well-being. 
) yes 
) no 
53 Employees expect the company to defend 
their interests. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
54 Some jobs are considered typically male, 
others female. 
yes 
) no 
55 Fewer women in management jobs 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
Section 7. Joint Venture's Employees' Policies 
56 Employee recruitment 
-Management staff 
a. In the early stage: 
( ) from Chinese parent company 
( ) from public employment fair 
( ) from other sources 
b. At present: 
( ) from Chinese parent company 
( ) from public employment fair 
( ) from other sources 
- Factory workers 
a. In the early stage: 
( ) from Chinese parent company ___ % 
( ) from public employment fair % 
( ) from other sources % 
b. At present: 
( ) from Chinese parent company ___ % 
( ) from public employment fair % 
( ) from other sources % 
57 Recruitment stress on identity and roots. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
58 A Manager must be an expert in the field he 
manages. 
) yes 
) no 
59 Job descriptions 
- There are well-defined job descriptions for 
managers 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
-There are well-defined job descriptions for 
workers? 
yes 
no 
60 Employees' training and development since 
joint venture's full operation 
- Train-ing methods for management staff: 
( ) on the job training by experts from 
foreign parent company 
to send good Chinese managers to foreign 
countries for training 
to send good managers to other joint 
ventures, which partly owned by the 
foreign partner 
by trainers from local universities or 
related institutes 
the company arranges foreign language 
training for manager 
- Training methods for factory workers: 
( ) on the job training by experts from 
foreign parent company 
to send good workers to foreign 
countries for training 
to send good workers to other joint 
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ventures for training which partly owned 
by the foreign partner 
by trainers from local universities or 
related institutes 
the company arranges foreign language 
training for workers 
61 Factory workers' job rotation opportunities 
since joint venture's full operations 
) Increased 
) constant 
) decreased 
62 Employees attached more importance to 
the training and use of skills in job. 
) yes 
) no 
63 Managers Choose duty, expertness, and 
prestige as life goals. 
) yes 
) no 
64 Employees rate having security in their 
jobs more important. 
) yes 
) no 
65 Promotion opportunities since JV's full 
operation 
- Management staff's promotion 
( ) Increased 
( ) constant 
( ) decreased 
- Factory workers' promotion 
( ) Increased 
( ) constant 
( ) decreased 
66 Promotion mainly from inside and on seniority. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
67 Higher average age in management jobs. 
( ) yes 
( ) no 
68 Achievement defined in terms of promotion and 
wealth 
yes 
no 
69 Benefit 
-Salary/wages compare with joint ventures' 
average level in the local area. 
a. In the early stage: 
( ) higher 
( ) same as the average level 
( ) lower 
b. At present: 
( ) higher 
( ) same as the average level 
( ) lower 
70 Employees prefer more salary to shorter 
working hours. 
) yes 
) no 
71 Employees prefer more salary and don't mind 
longer working hours. 
) yes 
) no 
72 Employees' Housing Arrangement 
a. In the early stage: 
) Joint venture provide housing 
) Joint venture does not provide housing, 
but provide housing subsidy 
Joint venture does not provide neither 
housing nor housing subsidy 
b. At present: 
( ) Joint venture provide housing 
( ) Joint venture does not provide housing, 
but provide housing subsidy 
Joint venture does not provide neither 
housing nor housing subsidy 
73 Company's Meals Arrangement 
a. In the early stage: 
) Joint venture provide meals 
) Joint venture does not provide meals, but 
provide meal subsidy 
Joint venture does not provide neither 
meals nor meal subsidy 
b. At present: 
( ) Joint venture provide meals 
( ) Joint venture does not provide meals, but 
provide meal subsidy 
Joint venture does not provide neither 
meals nor meal subsidy 
74 Employees' turnover rate 
a. In the early stage : 
) very high 
) acceptable 
) very low 
The main reasons for employees' quit are: 
( ) attracted by the higher pay by other 
companies 
joint venture does not provide housing 
Joint venture does not provide meals 
joint venture's low salary 
no promotion opportunities 
expatriate manager's leaving 
Other: _______________ _ 
b. At present: 
( ) very high 
( ) acceptable 
( ) very low 
1l1e main reasons for employees' quit are: 
( ) attracted by the higher pay by other 
companies 
joint venture does not provide housing 
Joint venture does not provide meals 
joint venture's low salary 
no promotion opportunities 
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expatriate manager's leaving 
Other: _______________ _ 
Section 8. Factors Effect Joint Venture's 
Operations 
75 External factors 
a. In the early stage: 
) China's unstable economic situation 
) absence of detailed foreign investment 
laws 
insufficient infrastructures 
local government's insufficient working 
process 
operation is frequently interfered by 
the Chinese parent company 
difficulty in repatriation of income or 
profit 
difficulty in getting raw materials in 
China 
Chinese government's restriction of 
domestic market 
Others: ________________ _ 
b. At present: 
( ) 
( ) 
China's unstable economic situation 
absence of detailed foreign investment 
laws 
insufficient infrastructures 
local government's insufficient working 
process 
operation is frequently interfered by 
the Chinese parent company 
difficulty in repatriation of income or 
profit 
difficulty in getting raw materials in 
China 
Chinese government's restriction of 
domestic market 
-Please list some of government's FDI policies 
changed in 1990s, which bring about the most 
favourite effect on joint venture's operation: 
-Please list some of government's FDI policies 
changed in 1990s, which bring about the most 
negative effect on joint venture's operations: 
76 Internal factors 
a. In the early stage: 
) difficulty caused by culture differences 
) different management styles 
) difficulty for expatriate managers to 
communicate with local staff 
difficulty in recruiting good local 
management and technical staff 
difficulty in controlling product quality 
difficulty in utilising Chinese parent 
company's existing sales channels 
poor co-coperation between Chinese 
and expatriate management staff 
Chinese employees' low education level 
Chinese workers' poor work efficiency 
high tum over rate of Chinese staff and 
factory workers 
over expenditure for keeping a good 
relationships with local government 
departments, suppliers, and customers 
Other: _____________ _ 
b. At present: 
( ) difficulty caused by culture differences 
( ) different management styles 
( ) difficulty for expatriate managers to 
communicate with local staff 
difficulty in recruiting good local 
management and technical staff 
difficulty in controlling product quality 
difficulty in utilising Chinese parent 
company's existing sales channels 
poor co-coperation between Chinese 
and expatriate management staff 
Chinese employees' low education level 
Chinese workers' poor work efficiency 
high tum over rate of Chinese staff and 
factory workers 
over expenditure for keeping a good 
relationships with local government 
departments, suppliers, and customers 
Other: ______________ _ 
77 1l1e major differences between Chinese and 
foreign parties 
a. In the early stage: 
) different views on expatriate general 
manager's term, income, benefits 
different views on the number of 
expatriate staff in the joint venture 
different views on the personnel 
arrangement of senior Chinese managers 
different views on JV's management 
style 
different views on JV's structure 
different views on JV's export 
percentage, and prices 
different views on Chinese employee's 
salary/wage, and bonus 
different views on Chinese employee's 
housing, meals, medical treatment, 
and holiday arrangement 
different views on setting up the Trade 
Union in the joint venture 
b. At present: 
( ) different views on expatriate general 
manager's term, income, benefits 
different views on the number of 
expatriate staff in the joint venture 
different views on the personnel 
arrangement of senior Chinese managers 
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different views on JV's management 
style 
different views on JV's structure 
different views on JV's export 
percentage, and prices 
different views on Chinese employee's 
salary/wage, and bonus 
different views on Chinese employee's 
housing, meals, medical treatment, 
and holiday arrangement 
different views on setting up the Trade 
Union in the joint venture 
- How often did these differences occur? 
- How long did these differences exist in the 
venture? 
- How did these differences be solved? 
Section 9. Joint Venture's Future Perspectives 
78 Chinese party's future perspectives: 
( ) very good 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
not optimistic 
hard to say at the moment 
will change partner 
will withdraw the capital 
79 Foreign party's future perspectives: 
( ) very good 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
not optimistic 
hard to say at the moment 
will change partner 
will withdraw the capital 
80 Is there any plan from each party to increase 
investment in the joint venture? 
) Both parties have already increased 
their investment, the total amount is: 
There is no such plan from either party 
It is possible, the total amount \Viii be 
____ % 
Appendix IV- Companies Responded the Questionnaire 
(August 1998) 
Company Names Set up No. of Sector Ownership 
time employees Chinese % Overseas % 
Liaoen Co. Ltd. 1985.11 183 Manufacturing State-owned 40 Japan 60 
Jinlun Textile 1986.03 823 Manufacturing State-owned 45 USA 55 
Aobake Co. Ltd. 1988.01 350 Manufacturing - - Japan 100 
Senxing Industrial 1988.03 350 Manufacturing - - USA 100 
Dalikai Co. Ltd. 1988.07 100 Manufacturing State-owned 65 Hong Kong 35 
Yuantian Industrial 1988.08 850 Manufacturing - - Japan 100 
Nm1h Lianhe 1989.02 500 Manufacturing State-owned 50 Hong Kong 50 
Yuandong Computer 1989.04 67 Services State-owned 40 Japan 60 
Pacific Multilayer Circuit 1989.06 420 Manufacturing State-owned 65 Hong Kong 35 
Linjingmi Casting Co. Ltd. 1989.07 553 Manufacturing - - Japan 100 
Futian Garment Co. Ltd. 1989.10 371 Manufacturing State-owned 85 Japan 15 
Dahua Electronics Co. Ltd. 1989.12 230 Manufacturing State-owned 75 Korea 25 
Jingang Garment Co. Ltd. 1990.01 530 Manufacturing State-owned 75 Hong Kong 25 
Sande Electronics Co. Ltd. 1990.02 1700 Manufacturing State-owned 15 Hong Kong 85 
Deli Medical Materials 1990.12 72 Manufacturing State-owned 75 Hong Kong 25 
Tengyan Local Food 1991.02 16 Manufacturing Private 50 Singapore 50 
Okai Leather Co. Ltd. 1991.04 116 Manufacturing State-owned 46.7 Japan 53.3 
Wanshitong Tele. Cables 1991.04 400 Manufacturing State-owned 70 USA 30 
Thermo King Refrigeration 1991 12 104 Manufacturing State-owned 30 USA 70 
North Pacific Cans 1992.01 176 Manufacturing State-owned 50 Hong Kong 50 
Sanye Fashion Co. Ltd. 1992.02 288 Manufacturing State-owned 65 Japan 35 
Chujiang Garment Co. Ltd. 1992.03 610 Manufacturing - - Hong Kong 100 
Kaida Wood Manufacture 1992.03 50 Manufacturing State-owned 50 Hong Kong 50 
Datong Garments Co. Ltd. 1992.06 580 Manufacturing State-owned 51 Hong Kong 49 
Zhineng Instruments 1992.06 30 Manufacturing State-owned 30 Hong Kong 70 
Riyu Industrial Co. Ltd. 1992.07 900 Manufacturing State-owned 79.3 Hong Kong 20.7 
Huaicheng Villa Co. Ltd. 1992.09 128 Real Estate State-owned 15 Japan 85 
Sanyang Refrigeration 1992.09 392 Manufacturing State-owned 40 Japan 60 
Industrial Land Develop. 1992.10 20 Real Estate State-owned 20 Japan 80 
Zhenpeng Indus. City 1992.10 21 Real Estate State-owned 50 Taiwan 50 
Wutian Kitchen Equipment 1992.12 19 Manufacturing State-owned 70 Japan 30 
Ellison Co. Ltd. 1993.01 320 Manufacturing State-owned 61 Sweden 39 
Huashun Kitchen Equip!. 1993.01 30 Manufacturing Private 70 Taiwan 30 
Taiyangcheng Entertainmet 1993.02 400 Restaurant State-owned 70 Hong Kong 30 
Lishile Automatic System 1993.02 22 Manufacturing Private 55 Germany 45 
Jinxing Plastic Products 1993.03 450 Manufacturing State-owned 74 Hong Kong 26 
Yuanda Building 1993.03 60 Real Estate State-owned 11 Hong Kong 89 
Gel ins ike Wood 1993.04 50 Manufacturing - - Japan 100 
Jinte Garment 1993.04 380 Manufacturing State-owned 75 Hong Kong 25 
Tianfu Kitchen Equipment 1993.04 80 Manufacturing State-owned 30 Taiwan 70 
Baolu Colour Printing 1993.05 52 Manufacturing State-owned 56 Taiwan 44 
Lanbao Fashionable Dress 1993.05 140 Manufacturing Private 64.3 Japan 35.7 
Jinli Garment Materials 1993.06 60 Manufacturing State-owned 75 Hong Kong 25 
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Company Names Set up No. of Sector Ownership 
time employees Chinese % Overseas % 
Laien System 1993.06 10 Services Private 75 USA 25 
Daguang Printing 1993.07 4 Manufacturing State-owned 25 Japan 75 
Fuhua Electronics 1993.07 5 Manufacturing State-owned 72 Taiwan 28 
Zhenhua Biological 1993.07 12 Manufacturing Private 51 Japan 49 
Changxing Casting 1993.08 100 Manufacturing State-owned 60 Hong Kong 40 
Chenggao Electronic 1993.08 8 Manufacturing Private 57 Japan 43 
Tianan Plastic Products 1993.08 58 Manufacturing State-owned 75 Hong Kong 25 
Changming Shore 1993.09 1600 Manufacturing - - Korea 100 
Haohua Kitchen Equipmt. 1993.09 56 Manufacturing State-owned 70 Hong Kong 30 
Salabuole Restaurant 1993.09 60 Restaurant State-owned 40 Korea 60 
Hongchuan Wood 1993.11 60 Manufacturing - - Hong Kong 100 
Ail ian Garment 1993.12 235 Manufacturing State-owned 75 Japan 25 
Huayang Garment 1993.12 304 Manufacturing Private 75 Hong Kong 25 
Datong Machinery 1994.01 53 Manufacturing State-owned 47 Japan 53 
Hengbin Food Products 1994.01 180 Manufacturing State-owned 50.5 Japan 49.5 
Sanyang Machinery 1994.01 145 Manufacturing Private 56 Japan 44 
Youai Family Products 1994.04 27 Manufacturing State-owned 25 Japan 75 
Wandehou Marine 1994.05 30 Manufacturing State-owned 50 Singapore 50 
Yangyu Plastic Products 1994.06 50 Manufacturing State-owned 0 Japan 100 
Weijing Fire-fighting 1994.06 268 Manufacturing State-owned 65 Hong Kong 35 
Yinghua Food 1994.07 10 Manufacturing Private 50 Japan 50 
Jianchang Foot Wear 1994.08 750 Manufacturing State-owned 16.7 Korea 83.3 
Sanan Garment 1994.08 200 Manufacturing - - Korea 100 
Jinzhuhan Garment 1994.09 350 Manufacturing - - Korea 100 
Sanyang Compressor 1994.09 150 Manufacturing State-owned 40 Japan 60 
Lingfa Food Products 1994.11 109 Manufacturing Private 75 Japan 25 
Minghua Electronics 1994.11 92 Manufacturing State-owned 30 Japan 70 
Far East Tools 1994.12 28 Manufacturing State-owned 70 USA 30 
Shangari-la Hotel 1994.12 803 Hotel/Restaurant State-owned 10 Hong Kong 90 
Huaxin Sea Food Products 1995.01 120 Manufacturing State-owned 10 Taiwan 90 
Tianlong Electronics 1995.01 6 Manufacturing Private 50 Hong Kong 50 
Mycallst Building 1995.02 100 Services - - Japan 100 
Okai Consultancy 1995.04 10 Consultancy State-owned 12 Japan 88 
Baijing Garment Co. Ltd. 1995.05 290 Manufacturing 
- - Korea 100 
Polyclad Co. Ltd. 1995.06 220 Manufacturing State-owned 30 Hong Kong 70 
Chigong Printing 1995.06 58 Manufacturing State-owned 7 Japan 93 
Dexin Wood Products 1995.06 270 Manufacturing State-owned 50 Japan 50 
Liyanmaluha Food 1995.06 76 Manufacturing 
- Japan 100 
Junhe Lift Co. Ltd. 1995.07 30 Manufacturing Private 60 Hong Kong 40 
Linde J inzhong 1995.08 122 Manufacturing State-owned 44 Germany 56 
Dayou Electronic 1995.08 15 Manufacturing State-owned 20 Korea 80 
Zhongying Precise Casting 1995.09 95 Manufacturing Private 55 Japan 45 
Washan Food Products 1995.09 150 Manufacturing State-owned 50 Japan 50 
Yuhai Lighting Products 1995.10 45 Manufacturing State-owned 50 Japan 50 
International Fashion City 1995.11 50 Real Estate State-owned 75 Hong Kong 25 
Lejinchandian Co. Ltd. 1995.11 295 Manufacturing State-owned 30 Korea 70 
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Company Names Set up No. of Sector Ownership I 
time employees Chinese % Overseas % I 
Pujin Steel Sheet Co. Ltd. 1995.11 240 Manufacturing State-owned 30 Korea 70 
Buohai Riping Machine 1996.02 420 Manufacturing State-owned 51 Japan 49 
Longtai Wood Products 1996.03 250 Manufacturing State-owned 73 Japan 27 
Y igousou Restaurant 1996.03 15 Restaurant - - Japan 100 
Lushan Health Centre 1996.05 130 Services State-owned 49 Japan 51 
Huamei Interior Design 1996.06 6 Manufacturing Private 50 Hong Kong 50 
Jinhe Wood Products 1996.09 140 Manufacturing - - Hong Kong 100 
Kaiyue Beauty/Health 1996.11 30 Services State-owned 40 Taiwan 60 
Mei1ian Advanced Tech. 1996.11 13 Services Private 55 USA 45 
Xiaoyekou Food 1996.12 180 Manufacturing State-owned 15 Japan 85 
Maoda Fashion 1997.04 250 Manufacturing Private 70 Japan 30 
Haihua Wood Products 1997.08 60 Manufacturing State-owned 66 USA 34 
Zhuyang Paper Products 1997.12 78 Manufacturing Private 54 Japan 46 
Jinhu Computer 1998.04 8 Services Private 40 Japan 60 
Note: the number of employees was recorded in August 1998. 
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Appendix V - Details of Respondents 
Company Set up time Job Title Time joining Nationality 
the JV 
Dalian Liaoen Co. Ltd. 1985.11 Deputy G. manager 1994.04 Chinese 
Dalian Jinlun Textile Co. Ltd. 1986.03 Office manager 1987.06 Chinese 
Dalian Aobake Co. Ltd. 1988.01 Accountant 1988.01 Chinese 
Dalian Senxing Industrial Co. Ltd. 1988.03 Office manager 1990.07 Chinese 
Dalian Dalikai Co. Ltd. 1988.07 Assistant G. manager 1989.05 Chinese 
Dalian Yuantian Industrial Co. Ltd. 1988.08 Assistant G. manager 1989.08 Chinese 
Dalian North Lianhe Toy Co. Ltd. 1989.02 Controller 1989.02 Chinese 
Dalian Yuandong Computer System Co. Ltd. 1989.04 Deputy G. manager 1990.03 Chinese 
Dalian Pacific Multilayer Circuit Board Co. Ltd. 1989.06 Accountant 1996.01 Chinese 
Dalian Linjingmi Casting Co. Ltd. 1989.07 Controller 1989.11 Chinese 
Dalian Futian Garment Co. Ltd. 1989.10 H. R. manager 1993.01 Chinese 
Dalian Dahua Electronics Co. Ltd. 1989.12 Office manager 1992.06 Chinese 
Dalian Jingang Garment Co. Ltd. 1990.01 Controller 1990.01 Chinese 
Dalian Sande Electronics Co. Ltd. 1990.02 Sales manager 1992.01 Chinese 
Dalian Deli Medical Materials Co. Ltd. 1990.12 General manager 1990.12 Chinese 
Dalian Tengyan Local Food Products Co. Ltd. 1991.01 Accountant 1991.01 Chinese 
Dalian Okai Leather Co. Ltd. 1991.04 General manager 1991.06 Chinese 
Dalian Wanshitong Tete. Cables Co. Ltd. I 1991.04 Deputy G. manager 1992.04 Chinese 
Dalian Thermo King Transport Refrigeration Ltd 1991.12 H. R. manager 1994.01 Chinese 
Dalian North Pacific Cans Co. Ltd. I 1992.01 Deputy G. manager 1992.01 Chinese 
Dalian Sanye Fashion Co. Ltd. I 1992.02 Office manager 1992.12 Chinese 
Dalian Chujiang Garment Co. Ltd. 1992.03 Controller 1992.09 Chinese 
Dalian Kaida Wood Manufacture Co. Ltd. 1992.03 Office manager 1992.03 Chinese 
Dalian Datong Garments Co. Ltd. I 1992.06 Accountant 1992.06 Chinese 
Dalian Zhineng Instruments and Meters Co. Ltd. 1992.06 Sales manager 1992.06 Chinese 
Dalian Riyu Industrial Co. Ltd. 1992.07 Controller 1992.07 Chinese 
Dalian Huaicheng Villa Co. Ltd. 1992.09 Deputy G. manager 1992.09 Chinese 
Dalian Sanyang Refrigeration Co. Ltd. I 1992.09 Secretary 1997.06 Chinese 
Dalian Industrial Land Development Co. Ltd. 1992.10 Deputy G. manager 1992.10 Chinese 
Dalian Zhenpeng Indus. City Develop. Co. Ltd. 1992.10 General manager 1992.10 Chinese 
Dalian Wutian Kitchen Equipment Co. Ltd. 1992.12 Department manager 1995.01 Chinese 
Dalian Ellison Co. Ltd. I 1993.01 Controller 1993.01 Chinese 
Dalian Huashun Kitchen Equipment Co. Ltd. 1993.01 Controller 1993.01 Chinese 
Dalian Taiyangcheng Entertainment Co. Ltd. 1993.02 Office manager 1993.02 Chinese 
Dalian Lishile Automatic System Co. Ltd. 1993.02 Controller 1993.02 Chinese 
Dalian Jinxing Plastic Products Co. Ltd. 1993.03 Controller 1994.08 Chinese 
Dalian Yuanda Building Co. Ltd. 1993.03 General manager 1993.03 Chinese 
Dalian Gelinsike Wood Co. Ltd. 1993.04 Accountant 1993.07 Chinese 
Dalian Jinte Garment Co. Ltd. 1993.04 Controller 1994.04 Chinese 
Dalian Tianfu Kitchen Equipment Co. Ltd. 1993.04 Controller 1993.04 Chinese 
Dalian Baolu Colour Printing Co. Ltd. 1993.05 Office manager 1993.05 Chinese 
Dalian Lanbao Fashionable Dress Co. Ltd. I 1993.05 Controller 1993.05 Chinese 
Dalian Jinli Garment Materials Co. Ltd. 1993.06 Controller 1994.07 Chinese 
Dalian Laien System Co. Ltd. 1993.06 General manager 1993.06 Chinese 
286 
Company Set up time Job Title Time joining Nationality 
the JV 
Dalian Daguang Printing Co. Ltd. 1993.07 Accountant 1995.01 Chinese 
Dalian Fuhua Electronics Co. Ltd. 1993.07 Controller 1995.08 Chinese 
Dalian Zhenhua Biological Engineering Co. Ltd. 1993.07 Deputy G. manager 1993.07 Chinese 
Dalian Changxing Casting Industrial Co. Ltd. 1993.08 Controller 1993.08 Chinese 
Dalian Chenggao Electronic Co. Ltd. 1993.08 Deputy G. manager 1993.08 Chinese 
Dalian Tianan Plastic Products Co. Ltd. 1993.08 General manager 1993.08 Chinese 
DalianChangming Shore Manufacturing Co. Ltd. I 1993.09 Controller 1993.11 Chinese 
Dalian Haohua Kitchen Equipment Co. Ltd. 1993.09 General manager 1994.01 Chinese 
Dalian Salabuole Restaurant Co. Ltd. 1993.09 Controller 1993.09 Chinese 
Dalian Hongchuan Wood Co. Ltd. 1993.11 Accountant 1993.11 Chinese 
Dalian Ail ian Gam1ent Co. Ltd. I 1993.12 Accountant 1998.01 Chinese 
Dalian Huayang Garment Co. Ltd. I 1993.12 Controller 1994.01 Chinese 
Dalian Datong Machinery Products Co. Ltd. 1994.01 General manager 1994.01 Chinese 
Dalian Hengbin Food Products Co. Ltd. I 1994.01 Controller 1994.01 Chinese 
Dalian San yang Machinery Co. Ltd. I 1994.01 Controller 1994.01 Chinese 
Dalian Youai Family Products Co. Ltd. 1994.04 Controller 1994.04 Chinese 
Dalian Wandehou Marine Engineering Co. Ltd. I 1994.05 Office manager 1993.08 Chinese 
Dalian Yangyu Plastic Products Co. Ltd. 1994.06 Controller 1996.07 Chinese 
Dalian Weijing Fire-fighting Engineering Co. 1994.06 General manager 1994.06 Chinese 
Dalian Yinghua Food Co. Ltd. 1994.07 Office staff 1995.08 Chinese 
Dalian Sanan Garment Co. Ltd. 1994.08 Accountant 1994.08 Chinese 
Dalian Jianchang Shoe Co. Ltd. I 1994.08 Controller 1995.07 Chinese 
Dalian Jinzhuhan Garment Co. Ltd. I 1994 09 Accountant 1996.01 Chinese 
Dalian Sanyang Compressor Co. Ltd. 1994.09 Office manager 1994.09 Chinese 
Dalian Ling fa Food Products Co. Ltd. 1994.11 General manager 1994.11 Chinese 
Dalian Minghua Electronics Co. Ltd. 1994.11 Office manager 1995.01 Chinese 
Dalian Far East Tools Co. Ltd. 1994.12 Controller 1994012 Chinese 
Dalian Sangari-la Hotel Co. Ltd. 1994.12 Public relation manager 1997.05 Chinese 
Dalian Huaxin Sea Food Products Co. Ltd. 1995.01 Accountant 1996.04 Chinese 
Dalian Tianlong Electronics Co. Ltd. 1995.01 Controller 1995.07 Chinese 
Dalian Mycal 1st Building Co. Ltd. 1995.04 Controller 1996.02 Chinese 
Dalian Okai Consultancy Co. Ltd. 1995.04 Department manager 1997.08 Chinese 
Dalian Baijing Garment Co. Ltd. 1995.05 Accountant 1995.05 Chinese 
Dalian Baolide Circuit Board Co. Ltd. 1995.06 Deputy G. manager 1997.02 Chinese 
Dalian Chigong Printing Co. Ltd. 1995.06 Department manager 1995.06 Chinese 
Dalian Dexin Wood Products Co. Ltd. 1995.06 Accountant 1995.06 Chinese 
Dalian Liyanmaluha Food Co. Ltd. 1995.06 Office staff 1995.06 Chinese 
Dalian Junhe Lift Co. Ltd. I 1995.07 Sales manager 1995.07 Chinese 
Dalian Linde Jinzhong Co. Ltd. 1995.08 Controller 1995.08 Chinese 
Dalian Dayou Electronic Co. Ltd. 1995.08 Controller 1996.05 Chinese 
Dalian Zhongying Precise Casting Co. Ltd. 1995.09 Office staff 1998.01 Chinese 
Dalian Washan Food Products Co. Ltd. 1995.09 Accountant 1995.09 Chinese 
Dalian Yuhai Lighting Products Co. Ltd. 1995.10 Controller 1996.06 Chinese 
Dalian International Fashion City Co. Ltd. 1995.11 Administrator 1995.11 Chinese 
Dalian Lejinchandian Co. Ltd. 1995.11 Department manager 1995.05 Chinese 
Dalian Pujin Steel Sheet Co. Ltd. 1995.11 Deputy G. manager 1995.11 Chinese 
Dalian Buohai Riping Machine Tools Co. Ltd. I 1996.02 Chief economist 1996.02 Chinese 
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Company Set up time Job Title Time joining Nationality 
the JV 
Dalian Longtai Wood Products Co. Ltd. I 1996.03 Controller 1996.07 Chinese 
Dalian Yigousou Restaurant Co. Ltd. 1996.03 General manager 1996.08 Japanese 
Dalian Lushan Health Centre Co. Ltd. I 1996.05 Deputy G. manager 1997.04 Chinese 
Dalian Huamei Interior Design Co. Ltd. 1996.06 Office manager 1996.06 Chinese 
Dalian Jinhe Wood Products Co. Ltd. I 1996.09 Accountant 1997.03 Chinese 
Dalian Kaiyue Beauty/Health Co. Ltd. 1996.11 Assist. general manager 1997.04 Chinese 
Dalian Meilian Advanced Technology Co. Ltd. 1996.11 Statistician 1996.11 Chinese 
Dalian Xiaoyekou Food Co. Ltd. 1996.12 Controller 1996.12 Chinese 
Dalian Maoda Fashion Co. Ltd. I 1997.04 Accountant 1997.07 Chinese 
Dalian Haihua Wood Products Co. Ltd. 1997.08 Accountant 1997.08 Chinese 
Dalian Zhuyang Paper Products Co. Ltd. 1997.12 Office manager 1997.12 Chinese 
Dalian J inhu Computer Co. Ltd. I 1998.04 Department manager 1998.04 Chinese 
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Appendix VI- Joint Ventures with Ownership Shares Transferred 
No.I Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1988.01 1996.10 
Aobake Chinese party 1 50 1 Japanese party I 50 Chinese party 1 0 1 Japanese party 1 100 
No.2 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1988.03 1997.03 
Senxing Chinese party 1 30 I USA I 70 Chinese party 1 0 I USA I 100 
No.3 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1988.07 1997.05 
Linjingmi Casting Chinese party 1 40 1 Japanese party 1 60 Chinese party 1 0 I Japanese I 100 
No.4 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1988.08 1997.08 
Yuantian Chinese party 1 60 1 Japanese party 1 40 Chinese party 1 0 1 Japanese party 1 100 
No.5 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1989.06 1997.03 
Pacific PC Board Chinese party 1 55 I H.K. party I 45 Chinese party I 65 I H. K. party I 35 
No.6 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1989.07 1996.10 
Lin Casting Chinese party 1 40 I Japanese I 60 Chinese party J 0 I Japanese party I 100 
No.7 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1989.10 1996.10 
Futian Garment Chinese party 1 50 1 Japanese party 1 50 Chinese party 1 85 1 Japanese party I 15 
No.8 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1990.02 1997.05 
Sande Electronics Chinese party 1 65 I H.K. party I 35 Chinese party 1 15 I H.K. party I 85 
No.9 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1991.04 1997.03 
Okai Leather Chinese party 1 47.62 1 Japanese party 1 52.38 Chinese party 1 46.72 1 Japanese party I 53.38 
No.IO Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1992.02 1997.08 
Sanye Fashion Chinese pmty 1 35 1 Japanese party 1 65 Chinese party 1 65 1 Japanese patty I 35 
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No.ll Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1992.03 1997.06 
Chujiang Garment Chinese party 1 51 I H.K. party I 49 Chinese party 1 0 I H.K. party I 100 
No.t2 Ownership In early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1993.04 1997.09 
Gelinsike Wood Chinese party 1 40 1 Japanese party 1 60 Chinese party 1 0 1 Japanese party I 100 
No.t3 0\vnership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1993.08 1998.03 
Changxing Casting Chinese party 1 60 I Hong Kong I 40 Chinese party 1 20 1 Japanese party I 80 
No.l4 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1993.08 1998.05 
Chenggao Chinese party 1 60 1 Japanese party 1 40 Chinese party 1 57 1 Japanese party I 43 
No.l5 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1993.09 19987.08 
Changming Shoes Chinese party 1 50 1 Korean party I 50 Chinese party 1 0 I Korean party I 100 
No.l6 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1993.11 199805 
Hongchuan Chinese party 1 50 I H.K. party I 50 Chinese party 1 0 I H.K. party I 100 
No.l7 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1994.01 1998.07 
Hengbi Food Chinese party 1 49 1 Japanese party 1 51 Chinese party 1 50.5 1 Japanese party 1 49.5 
No. IS Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1994.01 1997.10 
Sanyang Machinery Chinese party 1 75 1 Japanese party 1 25 Chinese party 1 56 1 Japanese party I 44 
No.l9 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1994.05 1997.09 
Wandehou Chinese party 1 75 l Singapore I 25 Chinese pa.ty 1 50 I Singapore I 50 
No.20 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1994.06 1997.10 
Yangyu Plastic Chinese party 1 50 I Japanese I 50 Chinese party 1 0 .I Japanese party I 100 
No.2 I Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1994.07 1998.03 
Yinghua Food Chinese party I 43 1 Japanese party 1 57 Chinese party 1 50 1 Japanese party I 50 
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No.22 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1994.08 1997.09 
Sanan Garment Chinese party 1 30 1 Korean party I 70 Chinese party 1 0 I Korean party I 100 
No.23 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1994.08 1998.04 
Jianchange Shoes Chinese party 1 25 1 Korean party I 75 Chinese party 1 16.7 1 Korean party I 83.3 
No.24 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1994.09 1997.08 
Jinzhuhan Gam1ent Chinese party 1 50 1 Korean party I 50 Chinese party 1 0 I Korean party I 100 
No.25 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1995.01 1997.10 
Huaxin Sea Food Chinese party 1 90 1 Taiwan party 1 10 Chinese party 1 10 I Taiwan party I 90 
No.26 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1995.02 1998.07 
Mycal lst Chinese party 1 50 I Japanese I 50 Chinese party 1 0 1 Japanese party I 100 
No.27 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1995.05 1998.05 
Baijing Garment Chinese party 1 50 1 Korean party I 50 Chinese party 1 0 I Korean party I 100 
No.28 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1995.06 1998.03 
Baolide PC Board Chinese party 1 35 I H.K. party I 65 Chinese party 1 30 I H.K. party I 70 
No.29 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1995.06 1998.05 
Chigong Printing Chinese party 1 49 1 Japanese party 1 51 Chinese party 1 7 1 Japanese party I 93 
No.30 Ownership In early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1995.06 1997.08 
Liyanmaluha Chinese party 1 50 I Japanese I 50 Chinese party 1 0 1 Japanese party I 100 
No.31 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1996.09 1998.03 
Jinhe Wood Chinese party 1 50 I H.K. party I 50 Chinese party 1 0 I H.K party I 100 
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No.32 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1996.11 1998.07 
Kaiyue Chinese party 1 60 1 Taiwan party I 40 Chinese party 1 40 I Taiwan party I 60 
No.33 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1996.12 1997.11 
Xiaoyekou Food Chinese party 1 35 1 Japanese party 1 65 Chinese party I 15 1 Japanese party I 85 
No.34 Ownership in early stage Ownership at present 
Company 1998.04 1998.07 
Jinhu Computer Chinese party 1 60 1 Japanese party 1 40 Chinese party 1 40 1 Japanese party I 60 
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